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American SOCIOLOGICAL Review

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SOCIOLOGISTS AND THE PEACE*

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG
Bennington College

A MAJOR portion of this program is devoted to the expression of hopes and fears for the post-war era. We are wondering what are the prospects of realizing some small dividend in improved social relations in return for the investment of life, time, and resources. The degrees of hopefulness of such a dividend vary. I have heard no expectation of an early millennium. On the contrary, as the military situation and all the excitement and animal emotion accompanying the fight recede from the foreground, the problems which gave rise to the war emerge through the smoke and the wreckage in no way simplified by the Roman holiday in which we have indulged. There stand the problems like the bills with interest, which you could postpone paying while on vacation, but can no longer postpone. In short, we may now soon return to where we left off twenty-five years ago, except that the problems then facing us have been immensely aggravated.

Nor is there any ground for believing that the settlement this time can be very much more satisfactory than in 1919. There has not been in the meantime a sufficient change in the conditions that determine a peace settlement. These conditions are, broadly speaking, the following: First, the social sciences must have advanced to a point where they could reliably specify the re-

quirements of an enduring peace. Second, social scientists must have attained such public respect that their voices would be influential at the peace table. To what extent do these conditions exist?

Even if we contend that social scientists today know a great deal about the requirements for a durable peace, there is absolutely no reason to believe that their counsels will be heeded. It is not my purpose here to bewail that fact. I prefer rather to consider what we must do before the voice of social scientists can have an influence in social organization comparable to the influence of physical scientists in physical arrangements. I assume it is self-evident that a desirable peace settlement involves primarily a knowledge of sociological subject matter. All sociologists, at least, will presumably agree. We believe that knowledge of the type which sociologists possess, or aspire to, is an essential and a technical requirement for a satisfactory peace just as the knowledge that physical scientists possess is necessary for modern war. This fact is not yet generally recognized. The physical scientist was at a disadvantage for some centuries against the nostrums, short-cuts, and panaceas of the magician. So the social scientist is today at a disadvantage against those who, if you will only vote for them, propose to secure for all men everywhere in our time social conditions which every social scientist knows can be approached if at all only through centuries of development and application of their science. But on the

* Presidential Address before the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, New York, December 4, 1943.

whole, there is no doubt that the faith in social as in physical magic is waning. As the pinch increases, the likelihood is that man will turn more and more in his social predicaments to that approach, namely science, which he has found effective in his other plights. Social scientists might better anticipate this eventuality so that they may have something substantial to offer when they are called upon.

This call does not come suddenly. We have already been called upon to some extent. Sociologists as well as other social scientists, however, are likely on occasions such as the present to feel that they and their advice are being largely ignored in public affairs. It is pointed out, and correctly, that if this and that advice of scholars had been followed, dire consequences of war and depression could have been avoided. If it happens that the course which was pursued was also dictated by one of our colleagues, we merely point out that bad judgment was exercised in the choice of a scientist.

This suggests our first problem, namely, how to trade-mark a true social scientist so that a public official can identify him on some other basis than the recommendation of politicians, the popularity of his writings, the accidents of personal friendship, or whatever the present basis is. The medical and the legal professions have established standards under the supervision of the state. The American Sociological Society has thus far been unable to define a professional sociologist. Supposedly he would be a person possessed of special skill and training, as contrasted with anyone else who also has six dollars and spends it for dues to the Society. If sociologists take this indifferent view of themselves, public officials can hardly be blamed if they do not regard sociologists as people of any special authority. The anthropologists are rated somewhat more highly at a time like this because of their familiarity with out-of-the-way places and queer people on which we are in process of imposing the four freedoms. The same is true of economists for somewhat different reasons. But it is perhaps fair to say that all social scientists are taken no more seriously than they

are today because they have not succeeded in developing among themselves adequate professional criteria, and in convincing the public that they possess the special qualifications they think they possess. It is futile to abuse the public for not being able to distinguish us from politicians, clergymen, journalists, novelists, poets, and wise men generally, as long as we ourselves are in doubt about the criteria which distinguish us from these dopesters.

The public will become interested in us when we identify ourselves by sufficiently evident and unique professional skills, and can point to a record of demonstrated superiority to the word mongers whose magic today formulates public policy and enchants the public. It is useless to bewail our handicaps. The unquestioned authority which physical scientists enjoy today in their respective fields had to be achieved by this same painful process of demonstrated superior performance as against the medicine men, the alchemists, and the astrologers. It took scientists generations to achieve their present status. We must expect to follow their rough road. When we develop and demonstrate the quality of our goods, a long-suffering public will be glad to lean more heavily on our advice, although we must expect some additional time to elapse before even a demonstrably superior article gains acceptance.

This conclusion, then, poses our principal problems, namely, (1) to develop demonstrably superior knowledge and techniques and (2) to gain public acceptance of them. Both require attention. In spite of what has been said about the inventors of mouse traps living in the deepest forest and the world making a beaten path to their door, it remains a fact that many excellent inventions get nowhere for the lack of sufficient advertising to change people's habits. It is true that we must develop a reliable science before we can expect people to become interested in it. But so far as the immediate situation is concerned, our problem is how to gain the public acceptance of what we already know. I shall consider first, therefore, the nature of the obstacles we have to overcome before even what social

scientists know today can be brought to bear on public affairs.

II

The story of the transition to a naturalistic, as contrasted with a supernaturalistic, view of man and his social relations is too familiar to require recapitulation. Unfortunately, the revolution of which Comte and Darwin became the publicly accredited agents is by no means yet completed. Let us consider some aspects of the transition to be achieved.

What is the principal survival of a pre-scientific orientation in contemporary society and even in the social sciences? Briefly, the principal surviving pre-scientific thought-way is a legalistic and moralistic viewpoint anchored in theology. The phenomenon as it operates in our international relations has been admirably summarized by Spykman as follows:

The heritage of seventeenth-century Puritanism is responsible for one of the characteristic features of our approach to international relations. Because of its concern with ethical values, it has conditioned the nation to a predominantly moral orientation. It makes our people feel called upon to express moral judgments about the foreign policy of others and demand that our president shall transform the White House into an international pulpit from which mankind can be scolded for the evil of its ways. The heritage of eighteenth century rationalism has contributed another characteristic feature, a legalistic approach, and a faith in the compelling power of the reason of the law. This almost instinctive preference for a moral and legal outlook on international affairs tends to obscure for the American people the underlying realities of power politics.¹

It would be easy to collect a volume of illustrations of how this viewpoint frustrates the social sciences at every turn. Now obviously everybody concedes the importance of both law and morals in all societies. I am talking about a superstitious and perverted notion regarding the source and nature of these rules. Considerable maladjustment often results. To begin with a minor illustra-

tion we find, for example, large numbers of organized and articulate Jews in their unhappy predicament devoting themselves to legalistic and moralistic conjurings so that their attention is entirely diverted from a realistic approach. They demand legislation prohibiting criticism and they demand international action outlawing anti-Semitism, instead of reckoning with the causes of the antagonism. They wallow in oratory about inalienable rights. One would think that if recent events had shown anything, they have shown that there are no such things as *inalienable* rights. The only rights we know about are those which a community from time to time chooses to grant and respect. The processes by which a community accords rights have long been well understood by anthropologists and sociologists, Jewish as well as Gentile. But their voices are never heard among the clamor of rabbis, showmen, and journalists who, if one may judge from the results, are much more interested in their own emotional displays than they are in the welfare of the Jewish people. That the above remarks will probably be decried as anti-Semitic by these same firebrands is perhaps the best evidence of how a primitive, moralistic, theological, legalistic attitude obstructs a scientific and effective approach.²

Another cultural minority invokes the same viewpoint in a recent statement declaring that "no nation has, under God, authority to invade family freedom, abrogate private ownership or impede, to the detriment of the common good, economic enterprise, cooperative undertaking for mutual welfare and organized works of charity sponsored by groups of citizens."³ Without

¹ This remark was immediately corroborated by an interruption from the audience by a gentleman who apparently was moved to call attention to certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States. Other manifestations of disapproval from three or four members further corroborated the prediction contained in my statement. This curious group seems to experience a thrill of achievement when they succeed in imputing anti-Semitism to the best friends of the Jews, and further spread the unfortunate impression that Jews, unlike other cultural groups, can not be criticized on any score without laying the critic open to the charge of being a sinister character.

² "Catholic Statement on Peace Essentials" by

³ N. J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1942, p. 216.

presuming to understand what may be meant by the phrase "under God" and without expressing an opinion on the qualifications and authority of the Catholic hierarchy to define the "common good," I merely call attention to the sociological fact that all nations throughout history have "invaded" and "impeded" human "freedom," "private ownership," and "economic enterprise" and they will in all probability continue to exercise these inevitable functions of social organization. We here sharply encounter the basic issue, namely, whether the authority and rights of sovereign nations shall be defined by various charismatic gentlemen purporting to speak for supernatural authority or by man's earthly experience as analyzed and interpreted by scientists.

Or consider the curious character of much sociological discussion about something which is called "Values." Some current discussions of "Values" imply that they are something beyond the reach of ordinary scientific methods. Why? Because values have for centuries been regarded as determined outside of the natural universe, or at least by mysterious mechanisms such as soul, mind, or conscience with which even sociologists until recently have been much preoccupied. There is in fact nothing unique about human values as a subject for scientific study. Data regarding man's values, i.e. his valuing behavior, are inextricably bound up in the data of all the social sciences. Science deals with them exactly as it deals with other behavioral data.⁴

As further illustrations of the survival in social science of the legalistic-moralistic orientation, consider the present discussions of justice, authority and freedom. The word justice today refers to a set of feelings about contemporary affairs projected on a framework of primitive theology. In fact, the

the Administrative Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference at the direction of the Archbishops and Bishops who attended the annual meeting in New York Nov., 1943, as reported in the *New York Times*, Nov. 14, 1943, p. 44.

⁴I have elaborated this viewpoint in "What To Do With the Humanities," *Harper's Magazine*, June 1943 (especially pp. 70-71); and "The Future of the Social Sciences," *The Scientific Monthly*, 53: 346-359, Oct. 1941.

gratification of this feeling is more important to many people than is world peace and other ends with which we also profess to be concerned. Actually, "the only practical criterion of the justice of a treaty is the intensity of the desire to change it."⁵ Imagine introducing that notion of justice at the end of the war! Yet this is the only type of justice relevant to the ends in which we profess to be interested.

This mystical attitude toward justice is mischievous. It is as if engineers became primarily interested in the justice of a landslide instead of in the angle of rest of the surrounding terrain. Of course, the sense of justice, however absurd and primitive in any community, has to be reckoned with as part of the situation with which we are confronted. The point is that while we must take into consideration even the most antiquated feelings of justice that may exist, scientists cannot accept these notions as a guide to policy when they contravene the very ends at which justice itself professes to aim.

Very similar is the preoccupation with a highly subjective and relative concept called freedom. The theological and metaphysical nonsense which currently characterizes discussions of this concept must delight whatever gods may be. Actually, the term is used to designate that feeling-tone which an individual experiences when his habits are relatively in accord with the restrictions of his environment. In short, men are free when they feel free. They feel free when they are thoroughly habituated to their way of life. It follows that within the limits of human conditioning, the feeling of freedom is compatible with an almost unlimited variety of social conditions. Now sociologists perhaps more than any other group, have been diligent in pointing out the wide limits of human conditioning and the doubtfulness of the doctrine that man is born with penchants for any particular kind of social order. Men apparently like the social order that ministers to the habits they have formed. Yet when social scientists in this country profess to render scientific counsel on practical ques-

⁵N. J. Spykman, *op. cit.*, p. 465.

tions of world organization, they forget this fact. As a result, their advice is grossly corrupted with their own cultural preferences for democracy. I have no objections to these preferences, and usually share them myself. What I object to is pretending that these preferences are scientific conclusions.

The logical inference from some of the current discussion about democracy seems to be that every man should be a social scientist. No such assumption is made with respect to the physical world. The authority of physical scientists is blindly accepted. A similar attitude toward the conclusions of social scientists is suspected of being authoritarian, as indeed it probably is. We need to recognize that it is not authority as such that we need fear but incompetent and unwisely constituted authority. When we undertake to insist on the same criteria of authority in the social as in the physical sciences, no one will worry about the delegation of that authority, any more than he worries about the physician's authority. All persons who presume to speak with authority will be expected to submit credentials of training and character of the type that physicians and other professionals now submit, and *to the state*, at that.⁵ This will hold for all would-be authorities whatsoever, whether they purport to speak for God or for nature. Those who are more interested in labelling an idea with an epithet than in examining its validity or in refuting it, will doubtless find this idea authoritarian, Fascist, and what not. Let them reflect that namecalling has a way of becoming tiresome in the long run and frequently operates as a boomerang. Namecalling is soon recognized for what it is, namely, an attempt to distract attention from something one is afraid to examine.

The various "grass roots" movements suffer from this unwarranted fear of authority. It is proposed to take people from the football game, the movie and the shooting gallery to attend neighborhood meetings

in order to be "guided" and instructed by some usually self-appointed "leader" on the intricacies of the international situation, monetary policy, or corporation finance. I think it was the late Heywood Broun who said that one of the greatest weaknesses of socialism was the number of evenings per week it required for meetings. This is supposed to be the eternal vigilance which is the price of liberty. When it can be shown to have some observable relation to liberty instead of being a curtailment thereof, people will probably put up with it and find it no burden. They will not put up with it under present conditions because it is clearly not related to any desired result at all.

Under these conditions the common man will correctly look for other means of guarding his interests. He assures himself today as far as possible against malpractice on the part of engineers, electricians, doctors, lawyers, and teachers by requiring them to qualify according to state regulated criteria. He thereupon gives his authorities and technicians a free hand and holds them responsible for results. Most of the multifarious duties of the private citizen today will, I predict, go this way in the not too distant future. For some time past, the "ward healer" has functioned as a sort of informal, unofficial social worker to relieve the citizen of some of his obligations as a citizen. More recently, the laboring man has decided or has had it decided for him, that his interests are better represented even by thugs who often function without authority or license from the larger community. This can happen anywhere on a national scale when the pressure becomes sufficient. If scientists do not take over, charlatans will.

The trend mentioned above is, of course, merely a transition toward the responsible performance by scientists under the auspices and authority of the state of certain functions hitherto imposed upon each citizen. Of course, there is much worry about the state these days. People talk as if the state were a big animal of some sort which, if we don't watch out, may suddenly swallow us. In the meantime, I notice that those who are yelling most loudly about the form of the state in other countries, are

⁵ The state may in turn *delegate* the function of formulating and administering these requirements back into the hands of members of the profession concerned. This does not alter the importance of retaining the ultimate authority in the hands of the community's accredited governmental agency.

themselves busily engaged in extending the functions of their own state. Now, I have an open mind as to the proper or desirable function of the state, because these questions depend upon how the state is constituted and upon the level of scientific development.⁶ But I have no doubt at all that I prefer the authority of a properly constituted state to what seems to be the alternative, namely, private and self-constituted legislatures, police, and courts as they occur among employers, labor unions, and churches. Even learned societies occasionally get the notion that they are proper courts and that the plaintiff is sufficient witness to decide whether he as a member has been unjustly discharged from his job.

This state of affairs is quite natural and perhaps fortunate in the sense that some leadership or some solution is better than none. When people are in trouble, they will look for a savior. Now there are certain temperaments in all countries which enjoy action on the basis of guess, magic, astrology or their own intuition. These are likely to come into power especially in periods of crises. They are likely to surround themselves with seers, poets, playwrights, and others alleged to possess these powers of "seeing." The idea is a sound one. The only reform needed is a substitution of scientists for these soothsayers and soothseers.

Fortunately, distinguished physical scientists are also beginning to take that view of the matter. This is the more important in view of the fact that the primitive sociological views of some of the leaders in

physical science have hitherto been an obstacle to the development of social science in the very places where the most influential and valuable technical support should be forthcoming. We welcome, therefore, the following recent statement from Dr. Frank B. Jewett, President of the National Academy of Sciences in collaboration with Dr. Robert W. King. After reviewing the need in statecraft of something corresponding to the research laboratory in industry, these scientists conclude:

It seems likely that we are well launched upon an era during which all the existing advisory aids to the government, as well as others still to be created, will have to function with increasing vigor. Such an arrangement will not savor of bureaucracy. The sovereign people will still remain sovereign. But belated and constructive recognition will have been given to the fact, now abundantly clear, that they day is gone, and probably forever, when a successful state can base its policies upon clamor of pressure groups or upon the uninformed beliefs of the majority, even though measured numerically by tens of millions.⁷

When this realization becomes more general, Massachusetts and California Institutes of Technology, to mention only two, may give as much attention to social as to physical science. What is more, such institutions devoted primarily or entirely to social science will begin to appear. A single such institution devoting itself seriously to the social sciences could transform them into reliable and respected guides of social action in a single generation.

III

So far I have dealt chiefly with the negative side of the picture, namely, what social scientists must desist from doing if they are to rise to the occasion to which the course of events has called them. What must we do on the positive side?

Before answering this question, let us review briefly some of the conspicuous achievements of the past ten or fifteen years.

⁶In fact, current discussions of the state are of significance perhaps chiefly as an indication of the inability or disinclination of the discussors to think except in terms of rather primitive stereotypes. Witness the preoccupation of even would-be social scientists with the various "isms" that are always current. There is from a practical or a scientific viewpoint no necessity of making any blanket commitments as to the proper functions of the state. Nations have always adjusted these functions to suit changing situations and they will doubtless continue to do so. As a red herring to distract attention from more serious issues, current emotional discussions of the state are, of course, very helpful. In the meantime we may note the fine tolerance with which we regard a number of totalitarian states as long as they are on our side.

⁷F. B. Jewett and R. W. King, "Engineering Progress and the Social Order." An address delivered before the Section on Natural Sciences of the University of Pennsylvania Bicentennial Conference, Philadelphia, September 19, 1940.

In the first place, it should be recognized that the chaos of unrelated projects, large and small, from doctors' theses to the gaudier studies supported by the foundations, constitute a not inconsiderable contribution. It is true that most of them have no avowed relation whatever to scientific theory. This could hardly be otherwise at this stage of our scientific development. Nevertheless, these unrelated projects, these little bits of partial knowledge about small segments of particular situations, constitute raw material which may some day suggest to us the larger theory that encompasses them. It is true that endless surveys of the negro, of delinquency, of particular communities and current problems will not of themselves ever produce a science of sociology. Such projects must be carried on in the future with reference to more clearly stated hypotheses so that the results will bear not only on the immediate problem which gave rise to the study, but will also contribute to general knowledge of principles. But taken altogether, these projects represent material of considerable value both in practical adjustments and as sources of scientific hypotheses.

Most important and systematic of the research of this general type is that in the field of population and demography. Since some aspects of population study have been organized on a large scale for some time, we tend to take them for granted. Any survey of the present status of sociological research must recognize, however, the leading importance of this field. The ordinary census material and vital statistics are indispensable in all kinds of practical daily affairs. The expansion of the work of the Census Bureau, the establishment of census tracts in cities, and a multitude of other developments in this field are of inestimable importance to scientific sociological research in a variety of other fields. Finally, demographic research has provided the model and the methods for much research in other fields. The notion of reliable prediction of social phenomena which has progressed so notably in the past ten years, was first developed in demography. The whole trend toward quantification of social data and the adoption in sociology of the general approach of the

other sciences undoubtedly derived more impetus from developments in demography than from any other source. Since a rapid swing in this direction is by far the most important development of the past decade, some of the implications and ramifications of that development should be briefly reviewed.

Population statistics provide today the only existing record of millions of systematic observations of human behavior. As a result, we have had for some decades in the field of demography broad generalizations that measure up comparatively well to the standard of scientific principles. Theories and conclusions regarding the conditions determining the characteristics and behavior of human populations were the first to achieve a scientific level, and we shall do well to consider the reasons for the relatively advanced state of sociological knowledge in this field.

It is generally agreed that demography has prospered by virtue of the fact that it early arrived at sharp definitions of units, engaged in large scale observation and recording of these units, and has handled these data according to the accepted quantitative methods employed by all the sciences. Curiously enough, these facts are taken in some quarters to indicate the irrelevance rather than the relevance of demographic methods for other sociological problems. After all, it is pointed out, demographic data *are* quantitative. Here crops up the old assumption that some data are by nature quantitative, others not. The assumption is so thoroughly untenable in the light of the history of quantification that we shall perhaps hear of it no more in serious discussion. In this connection we must record as a most conspicuous and important achievement of the last decade the passing of the argument about statistics and quantitative methods. The rising generation simply will not argue about it. The only reason that scientists in any field have become interested in mathematics is that they have found it useful and necessary in stating intricate relationships and in handling large numbers of observations. That is also the only reason sociologists have turned to mathematics. Yet some critics

still regard this interest as "esoteric" and imply that sociologists who explore the possible contributions of mathematics to sociology do so from motives of malice, superstition, or sport. The rising generation will regard training in statistical methods somewhat as they regard reading today. They will be interested, as statisticians always have been, in the techniques of quantification, especially in new fields, and in the rules of legitimate inference from data. But they will no longer argue whether it is possible to generalize or predict from a single case, or about such misconceptions as is implied in the phrase "case study *versus* the statistical method."⁸ They will devote themselves instead to the methods which have been so productive in the fields of our highest achievement, not only in sociology but also in the other sciences.

With the disappearance of the notion that social phenomena were divided by God into two categories, those that can be quantified and those which cannot, a vigorous experimental movement in the construction of scales, tests, indices and other measuring instruments has appeared in sociology and in psychology.⁹ Indeed, the advance here in the last ten years probably far surpasses the

achievements of all previous history in this type of measurement of social phenomena. It was inevitable that many of these instruments should be defective and that principles governing their validation should be inadequately understood at first. It was also to be expected that as a result of the great interest in this direction, these principles would themselves be more adequately formulated. Such has in fact been the case. Guttman's¹⁰ recent work in the field will, I predict, render obsolete a great deal of recent argument about scales and the measurement of hitherto untouchable phenomena.

Since I have indicated that these developments were largely suggested by previous developments in the field of demography, the effect of these developments on demography itself should be noted. The boundaries of that field have hitherto been defined in terms not so much of subject matter as in terms of whether the data were quantified or not.¹¹ At first demography consisted chiefly of statistics of population size, density, age, sex, and vital rates. More recently conspicuous demographic studies have dealt with social characteristics of populations, such as the distribution of wealth, occupations, mobility, illiteracy and intelligence. With the new instruments for measuring opinion, attitude, status, social participation, social expansiveness, and the whole field of communication and interpersonal relations, these fields become eligible for inclusion in demography as types of study on a scientific level comparable to the better studies of population characteristics and movements.

The effect of all these developments has been to make possible in sociology understanding and prediction in fields hitherto regarded as chaotic, inscrutable, or at best determinable only by mysterious powers of

*See the symposium on his subject by E. W. Burgess, S. A. Stouffer, L. S. Cottrell, Jr., S. A. Queen, G. B. Vold, and G. A. Lundberg in *Sociometry*, 4: 329-383, November 1941.

The epitaph on the controversy has been written recently by T. Sarbin in his paper "A Contribution to the Study of Actuarial and Individual Methods of Prediction," *American Journal of Sociology*, 48: 593-602, 1943.

⁹For a summary of the recent developments in this field, including 200 references, concerning only the period 1937-39, see Daniel Day, "Methods in Attitude Research," *American Sociological Review*, 5: 395-410, 1940. See also F. S. Chapin, "Trends in Sociometrics and Critique," *Sociometry*, 3: 245-262, July 1940. For detailed treatments of scale construction, see W. H. Sewell, *The Construction and Standardization of a Scale for the Measurement of Socio-Economic Status of Oklahoma Farm Families*. Oklahoma A & M College, Technical Bulletin No. 9, Stillwater, Okla., 1940. Also, by the same author, "The Development of a Sociometric Scale," *Sociometry*, 5: 279-297, 1942. Also, F. S. Chapin, *The Measurement of Social Status*, University of Minnesota Press, 1933. Reprinted with revisions 1936.

¹⁰L. Guttman, "A Basis for Scaling Quantitative Data," to be published shortly in the April *American Sociological Review*.

¹¹Cf. *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, V, pp. 85-86, which defines demography as "the numerical analysis of the state and movement of human population inclusive of census enumeration and registration of vital processes and of whatever quantitative statistical analysis can be made of the state and movement of population on the basis of fundamental census and registration data."

¹²See S. Cottrell, Jr., *Prediction in Research*, Moreno Configuration Bibliography of the S (1942).

insight, empathy or clairvoyance. Indeed, the progress in the technique of prediction and measurement in a number of new fields involving interpersonal relations, must be regarded as among the most notable achievements of the past decade.¹²

The tremendous development of scales, tests, and other measuring instruments in the last decade has conspicuously advanced research and predictive power in the fields of social status, communication, and interpersonal relations. In short, our advance in sociological knowledge, as in other departments of an evolving culture, has depended largely on the invention of instruments and tools. As in the other sciences these tools have been largely of a statistical and mathematical character. As in the other sciences, also, these developments have forced us to consider the nature and limitations of our most ancient and traditional tools, namely, the words of the language that have come down to us from pre-scientific times. Outstanding in importance among the developments of the last decade, therefore, has been the awakening of widespread interest in semantics. Dealing as it does with the sociologically fundamental phenomenon of communication, the interest in semantics will greatly facilitate the emancipation of sociological theory from the metaphysical and mentalistic toils in which it has suffered down to the present time.

The abandonment of the arguments about quantification noted above is, of course, itself an example of the discovery that the categories in a language do not represent inherent divisions in nature. Special cases, however, are frequently the clue to the discovery of a more general principle. Thus it happens that the work on scales and indices of particular social phenomena, which has made such outstanding progress in the last decade,

coincides with and reinforces a considerable interest in general semantics on the part of philosophy, literature, and science. The development is easily the most important in recent times. There is not a major controversy in sociology which cannot be shown to be largely based upon the semantic immaturity of one or more of the participants. The overt evidence of the awakening of this fact in sociology is found in a more general self-consciousness about the sociological vocabulary and a desire to define its words more rigorously. As a rudimentary beginning, a Dictionary of Sociology has appeared this year. A Committee on Conceptual Integration was established some years ago in the American Sociological Society to consider more rigorous and detailed work. While floundering badly at first on account of its own semantic handicaps, the Committee has at least called attention to the crucial nature of the problem with which it wrestles.¹³ The need for semantic ministrations to sociologists is apparent on practically every page of their theoretical writings.

The type of research I have reviewed is not generally regarded as chiefly a contribution to sociological theory. Yet its principal significance is precisely that it has revealed to sociologists the true nature of scientific theory and has exposed the type of verbalization that has hitherto passed for sociological theory. The notion has been current among us that sociological theory consists of the history of social thought or a kind of social philosophy which frequently is not even sound philosophy. It has been quite generally and erroneously assumed that sociological theory must consist of the discovery and re-discovery, the translation and retranslation of sacred texts, and that unless theory relates itself somehow to Marx, Weber, Durkheim or Pareto, it is *ipso facto* not sociological theory, or at least not good theory. This notion is so deepseated that it probably will

¹² See, for example, E. W. Burgess and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*, Prentice-Hall, 1939. Paul Horst, Editor, *The Prediction of Personal Adjustment*, Social Science Research Council Bulletin, 48, 1941, Part II. J. L. Moreno and H. H. Jennings, "Statistics of Social Configurations," *Sociometry*, 1: 342-374. See also *Bibliography of Sociometric Literature* (Bulletin of the Sociometric Institute, 101 Park Ave., N.Y., 1942).

¹³ See G. A. Lundberg, "Operational Definitions in the Social Sciences," *American Journal of Sociology*, 47: 727-743, 1942. Also, S. C. Dodd, "Operational Definitions Operationally Defined," *American Journal of Sociology*, 48: 482-489, 1943. Also, H. Hart, "Some Methods for Improving Sociological Definitions," *American Sociological Review*, 8: 333-342, 1943.

be with us for some time yet. People still review books on the basis of whether the sacred names are mentioned, and note as a reproof the fact that a book devoted chiefly to the logic and methods of science contains only two references to Durkheim while it mentions Einstein thirteen times.¹⁴ But this practice is on the wane. Students will increasingly recognize that mere verbalization about social phenomena in the abstract is not necessarily sociological theory. Neither will they mistake mere obscurity for profundity nor measure the comprehensiveness of a theory by the number of pages required to state it. Furthermore, it will be recognized that any theory which involves for its testing conditions which are impossible is not a scientific but a metaphysical theory.

Instead, we shall see more work of the

¹⁴ Examples of this and other misapprehensions of what is relevant to the discussion in question will be found in L. White, "Sociology, Physics, and Mathematics," *American Sociological Review*, 8: 373-379. In addition to the detail mentioned in the text, this author is also concerned about the old fear that if social scientists draw upon the logic and symbolism of the other sciences, there is danger that the framework of physics may be imposed upon the social sciences. I have elsewhere tried to dispel this curious idea. (See "Regionalism, Science and the Peace Settlement," *Social Forces*, 21: 133). Nor is he entirely reassured by the fact that writers who think we have much to learn from the other sciences nevertheless finally come around to such familiar concepts as mores, conflict, and socialization. He rather suspects that this was an unintentional slip and an inconsistency. Chemists and biologists will be interested to hear that their sciences are "essentially non-mathematical," whatever that means. Sociologists as well as other scientists have become interested in mathematics only in so far as they find it useful in describing relationships and in orderly generalizations from numbers of observations, and in the latter respect, at least, all sciences are "essentially" mathematical. The old worry about mathematics appears to have been aggravated by the appearance of S. C. Dodd's *Dimensions of Society* (Macmillan 1942). Several reviewers who mistook the nature of Dodd's undertaking although it was clearly announced in his book, will be relieved to find that he was engaged in quite a different project than they imagined. (See, S. C. Dodd, "Of What Use is Dimensional Sociology?", *Social Forces*, December, 1943.) In the meantime, another social scientist, considering Dodd's book for what it is, namely a system of hypotheses for improved definition of concepts and methodology, finds it with-

type represented, for example, by Stouffer's theory relating mobility and distance. Stouffer proposed the hypothesis that "*the number of persons going a given distance is directly proportional to the number of opportunities at that distance and inversely proportional to the number of intervening opportunities.*"¹⁵ After rigorously defining all the terms and stating the theory as a mathematical equation, it is painstakingly tested by actual data.

Now I know that some will be surprised that I cite Stouffer's work as example of sociological theory. For there are many who apparently distinguish theory only by whether or not there are mathematical expressions in it. Nevertheless, I regard Stouffer's monograph as perhaps the past decade's finest example of how to build sociological theory. He starts with observable human behavior and considers various hypotheses as to how it could be explained and generalized. He final-

out reservation "an exceptionally good book." (See, J. G. Smith (Princeton), in *American Economic Review*, December, 1942.) See also W. S. Robinson (Columbia) in *Pol. Sci. Quarterly*, 57: 453-455, Sept. 1942.

¹⁵ S. A. Stouffer, "Intervening Opportunities: A Theory Relating Mobility and Distance," *American Sociological Review*, 5: 845-867, 1940. See also a corroboration of the theory by D. S. Thomas, "Interstate Migration and Intervening Opportunities," *American Sociological Review*, 6: 773-783, 1941. See also, J. Q. Stewart, "The Influence of a Population at a Distance," *Sociometry*, 5: 63-71, 1942.

Stouffer's modest statement regarding his theory should be considered by all social scientists: "This paper seeks to make an addition to sociological theory by proposing a conceptual framework for attacking the problem of distance. The theory is offered as a key which may open at least an outer door, although like any simple abstract theory it may require considerable elaboration and modification if it is to explain a wide variety of actual events. The writer believes that what sociology most needs is basic theories which can be so stated that verification in particular cases is possible. Therefore, painstaking effort has been made to test the theory in a particular case. If other studies confirm the success of this initial effort at verification, we have here a modest formulation of a new sociological law. The ultimate utility of the abstract theory will be determined by the variety and abundance of concrete situations in which it proves helpful in providing at least an initial ordering of thinking and of data."

ly arrives at one hypothesis stated in rigorous mathematical terms, and shows that it conforms remarkably well to the data against which it has been checked to date. Others have tested and are testing the theory in other places and settings. It is from numerous particular and detailed studies of this kind that increasingly comprehensive theories become possible.

I refer to the above study not because it is the only one. It represents, however, the most clear-cut example of a type of procedure which is destined both to produce and to test the sociological theories of the future. We have been working in this direction for some time.

With this transition in sociological theory will come a more realistic appreciation of the proper role of insight, understanding and empathy in sociology. In the past and down to the present there has been much mysterious conjuring with these terms, trying to make out that they are a unique and peculiar consideration in sociology as compared with the other sciences. There is still some sentiment in sociology to the effect that just as long as the sociologist himself "understands," he needs give no account of how he comes to his conclusions nor how his understanding can be checked against the different understandings of others. The fact seems to be that some sociologists have mistaken for scientific procedure the vague processes by which they arrive at hypotheses. Insight, empathy, and understanding are indeed proper and most desirable sources for hypotheses. But to mistake these insights either for the full scientific procedure or for scientific conclusions, is to neglect the task which most needs doing. An unbelievable amount of nonsense has been written to the effect that to "understand" a social act one must "experience" it, as nearly as may be, as the actors in it do. Literature probably aims to communicate this type of empathy or understanding. This is not the criterion at all for scientific understanding. The best *scientific* understanding of delirium tremens, murder, and prostitution, for example, is probably in the possession of people who have themselves never "experienced" (in the empathic sense) these forms of behavior.

The temptation to be overconcerned with the unique particular in the social sciences is very great. We need to remind ourselves, therefore, that *scientific* understanding of the unique particular is always in the light of the abstract general, not in mere personal understanding, identification, sharing, or empathy. Indeed, the latter may even corrupt that impersonal and rigorous manipulation of data which is absolutely required in science.¹⁶ Whatever might have been the original source of Stouffer's hypothesis, his theory certainly did not emerge from empathy or participation in apartment hunting in Cleveland. In fact, he operated upon data already collected by other people for other purposes, and quite without the life histories of the people concerned. No one has questioned the value of such experience for *other purposes* and in the formulation of hypotheses. But we must not let this fact obscure the full procedure by which sociological theory in the future will be evolved.

IV

If I am right in the above appraisal of the solid achievements of the last ten years in sociology, then our program for the future hardly needs to be pointed out.

First, we must continue to emancipate ourselves from thoughtways which are not only alien but even contradictory to the scientific approach, and which frustrate the ends everyone seeks. Chief among these thoughtways is the legalistic-moralistic orientation which continues to look for sanctions outside of man's experience and outside of nature.

Second, if I have noted correctly the kind of research which has produced results of the type for which the social sciences strive, then university administrations, departments of sociology, and the foundations supporting research should adapt their programs accordingly. I have indicated three general areas of progress during the past decade:

(1) We have continued sociological research with special success in the field of

¹⁶ The preceding sentences on this subject are a paraphrase of Read Bain's excellent treatment of this subject in *American Sociological Review*, 7: 387, 1942.

demography, regionalism, communications, and interpersonal relations.

(2) The invention of new methods and new tools, indices, scales, and other sociometric devices has resulted in conspicuous advance in our power of analysis and prediction in many fields.

(3) These same technical developments have suggested the re-examination of the whole sociological vocabulary and have resulted in an awakening to the nature of units, language, and semantics. These developments promise our liberation from the whole mysterious mentalistic terminology which for generations has obstructed the development of scientific sociological theory.

These types of research, because they would be cumulative, would not only result in the gradual emergence of principles of sociology which would be applicable to a vast variety of situations that exist and that may arise. Such research would also contribute most to the immediate situation. Research of the type I have advocated would provide means and instruments for the determination of local and regional equilibria in different parts of the world, after which we might discuss with some semblance of intelligence subjects like world organization.¹⁷

Present discussion of that subject, far from being an attempt to face crucial problems, is rather of an escapist character. We turn to the golden opportunity for romantic ver-

¹⁷ The Office of Population Research shows a commendable appreciation of the problem involved, as do the various organizations engaged in regional research. Among the universities, the work under Professor Odum's direction at the University of North Carolina deserves special mention. See "Regionalism in Transition" (reprinted from *Social Forces*, 1942-1943), University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

See also the following penetrating papers in *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol. 75, pp. 23-37, October 1942 (28 Newbury St., Boston): C. S. Coon, "Technology and Human Relations"; C. M. Arensberg, "The Nature of World Equilibrium"; and E. D. Chapple, "How a World Equilibrium can be Organized and Administered."

The Cross-Cultural Survey at Yale is notable not only for its collection of materials useful in any regional study that may be undertaken, but also for its use of this material in the construction of sociological theory.

balization that the subject of world organization provides because we cannot face the fact that we do not yet know how to solve similar problems on a local, national, or regional basis. Sixty sovereign states will never directly form a workable world federation. Five or six (or even Culbertson's eleven) regions, each with coherent structure of its own, might conceivably effect such an organization. Today we seem to be committed to prevent regional integration at all costs. At the same time we profess to be interested in world organization and peace. It would be difficult to find a more perfect or a more tragic illustration of the current bankruptcy of sociological theory. The whole subject of regionalism and ecology¹⁸ should increasingly become the framework for a great deal of social science research.

Peace foundations and peace organizations flourish and agitate both between and during wars. It is time that they examine realistically what they are doing and ask themselves whether their activities are calculated to achieve results or merely to provide idealistic employment for the participants. One of the first questions these groups should ask themselves is this: Do we seriously believe that we can achieve by a world organization results which no large nation has yet achieved for itself? A second question should be: Why is the technique of adjusting human relations so inadequate that even the most favored nation cannot escape widespread maladjustment and occasionally civil war? If the answer to this question is that some people are wicked and that when they have been removed and punished all will be well, then sociologists have nothing today to offer toward world peace. But if the answer is that human relations are what they are because they have never been systematically, extensively and scientifically studied

¹⁸ See J. A. Quinn, "Topical Summary of Current Literature on Human Ecology," *American Journal of Sociology*, 46: 191-226, 1940 (347 references). A conspicuous exception to my criticism of schemes for world organization should be made in the case of the Culbertson plan, which, in addition to other excellent features, recognizes at least the principle of regionalism.

so that better techniques of adjustment could be invented, then sociologists may point the way.

Finally it should be pointed out that not only must we push forward in the directions I have indicated, but the amount of activity must be greatly increased. Huxley has estimated that "before humanity can obtain on the collective level that degree of foresight, control and flexibility which on the biological level is at the disposal of human individuals, it must multiply at least ten-fold, perhaps fifty-fold, the proportion of individuals and organizations devoted to obtaining information, to planning, to correlation and the flexible control of execution." That the resources for such expansion a hundred times over are readily available is clear from our ability to indulge in such activities as the war.

It comes down, then, to this: Shall we put our faith in science or in something else? We have already answered that question as regards our physical problems. Once we make up our minds to do likewise regarding our social predicaments, the path before us is clear. This is the question which ultimately must be answered by everyone, but first by scientists themselves, by the Foundations, and by individuals who endow and finance research and education. If it is answered in the affirmative, then social research institutions will make their appearance, which will rank with Massachusetts and California Institutes of Technology, Mellon Institute, the research laboratories of Bell Telephone, General Electric and General Motors, not to mention some two thousand others. For some time the sponsors of these enterprises devoted to physical research have been wondering if the solution of social problems does not lie in the same direction. They are entitled to a more emphatic answer and more positive examples of what can be done by social scientists. I believe that we now can begin to exhibit some achievements which justify public faith.

The two principal problems which I mentioned at the outset thus turn out to be correlative. I pointed out that social scientists today do not enjoy a prestige or a public

confidence which will enable them seriously to influence the peace or other public policy. I also said that the only way to win public confidence is through superior performance. It may be contended that without public confidence we shall have no opportunity to show our skill. It is also true that as we are afforded opportunities in public affairs, our skill will increase and public confidence will afford us further opportunities. Skill and public confidence are correlative, but the initial effort must be ours. The development of sociology comes first. There is still a good deal of confidence in leaders whose only training and experience has been in getting other people to vote for them. But that faith will wane. It will some day be recognized that real social scientists are as necessary in making an effective peace as physical scientists are in the making of modern war.

Finally, there are those who find the methods of science too slow. They want to know what we shall do while we wait for the social sciences to develop. Well, we shall doubtless continue to suffer. Executives will continue to decide on the basis of guess and intuition and to mistake their own voices for the voice of the people or of God. The nations will doubtless continue to rage and the people to imagine vain things. Life went on also in the days before anesthetics, vaccines, and sulpha drugs. These days also had their immediate and pressing problems. A few people, however, devoted themselves to research which could not possibly solve the current difficulties, but which have transformed our world. We do not abandon cancer research because the patients of today may not be saved by it.

Many of the fruits of science, however, can be used to advantage while in the process of development. Science is at best a growth, not a sudden revelation. When we once put our undivided faith in science, we shall enjoy not only the support of a faith more demonstrably deserving our allegiance than many that we have followed in the past, but we shall also vastly accentuate the transition to the realization of that faith.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC PLANNING FOR SOCIOLOGY*

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WHEN the basic structure of a cultural system is generally accepted, its social sciences tend to focus on the analysis of how the given cultural system works, i.e., on the discovery of its processes and laws, on minor remedial changes in details of this going system, on the charting of trends. And such a situation, playing down concern with large statements of alternatives in goal, structure, or manner of operation of the culture, encourages scientific advances in such things as quantification, methodology, classification, and restatement of refined aspects of the culture's own philosophy.

But when the basic structure of a cultural system is thrown into question, then what was before the concern of only occasional marginal dissenters may become a necessary main concern of the social sciences.

The question I am raising is whether the clash of institutions that shakes the ground under our feet today is just a temporary tremor that will leave our "American way" to resume its course essentially unchanged after the war, or whether the present is in fact an abrupt, enforced transition from the familiar American institutional system to a new and fundamentally different one. Is it a transition demanding of us social scientists a basic overhauling of our apparatus of problems, including many of the basic assumptions that underlie them? Social science, as society's organ for thinking ahead, cannot afford just to "wait and see."

We human beings, including social scientists, differ in our interest in and ability to sense change-in-process. As you members of the American Sociological Society look at George Lundberg and me reading papers before you, you probably identify us as persons who place ourselves rather far apart

in our identification of ourselves with this matter of the immanence of change. George, with his sardonic, smiling urbanity and his dislike of urgent people—the moment anybody gets urgent about anything other than methodology—appears to belong somewhere toward the right end of this axis of personal orientation I am describing. George maintains a tolerant mood of *de gustibus* and views the role of the sociologist as one of keeping clear of political matters and of quantifying whatever is and whatever may happen. Me, on the other hand, with my "Knowledge for What?" on record as a statement of my sense of political urgency about the social scientist's job—me you will place well across the center from George, among the left-wingers.

The left-wingers in any group carry the burden of two questions they must ask themselves, if they are candid: (1) In dissenting from their fellows and taking a more radical stance, is their judgment of the current scene and of impending types and degrees of change factually correct? And, even if sound over the long run, is their sense of timing correct? (2) And, on a quite different but equally crucial level, to what extent are they projecting onto society issues and demands for solutions to issues that properly belong within themselves as persons? Here is the problem Arthur Koestler grapples with in his last book, *Arrival and Departure*. D. H. Lawrence states this difficult problem well in one of his books: "Poor Richard Lovatt wearied himself to death struggling with the problem of himself, and calling it Australia."

As regards the first of these two questions, the answer depends upon rigorous analysis and judgment. One can never know the future for certain. As regards the second—the danger that the left-winger simply projects his own inner conflicts onto the social scene—I incline to think that too

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slick and summary a disposal of the issue. The problems of imperfect society factually do exist all about us, and much can be said for the point that problems within individuals sharpen their awareness of problems in the culture which they might otherwise slide smoothly over in the grooves of adjustable habit.

I believe the United States, along with the rest of industrial society, is now moving rather abruptly and whether we like it or not through an institutional revolution; and the old institutional system, that has shaped our thinking as social scientists and the statement of our problems as scientists, is falling away from under our feet. I believe we are changing over from an institutional system in which desired things were assumed to happen *indirectly* and as a by-product of working for something else to a prevasively different system oriented around direct and centralized planning to make desired things happen. The old "American way," now on its way out, operated on the principle of "Each for himself and God for all of us, as the elephant said as he danced among the chickens." And this humanly wasteful way evoked prodigies of raw energy and enterprise, i.e., was efficient by its own primitive standards, in the loose-jointed frontier era of grab and exploit. It sought to provide employment and needed goods and services and to keep an increasingly productive technological apparatus at work as a by-product of the private scramble for property. It sought to provide a social system by allowing society to heap itself up casually, anyway, in the wake of this atomized competitive striving for money. It sought to operate a democratic state by the fiction that power is divisible, that liberal state power can stand apart from, and yet whenever necessary dominate, other systems of power such as that implicit in economic institutions.

For us as sociologists, the points particularly worth noting here are the following: (1) The assumption that the several institutional areas (economic, social, political) operate separately—the political apart

from the economic, the social apart from the economic, etc. (2) The assumption that social organization happens in approximately the best possible form if just left to run along and take care of itself. (3) The assumption that motivation is basically private and pecuniary, and yet that men can and actually do periodically step outside this private pecuniary preoccupation, put on a novel kind of Sunday-suit of social motivation, and vote and act as "citizens of democracy."

Pure *laissez faire* has never existed, and during the last 75 years the piecemeal retreat from the official theory of *laissez faire* has been going on at an accelerating tempo. The thing that is important about the immediate present is that this abandonment of *laissez faire* is ceasing to happen piecemeal and industrial society is re-building its institutions wholesale around centrally-planned industrial organization. After 150 years of economic liberalism and shadow-boxing with state regulation, we are now having to move at a leap into a system that deliberately reverses many of our deepest cultural slogans. It is this element of disjunction and swift change that I want to stress; for it is this, I believe, that imparts urgency to the new job social scientists face.

Why is the change coming so rapidly? Because the frustration of technology under economic liberalism has been dramatically and successfully reversed by resort to central planning in Nazi Germany, in Soviet Russia, and (temporarily during the present war) in the United States and Britain. In each of these countries emergency has bounced action out of the ruts of old practice and demonstrated that things formerly assumed to be unavoidable *can* in large measure be controlled by national planning. Here in the United States we still try to regard national planning as only a temporary war measure. But with national planning up over the cultural horizon in permanent and manifestly effective operation in *some* nations, there is no longer any option as to whether to plan or not to plan in any industrial nation. The question is today as unreal as would have been the question in

1800 whether to use or not to use power-driven machinery. National progress by the old set of indirections is from here on out obsolete. This is so for the simple reason that, in the tightening grooves of world competition and the necessity internally to secure approximately full employment, no nation that lives by giant technology can afford to forego the adoption of any device that diminishes the present colossal frustration of technology and has proved its ability both to stabilize and to enhance the wealth of the nation.

The logical and political inevitability of economic planning is underscored by the fact that it is already the central process of intra-corporate operation in business and is spreading rapidly to inter-corporate activity. Engineering, cost-accounting, and managerial planning make possible such operating giants as American Telephone and Telegraph, DuPont, General Electric, General Motors, and Standard Oil, with their ramified subsidiaries and international affiliates. In other words, central economic planning on a national scale is but the normal next step, the logical extension, of the central managerial technique of modern industrial society. It is simply what big technology and big managerial techniques have been moving toward for seventy-five years. Unequipped, as a culture shaped around the theory of economic liberalism, to state the problem of industrial organization positively, the United States has damned this rising movement under the name of "monopoly," has tried to legislate it out of existence, and has tried to shut its eyes to what was happening.

The political core of the change-over from indirect to direct pursuit of national welfare concerns the answer to the question: planning for what, by whom, and how? This is the power struggle now going on within every industrial nation. It involves the recognition that the casual attitude toward power that characterized the era of economic liberalism is now obsolete. As each nation girds itself for the world economic struggle ahead, the earlier fiction of the separation of powers is giving way and a merger is in process. State power and economic power

are becoming one because each so inescapably requires the other and no national state can afford to continue the wastes in efficiency involved in the kind of guerilla warfare between business and regulating state to which we are so conspicuously accustomed.

If we no longer have any option as to whether to plan or not to plan, we do have a momentous political choice as to whether (1) private industry will take over and run the state under a fascist type of set-up, or (2) the democratic state will take over and socialize the economy. And there is no possibility, beyond perhaps the next decade, of straddling the two systems. There is some current backing for a "mixed economy," with a large chunk socialized and the rest left in private hands. To the middle-class liberal such a hyphenated system seems consonant with our easy-going, pluralistic past. But if the demands upon the nation are for approximately full employment and international competitive efficiency, i.e., for a level of efficient performance that can only be met by co-ordinated planning, a mixed economy will not deliver the goods. And it will not for *political* reasons. A mixed economy with steel and other great industries left in private hands would simply focus and intensify the present warfare between democratic government and organized business that the T.N.E.C. reports and every other study of the politics of business in peace and war disclose. Vested private interests would lobby to fence in, restrict, and control the scope and efficiency of public corporations; and they would refuse that degree of forthright collaboration all through the economic system which is an absolute necessity for effective economic planning. Such a mixed system would be highly dynamic and unstable, and the pressures within itself and from international competition would force it steadily toward one or the other of the two optional courses stated at the beginning of this paragraph.

The post-war period is extremely unlikely to bring permanent easement to nations in their international economic relations. The London *Economist*, looking ahead

at the post-war world in its issue of September 4, 1943, commented: "Business in general looks like becoming a more rather than a less chancey matter." Sir William Beveridge warned American businessmen when he was here in June that they should have no illusions that Britain will not recover her pre-war world trade after the war, for she is prepared to use cartels, subsidies, and any other necessary means to do so. The post-war world is not going to be a pretty time for any nation; rather, it is likely to be a bare-fisted international battle-royal as each nation strips to produce its way out of debts and unemployment.

Now if I am right that the United States, along with the rest of industrial society, is changing over swiftly from a casual, indirectly oriented cultural system, with power naively conceived as divided and unimportant, to a system deliberately organized and co-ordinated to aim directly at its goals, what does this mean for us sociologists?

It means the greatest chance in the history of sociology. For planning in the economic sphere will require major inventive changes in both social organization and motivation. Both German and Russian experience have shown that a planned economy cannot be erected on a merely casually coherent social system and in a society of individuals so little interested in group goals as we Americans are today. The ravages of 150 years of individualism will be replaced by an organized society moving toward group goals. And the choice between only two lines of movement in economic planning, pointed out above, means that here, too, we face but two choices: either democracy will take the lead in organizing its citizens to participate from grass-roots to administrative apex in the business of society, or fascist business power will organize us as the Nazis organized the Germans. We are leaving behind the cultural system that discouraged the deliberate structuring of society and entering one in which the rational, coherent organization of society around common purposes will be an essential part of the central effort of the society. Here is sociology's chance to come of age.

This institutional change-over also means that sociologists are plunged into highly political problems. We'll have to stop mincing around the margins of such things as "class" in industrial society, to stop dodging its central economic power implications by talking only of "class as subjective" and "class as social status." It is a colossal power struggle that grips industrial society. If we flinch before it, we can, of course, duck the job and do what German sociology did sixty years ago when it pulled out of a threatening power struggle to occupy itself with other and less dangerous concerns. It will be easy to do this because we academic folk are middle-class people and therefore vulnerable when power applies pressure to us and our work.

But if we face squarely into this enormous and fascinating opportunity to develop the know-how for the re-structuring and re-motivating of American society, what do we go to work on? I assume, although Nazi experience sobers one in making such an assumption, that our loyalty and energies would go to the effort to implement the democratic side of this struggle, rather than its opposite. The over-all question that confronts us as sociologists is, therefore: What specific things does American society need to know and to know how to do in order to construct and operate a social system involving universal participation in the continuous activity of democratic planning?

For those sociologists who are concerned with the study of social groups—big groups and little groups, groups in the several functional areas of man's living, the structure, functioning, and leadership of these groups—such problems as the following present themselves. How should democratic society set about the organization of the necessary network of democratically participating groups, in each functional area, in each factory and neighborhood, and linked by city-wide and regional groups with the apex in Washington? Each of us knows from experience how difficult it is to develop durable functional groups that really work—organizations of citizens for study and discussion or for public action, organizations of parents around

school needs, even organizations of workers to consider anything other than wages and hours. Sociologists should have more than opinions as to why such local grass-roots organizations are so difficult to form and to maintain in vigor, and we should be able to state the conditions under which such organizations of each type could be made to stick and to work. Do we know that? The fact is that most of us Americans do not desire to undertake responsibility for even those organizations to which we do belong. Are we prepared to say why this is so—e.g., how much of it is assessable to unavoidable tendencies in human nature and how much to the specific nature of the culture in which we now live? How much deep-level interviewing have we done to discover the why of organizational belonging and non-belonging to specific trade unions and other groups? What do we know, for each type of functional grouping, about the optimum size of the group for maximum intra-group participation? What are the conditions that create the most democratic leadership in each kind of group, e.g., in a local trade union? What economic, racial, and other cleavages within the population can effective organization hope to bridge and heal, and what cleavages should be avoided from the outset in organizing groups? Suppose Washington asked us tomorrow, as the body of professionals supported by society as its specialists in problems of social organization, to present our data and recommendations for the development of an American society oriented to wide democratic participation in national planning, what could we say?

For those sociologists who work on the problems of the relation of group action to motivation, equally penetrating problems are posed. The Battle of Britain and the defense of Stalingrad have taught us—if we needed to have it taught us—that our traditional reliance upon personal pecuniary motivation leaves untapped vast potential sources of *social* motivation. And our own rather sorry morale in this war points an equally eloquent warning. Clearly, an organized society engaged in deciding and planning what shall

happen to it will require the utmost of continuous social motivation at every step from the statement of needs and the formulation of the plan to the carrying of it out in action. (Needless to say, I am not envisaging a dream world in which personal and even pecuniary motivation will be absent, but, rather, a society in which all kinds of positive *social* motivation will also be encouraged and used to the utmost.) We know how rich are the motivational potentialities of human beings. How can the whole range of these motivations be evoked and used? Under what circumstances can people at the grass-roots be expected to broaden their habitual motivational orientation to include both local community and national aspects of the public interest? Our concern with polling surface attitudes and opinions regarding a miscellany of public issues is yielding acres of superficial data, but very little on the deeper motivational why's of people; and our how's for achieving social motivation from these studies go little beyond hints for the application of propaganda techniques.

The urgent case for quickening social participation addressed to group ends is well stated in the centennial issue of the London *Economist*, cited above. Reviewing the past hundred years and looking ahead to the post-war time, the *Economist* says:

"Consent is an essential prerequisite of any form of democracy; but it is a negative element, and one of the greatest needs of the twentieth century is to transmute it into something more positive . . . —if [British institutions] are to measure up to the demands of the next few decades, they need to have generated behind them the explosive force of the active co-operation of a whole people . . . —it has been left for our own age to show what enormous forces can be generated when the enthusiasm of a whole people is united with the technique of the modern state. . . .

"The task is, then, one of arousing positive enthusiasm for institutions which are now merely accepted. The British citizen *should be* an ardent participant in his public affairs; he is little more than a consenting spectator who draws a distinction between 'We' who sit and watch and 'They' who run the state. There is

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no lack of signs that he is unhappy in his rôle; the passion for Russia that has been such a feature of the last two years is probably to be interpreted less as an admiration than as an envy—envy of a country that is not frustrated. . . . It is difficult to diagnose exactly what is missing. . . . But, whatever the cause, it must be one of the chief labours of the next few decades to level the barriers between 'We' and 'They.' This must be done not merely because it is just, but mainly because we cannot afford not to. Democracy in the twentieth century needs fire in its belly."

Are we sociologists ready to specify how to put this kind of pervasive fire in the belly of American society? What have we learned—or should we have learned—from the planning experience of the Nazis and the Soviet Union? Here is one obvious thing I think we should have learned: If you want people to enlist for a hard campaign to secure needed social gains, then break your goals down into concrete, short-run terms having instant meaning to people, e.g., a five-year plan to do specific things about housing and unemployment, rather than asking people to co-operate and sacrifice for vague things like "stabilizing the economy" or for things that only their grandchildren will enjoy. And here is another thing we should have learned, a warning: In our Western Christian cultures men have been given a sense of wanting life to feel "significant," "worth while." And most people tend to feel blurred and unsatisfied as to the extent to which they are thus validating their lives. Accordingly, social motivation can be a dangerously two-edged sword: fascism as well as democracy can exploit the instant sense of security that comes from finding oneself in a mass cause. Even in people's leisure activities the Nazis have exploited this need. In a social situation as ravelled out as American life has become, the development of motivation and participation by democratic methods is the slow way and the hard way. Much easier is the way of force disguised under persuasive propaganda. In our present state—casually organized, only intermittently active as citizens, and primarily bent on personal security—we Americans are helpless ducks on a fence before the undemocratic sharp-shooting of such big-business power-blocs as the National Asso-

ciation of Manufacturers. What do, or can, sociologists know that will help to safeguard the use of this essential but double-edged instrument of group motivation?

From sociologists who work on problems of public opinion close work is needed on factors disposing Americans to oppose and to support central planning, and on how negative attitudes can be changed into positive attitudes. We need to know what the concept "national planning" means to different people, and why. We need to identify the strands of experience within our American institutional past which influence people in the stand they take regarding planning. Among these last one would probably find the following: (1) The American explanation of how progress has happened among us in the past tends to gloss over the large element of good fortune due to location and rich natural resources, the fact that all down through our national history we have had a lucky favoring tail wind, and to attribute our progress to the rightness of the "American way." We tend to believe that the situation of the United States is unique and fundamentally different from that of the older nations in Europe. And we tend to believe naively and uncritically that what has worked in our past will continue to work in the future. (2) We exhibit as a people a fundamental ambivalence towards change. We express instant hospitality to material changes in technology (bigger and better steel mills and assembly-lines and power dams) and toward science as represented by a man in a laboratory looking down the barrel of a microscope. But we tend to tighten up and become reluctant to change in our basic non-material cultural traits—our form of government, our laws of property, the rules by which our economy operates. (3) Following from the preceding, we are ambivalent about superior persons, especially "experts." The cracker-box tradition that scoffs at experts has changed as regards engineers, medical men, and men in white coats in laboratories working with test tubes, but it still begrudges recognition to experts in other institutional matters. Married men, for instance, are apt to feel that nobody can tell

them anything about being husbands and fathers. (4) The deep American tradition that "that government is best that governs least" stands squarely in the path of a shift to planning headed up in Washington. We are used to the idea of business using the government to do things for it like creating protective tariffs, but we bristle when government "interferes" in other areas of living. (5) Likewise, Americans tend to think that "bureaucracy" is a disease peculiar to government. We fail to recognize that bureaucracy is normal to big administration of any sort, including large business corporations. (6) The defensiveness and negativism of an insecure middle class stand in sharp contrast to the positive mood required for orientation to planning. (7) The association of national planning in American experience with unfortunate emergencies (two wars and a disastrous depression) has encouraged an attitude towards planning as a merely temporary device, useful to get things back to "normal" but to be discarded immediately thereafter. (8) As a nation we boast of freedom at the same time that we have allowed freedom to become largely negative, defensive, freedom *from* invasions of our persons and property. The positive statement of freedom lives on principally in the clamor for freedom of enterprise. In other words, American democracy has so far lost sight of what democracy can become that the principal goal it states for itself is that the individual be left to struggle alone to make money. But the major tendency of our time is towards *collective* effort; for massed urban living, depressions and wars are teaching us that social fate is increasingly a collective affair. Freedom envisaged as a lone personal achievement

tends increasingly to get lost under the feet of organized institutional coercions. One of the most grotesque and disastrous lags in American democracy is the current widespread exploitation of people in the name of freedom. But, as Walton Hamilton has remarked, private business succeeds better than government in imposing its coercions because they are disguised as choices. So we are unprepared to view national planning as providing that enhanced clarity and coherence of structure so essential within the culture and within the person if we are to achieve the freedom democracy promises.

I may mis-appraise the relevance of some of the above eight factors as formative of American attitudes towards planning. The purpose in citing them is to suggest the type of cross-analysis of cultural factors and attitudes that is needed.

I am well aware that I have been posing big problems. In each of the areas I have mentioned a vast amount of highly specific research is required. For I believe the gap is very wide between what sociologists know—really know as a science should know its material—and what the current situation so urgently demands of us. As I look at the pages of our *American Sociological Review* I am troubled by the sense that we are not getting ahead very fast on the sorts of problems on which society has a right to demand our help. And I believe it will help us in seizing this glittering opportunity circumstances have thrown in our laps as sociologists if we select and state our problems for specific research in terms of the full stature of the central political issue of our time.

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SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL CROSS-CURRENTS THAT MAY AFFECT PEACE PLANS*

F. STUART CHAPIN
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MILITARISTS in Germany, Italy and Japan, were the first to seize upon and capitalize to their own advantage certain elements in the world revolution which has taken place during the past twenty-five years. Sociologists regard the present world revolution as primarily the reverberation of new inventions in transportation and communication extended to the masses of the people. The focus of attention on the capacity for record-breaking production of economic goods has tended to divert attention from the dynamic character and power of these revolutionary changes in transportation and communication to disseminate the ideologies of any minority group which seizes control of them. We now know that ideological differences are often of more importance than bare economic facts because they bring a clash of value-systems, the Nazi-fascist-totalitarian-militarist system *versus* the democratic system.

General Smuts said, "The world has grown smaller in space but larger in vision." Certainly the world has grown larger in potential vision. We live in an expanding social universe which enlarges more rapidly than our provincial imaginations can cope with it. The ability of the average man to form true visual images of external objects not present to sense perception lags behind the actuality of the expanding net-work of transportation by air and communications by new mechanica means.¹ Just as democracy was made possible in the vast continental United States by modern means of transportation and communication,² so the expanding social universe should make possible popular self-determination on a global basis.

The psychological correlatives of the ex-

panding social universe expressed through modern agencies of communication deserve consideration. An opportunity for democratic self-determination and expression is provided by the ease and frequency of communication. But this situation forces upon the masses of the people the necessity of making frequent decisions and this condition is likely to expand rather than contract. Strain is the result and those who are fatigued by this experience yearn for relief from the necessity of having to make more and more frequent decisions. As all sociologists know, Cooley was one of the first to call attention to this matter.³ One wonders whether the original nature of man is yet adequate to cope with this new and overstimulating environment of machine communication. Certainly there are some recent developments that give pause for thoughtful analysis.

An easy escape from the increasing pressures to make individual decisions, which had to be made person by person, was offered to the German, Italian and Japanese peoples by the dissemination of the mystical ideologies of Nazism, Fascism and Militarism, and apparently this avenue of escape was welcomed and accepted as a sure route to adjustment. In these ideologies of the super-state, the individual had all his life-decisions made for him in advance, and so escaped the pain of having to decide for himself about matters of large import about which he was uninformed.⁴

Unfortunately for the average individual in the literate societies of Europe and Asia, this revolution of communication came to a

* Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 1909; also in 1917, Chapin's *An Historical Introduction to Social Economy*, chapter xvi, and in 1933, Willey and Rice's *Communication Agencies and Social Life*.

⁴ Harold Callender, "Breaching the Fortress of German Morale," *N.Y. Times Magazine*, Aug. 1, 1943.

* Presented to the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, New York, December 5, 1943.

¹ Burnet Hershey, *The Air Future*, 1943.

² Roger Burlingame, *Engines of Democracy*, 1940.

head in the period of chaotic ethics and disillusionment of the 1920's, so that there was no untroubled time during which education in the difficult process of making individual decisions could develop. Even in the United States, the possibilities of centralized control of public opinion were evident in the oratory of demagogues of the type of Huey Long, and illustrations of the possibilities of gangster control appeared in the organization of bootlegging, kidnapping and food rackets by underworld leaders in many large American cities.⁵ Although there was little or none of systematic ideology involved in these American events, the sinister portent of this development was sufficiently evident to the American people, so that their common sense asserted itself in support of a few courageous civic leaders who were fortunately able to utilize the established court system to get this dangerous trend under control. But in Europe, where a background of frustrated militarism was still existent, the force got out of hand, especially when rationalized in systematic ideologies.

There seem to be several psychological explanations of the now curious fact that most thoughtful people were, at the time of its incubation and development, unaware of the true significance and dreadful menace of totalitarian philosophy.⁶ These explanations reside in certain ethical assumptions which seem to be inherent in the experience of a democratic way of life. Those who have lived under the regime of popular government assume that other peoples possess a basic decency and consideration. Other peoples not accustomed to self-determination are assumed to be at heart essentially peace-loving, and given the chance and time, their better natures will assert themselves over temporary fits of mass hysteria. This "live and let live" philosophy is essentially sound provided there is no centralized control of transportation and communication by an

ambitious minority with an authoritarian ideology. A second psychological explanation of popular indifference is the rationalization that opposition groups will offset one another and prevent extreme measures such as resort to war and in the long run preserve a reasonable balance between different factions. But here again experience in popular government is the concealed assumption. A third influence was the philosophy that all men have come to the realization that means must be considered as well as ends, and that ends which are theoretically good do not justify the employment of questionable means. A fourth factor may have been a sense of guilt on the part of leaders who felt that they may have been partly responsible for the world chaos because they had not been democratic enough. There was a feeling of inadequacy because they had not always been sufficiently considerate of others. The prevalent philosophy of such persons was, "the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy." In retrospect it now seems that one of the real factors was lack of decisiveness in times of crisis, as when Japan was not stopped at Manchuria in 1931, Germany was not stopped at the Ruhr in 1936, and Italy was not stopped in Abyssinia in 1935. Much of the muddled thinking of the thirties was due to factor of strain induced by the need of decisions about far-reaching issues. Executives are often alleged to be coldblooded when they are merely decisive. They have to make many decisions and can not afford to be emotionally soft and vacillating. But the mental toughness, the emotional toughness which is developed only in the process of making decisions is not necessarily an indication of brutality, callousness or sadism. Decisiveness more often indicates the existence of strength of character that is willing to face the responsibility that follows from making a decision, a type of responsibility that most persons shrink from. Finally, another psychological factor that helps explain unawareness of what was happening, seems to have been that the leaders of the democracies, faltering and uncertain in reaching decisions, imputed similar misgivings to Nazi and Fascist leaders as to the rightness

⁵ W. B. and J. B. Northrop, *The Insolence of Office*, 1932; Milton Mackaye, *The Tin Box Parade*, 1934.

⁶ Winston Churchill was one of the few leaders who saw the handwriting on the wall; see his, *While England Slept*, 1938, and *Step by Step*, 1939.

of their cause. Democratic leaders could not conceive of such a degree of fanatical certainty as that of totalitarian philosophy.

Against this background of psychological factors we now face the added complications of such psychological cross-currents as the carry-over of prewar and war attitudes into the beginnings of the peace period, and the new attitudes of disillusionment and let-down that may appear. The empirical psychology of mass likenesses supported the Nazi philosophy of totalitarianism, just as the psychology of individual differences was a natural development in the cultural milieu of democratic political systems. Professional psychologists in democratic countries followed the trend of this psychology of individual differences into the intricacies of tests and measurements and in their preoccupation with precision often lost sight of the less precise but still valid psychology of mass behavior. When the empirical psychology of mass behavior is pursued in a social and ideological environment which elevates end-values to a position of supreme importance and subordinates considerations of ethical means, we set the scene for a rationalization of the "might makes right" philosophy that has seldom seen its counterpart in history. In the totalitarian states motivation by greed and hate was appealed to as the means of attaining theoretically good (desired) ends. Opposition to this philosophy was suppressed by concentration camps, expatriation and the firing squad. Integration of the new system of attitudes was structuralized by the exclusion of ideas from the outside through strict censorship of communications, and internal attitude differences were minimized by the organization of youth movements and control of the school system. This method of centralized control based upon an empirical psychology of the motivation of mass behavior was good for short-term results. It was decisive and demonstrable to doubters and seems even to have made some deluded converts in democratic countries. But it was weak in the long term because it sacrificed new ideas. In the long run the system will break down and disintegrate because it loses the elas-

ticity that comes only from the incorporation into the social structure of new ideas.

In striking contrast the democratic ordering of society, which might on first glance seem to be based on a psychology of mass behavior, was in fact based upon a psychology of individual differences of opinion. It emphasized not common traits but differences. The supreme value of democratic society seems to be freedom to disagree. The process operates through freedom of speech, freedom of assemblage, freedom of the press, and freedom of religious worship or belief. At the present time disagreements are rampant in the pressures of special groups, of labor to raise wages, of some producers against subsidies and price control, and in the voluble isolationist philosophies. In the special pleadings of these minority groups we see the persistence of muddled thinking about world issues that I attempted to enumerate a moment ago. Many people seem still to be incredulous of the dark menace inherent in the philosophy that good ends justify questionable means. Thus fascist thinking is inherent and implicit in many of these special groups that would sacrifice the larger national good for the attainment of their special advantage. Complete freedom from a sense of guilt is of course a great advantage of this fascist type of thinking. As soon as one's ends are accepted as superior to the ends of others the compulsive for the consideration of others is removed and the sense of responsibility is destroyed.

Besides these general psychological trends there are likely to be carry-overs of special attitudes into the peace period. Elements of revenge and retribution are an accompaniment of the psychology of "win the war first," which has been built up to such intensity. There is need to analyze out these factors and to segregate them from those factors of irresponsible isolationism which so effectively defeated the success of the peace settlement of World War I. The psychology of expectation of normalcy after the war also needs scrutiny. There intrude here considerations relating to the revival of free individual expression, the sudden versus

the gradual scaling down of such war-time restrictions as high taxes, rationing, and price controls. Also the expectation of an easy revival of the old leisurely life with its high standard of living, needs examination. There seems likely to be in the let-down from the war psychology of individual subordination to common objectives, dangers of a special sort for both victors and vanquished. The awakening of the German people to the facts of Nazi deceptions and the bitterness and confused sense of values of a younger generation trained to brutality are likely to be a problem requiring long term treatment. On the home front the emergence of bickerings and conflict among minority groups no longer held in check by a common cause of winning the war, present problems that can become dangerous if the potential fascist pressure groups in American society are permitted to combine. One needs only to read the recent books of John R. Carlson, *Under Cover*, and Lewis Browne, *See What I Mean?* to realize the ever present threat of fascist thinking in America. The isolationist philosophy of frustration is still with us, even in this age of global transportation and communications, and this brand of international introversion makes its special contribution to confused thinking. When attention is turned to the immediate post-war situation in France and in the other smaller European states now occupied by the Nazi, one needs only to ask, "How shall we distinguish between the underground groups seeking liberation and the underground groups of gunmen and racketeers seeking the cover of revolutionary movements for their plundering activities?" to realize that many difficult problems lie ahead in the countries to be occupied by the Allies.

What common basis can there be for these diverse trends? One of the immediate needs is for a moral equivalent of win the war psychology that will accomplish an orderly transition and redirection of emotional drives which have been so effectively subordinated to common ends in a society in which hitherto individual liberty was lauded. Winning the war to achieve a durable peace

can not neglect the need of convincing those who disturbed the peace that use of force without law does not pay and can not succeed. The people need to realize that the issue is not between force and law, between might and right, but is between the use of might to destroy international order and the use of might to enforce international law.⁷ The kind of law to be enforced must arise from free covenants openly arrived at. The joint four-nation declaration at Moscow in October 1943 is a step in that direction if adequately followed up. Control of the militarists in Germany and Japan must be such as to demonstrate that the consequence of unlawful use of force is failure to attain the ends to which that force was directed, and not mere punishment, retribution and revenge for the sake of these alone. Those sentimental perfectionists who, in a quite understandable revulsion from punishment by use of force, then go so far as to advocate the elimination of all force in international affairs, make the mistake of throwing out the baby with the bath water. It will be sound public policy to demonstrate that use of illegal force sets in operation an inevitable cause and effect sequence in which such force (use of military means to attain national ends) releases an over-powering counter-force of reaction, consisting of the aroused indignation of the great masses of free men and common people expressed through some form of world organization. That this collective reaction is and will always be the inevitable and insuperable consequence of the illegal use of military force must be demonstrated without question of doubt. Thus it seems of utmost importance to remove discussion and thinking from the plane of vague means-ends schema, with all the obscure, mystical and ideological confusions that accompany such normative modes of thought, to a somewhat more impersonal plane of cause and effect thinking, in which the use of military force to settle international disputes will always act

⁷ Norman Angell, "The Real Question: Are the Allies Incurable?", *N.Y. Times Magazine*, Aug. 8, 1943; Walter Lippmann, *U. S. Foreign Policy*, 1943.

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as a cause to set in motion an organized world reaction to neutralize such force and have as its effect the destruction of such instrumentalities of unlawful force, fascism, totalitarianism and national militarism. Once the machinery to accomplish this purpose has been created and the effective use of such machinery clearly demonstrated, there will be time enough to move onward to a higher plane of moral equivalents of war, such as to organize a war on disease, unemployment and similar social evils.⁸

These considerations bring us squarely up against the psychological factors involved in peace settlement plans. There are now so many diverse plans for the organization and preservation of world peace that we can not hope to consider in this short discussion more than two extreme examples. The first of these is the Kellogg-Briand peace pact and second the very detailed Culbertson, *The World Federation Plan*.⁹ The focal point of our analysis of these contrasting plans is the question, "Do the concepts and terms used in these plans have real fact referents, or are the referents not structural facts of the social order, but mere theoretical concepts of a wishful or escapist ideological nature?"

The Kellogg peace pact was a typical example of unrealistic thinking because the terms used included the fallacy of concealed classification. In this case it was a null class, as will be shown presently. By this plan the nations presumably agreed (1) to forsake war as an instrument of national policy; and (2) to invoke economic penalties or sanctions against any states that failed to conform to (1). The pact was thus a sort of a contract between parties, but a contract which had no accepted court system or police organization to enforce it. Hence, just as in the case of civil contracts, which can not be enforced without courts or authority, so too, this international system of pacts was

unenforceable without courts or police. Courts and police were thus the *null class* in the system of concepts used. The weakness of the pact was due to the absence of fact referents (courts and police) which was implicit in any plan of enforceable contracts. The pact assumed the existence of something that did not exist.

By contrast to the well-meaning but futile Kellogg-Briand plan, consider the concreteness of Culbertson's, *The World Federation Plan*. Time and space prevent adequate attention to the implications of this plan in terms of political philosophy, so let us concentrate for a moment on the question, "Do the concepts and terms of the Culbertson plan have fact referents, or at least potential fact referents, rather than merely conceptual referents?"

It needs to be stated at the outset that the Culbertson plan does not concern itself with the complex of the causal factors of war. That is a problem for future negotiation and planning over generations of experimentation. What the Culbertson plan does do is to focus attention and effort on the *means* of war-making. It seeks to segregate the means of war-making by: (1) control of heavy weapons, and (2) abrogating the national right to make war. The organization to accomplish this end is probably too detailed and explicit to be readily accepted in the present stage of development of world thinking about this problem, but the plan has the merit of concreteness and realism.

The Culbertson plan proposes that the control of the means of war-making is to be attained by the Quota Force Principle. This principle is given potential fact referents by the creation of an organized World Police force of two divisions. One division is the so-called "National Contingents," composed of volunteer soldiers who are highly educated and trained. This military force is to be apportioned by quota among each of the leading states in eleven defined "Regional Federations" of the world. Heavy weapons, capital ships, tanks, artillery and airplanes, are to be similarly apportioned. The "National Contingents" constitute 78% of the world police force. The "Mobile

⁸ J. B. Priestley, "Four Years Have Rebuilt British Democracy," *N.Y. Times Magazine*, September 5, 1943.

⁹ Ely Culbertson, *The World Federation Plan*, 1942; also, "A System to Win this War—and the Peace to Come," *The Reader's Digest*, February, 1943.

Corps" is the second division of the world police force. This Corps is recruited from the smaller nations and constitutes 22% of the world police; an army larger than any single national quota in the division of "National Contingents." This Corps is to be armed with heavy weapons and stationed at strategic points throughout the world. Time prevents further elaboration of the plan except to reiterate that the referents of the concepts and terms used include such facts as geographic regions, political states within these regions, a world police of specified size and composition, allocation and control of heavy weapons and their manufacture, and occupation of strategically located points. Thus by contrast with the Kellogg-Briand pact this plan of Culbertson should clarify discussion of the issue of world order because it provides concepts and terms that are definite and tangible.

Let us now conclude this analysis of some of the psychological cross-currents that may affect peace plans with a consideration of some of the characteristics of large social inventions such as world federation or world organization plans. Thus far our attention has been directed to an enumeration of the psychological factors in the situation, whether these be trends carried over from the pre-war period, or dynamic influences at work in the present. We now turn to the psychological characteristics of the structure of social inventions—since any form of international organization to preserve world peace is essentially a social invention of greatest magnitude. What are the traits of such social inventions which hamper their fabrication and general acceptance? In the first place, every large social invention is not demonstrable *in advance* of general approval by exhibiting a successful working-model. The mechanical invention is demonstrated in advance of general acceptance by a successful working model because it is constructed of material substances. The social invention, by comparison, consists in large part of terms and words used to describe conforming behavior, so that these terms can too easily side-step the requirement of tan-

gible fact referents and terminate their function with referents in concepts, ideologies and means-ends schema. As a result of this characteristic the tests of success of social invention tend to be less decisive and clean cut than is the case with mechanical inventions. The stuff of which social inventions are made consists of processes, procedures, attitudes, habits of mind, public opinion etc., and not material substances. Furthermore, social inventions are more likely to be in the nature of additional restrictions on the individual initiative of some minority group, than the substitution of a new form for something that is more or less clearly obsolete and to be eliminated. Social inventions tend to accumulate and pyramid. In governmental structures, new units tend to be added to those existing rather than to replace them. New forms of substitute taxes usually turn out in practice to be additional taxes. Social security aids that were advocated as substitutes for direct relief become additional to direct relief. This characteristic of social inventions explains some of the resistances to them which minority groups offer. Another aspect of social inventions is the fact that they are often more dependent for acceptance upon a favorable public opinion than are physical inventions. New social inventions are almost always *at the expense of* the freedom of initiative of some minority group or special interest group in the community and such losses as these minorities suffer are not obscured in the competitive process or as easily lost to view as happens when a new machine replaces an obsolete machine in a manufacturing plant. Social inventions are therefore based upon "give and take" without any obvious *net gain* to all. Finally, legal requirements of adoption and acceptance are always present and in the case of social inventions offer systematic resistance based upon precedents and the inertia of prejudiced special vested interests. While this enumeration of the characteristics of social inventions is by no means complete it will perhaps serve to refresh our memories of some of the psychological obstacles to be

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overcome in any effort to build an international social structure to preserve world order.

To bring this brief analysis to a close, it may be useful to summarize the successive points we have tried to make. First we examined certain psychological factors related to the world revolution in transportation and communication. We found that the increasing pressures to make decisions resulted in strain which many people terminated by escape into fascist ideologies. Democratic peoples were incredulous of this trend because of sentimental associations, unrealistic observations and illogical inferences from the events. Contrasting psychology of explanation helped to confuse the issues. On the one hand fascist policies were based upon belief in mass likenesses and common motivation. On the other hand in democratic countries, where consideration of the individual was emphasized, a psychology of individual differences developed to support democratic ideology. Against these larger psychological patterns one has to reckon with a carry-over of war attitudes into the peace period in the form of psychological let-down, disappointment over failure to return to normalcy, disillusionment, and the logical confusions of isolationist philosophy. In this confused situation one thing stands out, and this is the need of a convincing demonstration to the world that illegal use of military force does not pay.

But to clarify this issue the dialectic of might versus right requires restatement, so that people understand that the real issue is between the use of force to destroy international law and the use of force to defend international law. Do current plans for the organization of peace embody the means for a settlement of this issue? The Kellogg-Briand pact failed to outlaw war because it assumed the existence of agencies to enforce the peace when in reality no such agencies existed. The concepts used in this plan had no fact referents. Turning to the other extreme of world organization plans, analysis shows that Culbertson's *The World Federation Plan*, is based upon considerations of realism. The concepts and terms used in the formulation of this plan have definite fact referents. Thus the issue between vague and general and well-meaning efforts on the one hand, and specific and definite plans on the other hand, is brought into relief. If distinctions of this sort are made in discussions of world organization, the issues may be clarified. But whatever the pattern of a world organization, it will inevitably suffer from certain handicaps which characterize social inventions in contrast to mechanical inventions. We must be prepared to understand the inherent weaknesses of structure of social inventions if we are to be tolerant and patient in our efforts to work out the organization of world peace.

POPULATION CHANGES AND THE POSTWAR WORLD*

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GREAT changes have occurred and are occurring in the size and distribution of the world's population. These changes are among the more fundamental and predictable determinants of the future. In their larger aspects population trends have shown a great deal of stability in the past and it seems reasonable to suppose that they will continue to do so in the future. They are one of the more certain elements in a most uncertain world. It is the purpose of this paper, first, to make some generalizations about population changes occurring in modern times and, second, to indicate some directions in which they, in association with other social trends, may affect the postwar world.

A generation ago, behind every discussion of population problems there loomed the gloomy figure of Malthus. The writings of demography were filled with the dangers of overpopulation. These dangers have not disappeared; in most of the world there is still a heavy pressure of population on developed resources, and the Malthusian controls of famine, disease, and war are still the major checks to population growth. But a different interpretation of population phenomena has become more popular, partly owing to obvious changes in population trends, partly because of a re-evaluation of the relationship between population growth and economic development in the modern world.

POPULATION TRENDS AS A FUNCTION OF "PROGRESS"

The dismal outlook of never-ending pressure of population on the food supply was dispelled in Western civilization by the achievements of the agricultural and industrial revolutions, and to a lesser extent by

the exploitation of new lands and of old peoples. These have combined to provide the economic basis for both rising levels of living and extraordinarily rapid population growth. In the past three centuries the population of European race has increased sevenfold: from 100 millions in 1650 to 700 millions at the present time. In the same period it has increased from less than a fifth of the world's total to more than a third. But accompanying the achievement of higher levels of living, both as cause and consequence, has been the spread of the empirical outlook on life conducive to the restriction of family size and the termination of population growth. As is well known, the indefinite continuation of interwar trends would ultimately lead to the depopulation of Western Europe and of Europe overseas.

Rapid population growth and the subsequent slowing of growth arising from control of family size are intrinsic elements in the nexus of cultural traits that are valued as "progress." Their development has not been haphazard. Within Europe, for instance, there has been a clear pattern of cultural diffusion from the initial locus of development in Northwestern and Central Europe. Modern education, improved health conditions, and economic advance are parts of the same cultural complex, indigenous to the West and for many decades past in the process of spreading across the continent. Progress flows along the lines of communication, is assisted by the presence of natural resources appropriate to industrialization, and is checked by natural and cultural barriers, but in general the level of material achievement of any given area in Europe is a function of its distance from the centers of diffusion in the West. Generally speaking, to go eastward in Europe is to backward in time. The mode of life in some of the remote corners of Europe, as in the mountain districts of Yugoslavia, in Bessarabia, or in the Caucasus, has many points of resemblance to that existing in Western Europe

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several generations ago. Intermediate areas tend to blend towards one extreme or the other depending upon their geographical location and cultural associations. In these terms Europe is a cultural unit, all in the same stream of development, but with differences in the level of attainment growing from differences in the time at which the transition began from a peasant, self-sufficient society to an urban, industrial society.

Outside of Europe technological civilization has made progress likewise in relation to the accessibility, both cultural and geographical, to the centers of its development. It has now gained a solid foothold even among non-European peoples, and the time has long since passed when our arrogance will permit us to assert that Orientals, for instance, are racially or culturally incapable of establishing a modern industrial civilization. The spread of industry and the growth of cities have been well nigh universal phenomena of recent times. Though in many countries these exist now only in embryonic form, it is questionable if there is a single country in the world that has not experienced some increase in industrial output and in modern urban influences during the twentieth century.

Demographic trends have shown an almost equal, and closely related, consistency in the direction of their development. Every country in the world with sufficiently good vital statistics to permit a judgment of trends displayed declining mortality rates in the interwar period. With few exceptions in the world, and none in the sphere of Western civilization, the birth rates likewise were lower at the end than at the beginning of the period.¹

¹ In a number of countries the decline of the birth rate was checked in the late thirties as the result of economic recovery and, in Germany and the U.S.S.R., as the result of deliberate population policy. However, except in the U.S.S.R., this phenomenon occurred only in countries already having low birth rates. In all cases the rates of the thirties were substantially below those of the twenties. The birth rate in Germany proper averaged 19.6 per thousand in 1936-1940, 22.1 in 1921-1925, and 27.0 in 1913. In the Soviet Union, the reported birth rate of 38.3 per thousand in 1938 compares with an average of 43.7 (European

THE CONTINUUM OF DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT

In regard to demographic matters the different countries of the world may be considered as on a single continuum of development, a continuum having both spatial and temporal significance. It is spatial in that the degree of development is related to the cultural and geographical accessibility to the most advanced countries. It is temporal in that each country in its development is following a general historical pattern common to all. In areas relatively untouched by Western influences, the typical demographic situation today is one of high birth rates and high death rates, with a low value placed on human life both in its inception and in its destruction. Of course this was also the demographic position of Europe at an earlier period. In normal years such areas have a substantial margin of natural increase, which is periodically checked by disasters of one sort or another. As modern influences increase, the beginnings of police control, better transportation, and the application of elementary public health measures all ameliorate the effects of these disasters. Before the war, the British in India, the Dutch in Java, the Japanese in Korea, we ourselves in the Philippines and Puerto Rico, had softened the impact of calamity, and had made effective the normally high rate of natural increase. This is the typical "colonial" situation today, characteristic of most of the Far East, the Mohammedan world, and much of Africa and Latin America. It was the condition of roughly half the population of the globe before the war.

In more developed countries further application of relatively elementary principles in the saving of lives had brought about further declines in the death rates. Later, the advance of modern influences, in the form of urban ways of life and the values which have accompanied this way of life in Western civilization, has resulted in the spread of the small family pattern, first among the upper classes and then among all the urban ele-

Russia) in 1925-1927, and 43.8 (European Russia including Western areas of lower fertility lost as the result of World War I) in 1911-1913.

ments of the population. Such developments have yielded the beginnings of the decline of the birth rate, with clear indication that it would continue if unimpeded by a return to earlier values or by the inauguration of repressive population policies. In Southern and Eastern Europe, in the more progressive countries of Latin America, and in Japan, the decline of the death rate in the interwar period was accompanied by a declining birth rate. In these countries the pattern of fertility decline was established. However, the momentum of past growth, as reflected in the youth of their populations, and the inevitable lag in the decline of fertility from its present levels posit substantial future growth of population in these areas for some years to come.

The countries nearer the centers of Western civilization have progressed further in the transition than those less fully caught up in the rising tide of material values. In the core of Western civilization in Northwestern Europe demographic evolution before the war had proceeded to the point where the birth rate was overtaking the death rate in its decline. The list of countries facing the likelihood of future population decline is a roster of the nations that have led the world in material progress.

The continuum of population development may be divided into three significant segments, each with its peculiar problems in the postwar world. About half the population of the world is in the first stage, the stage of great potential growth. Western influences have made possible a reduction in the death rate without compensating declines in the birth rate. In a relatively stable postwar world these areas will experience tremendous population growth, comparable in amount, though probably not in rate, to that experienced by the Western world at an earlier period of its history. A second, and transitional, stage has been achieved by those nations now caught up in the tide of industrialization and urbanization, but formerly, at least, on the peripheries of Western civilization. In these countries birth and death rates have both been declining, but the birth rates are still sufficiently high to support

population growth for some time to come. Finally, there are those countries that face the prospect of depopulation if the net fertility declines of the interwar period are continued.

It would be tempting to consider a multitude of problems that may be encountered at each stage of economic and demographic evolution, but it would be impossible even to list them in the space allotted, and much less to analyze all the permutations and combinations represented in the various parts of the world. Perhaps what is most significant to us now, with the problems of planning a peace a public issue, is the political implications of the differing demographic trends, first, within Europe, and, second, in the relationships between the Western peoples and the rest of the world.

POWER IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION TRENDS: WITHIN EUROPE

It has been suggested that European peoples, and in fact almost all the nations of the earth, are moving on a continuum of economic and demographic development, representing greater or lesser change in the direction of an urban society. Within Europe, economic development and population change have gone hand in hand. Both have undoubtedly been elements in the changing distribution of political power.

The predominant position of France on the continent of Europe two or three centuries ago was partly a function of the fact that she was the wealthiest and in many respects the most advanced country in Europe. It is also undoubtedly associated with the fact that she was probably at the same time the most populous nation of the continent, not even excluding Russia, which now has four times her population. The economic and political position of France in relation to the remainder of Europe has changed enormously since 1800, and this change is probably not entirely unrelated to the fact that she now stands fifth rather than first among European nations in regard to population size.

The rise of Germany likewise has demographic foundations. In the Napoleonic period, Germans lived in a Europe dominated

¹ Estimation of population size is based on Kiser, *The Soviet Union* (League of Nations Press),

not only politically, but also numerically by the French. As the result of the economic development of Germany and the population increase made possible by this development, since the middle of the last century Germans have become much the most numerous of the European peoples aside from the Russians. As the largest single group, occupying a central position in Europe, it is natural that the Germans should have sought to bring the balance of political power into line with their growing numerical and industrial importance. That this could have been achieved more effectively through peaceful rather than through warlike means is now unfortunately beside the point.

By virtue of its more rapid natural increase and the Nazi annexation of German-speaking areas, Germany in 1939 had twice the population of France and a considerably larger population than that of Britain. However, from the demographic point of view, Germany had already passed the crest of the wave. The last war had serious consequences. But these were overshadowed by the effects of fertility declines. The population of the old Reich in 1939 was perhaps 6 million less because of World War I. It was 13 million less as the result of the decline of the birth rate since 1910.² Prior to Hitler's accession to power the net reproduction rate had fallen to a lower level than that of France, the classic country of depopulation. The Nazi population policies, though moderately successful in their objective of increasing the number of births, nevertheless fell very far short of re-establishing 1910 fertility. The eastward wave of population increase has come and gone in Germany, and she is on the receding side of the tide in company with her Western neighbors. Demographically, Germany is in substantially the same position as England, France, and Scandinavia, all of which face the prospect of stationary or declining populations. War may speed the approach of population de-

cline; postwar population policies may retard it. But the underlying demographic situation will probably not be altered. Aside from an unforeseen volume of immigration the era of rapid population growth in these countries is past.

The populations of Eastern Europe grew much faster than those of Western European countries in the interwar period despite political disorder and the more severe effects of World War I in the East. At an earlier period the large population growth of this region was made possible by the fact that large areas were then in the process of initial agricultural settlement, or, put in other terms, in transition from a pastoral to a settled farm economy. In Russia there was new settlement not unlike that of our own frontier. This agricultural settlement represented a superior form of land utilization, and made possible the support of a far denser population than had formerly existed. More recently the wave of material progress represented by industrialization and an urban way of life has reached Eastern Europe from its centers of origin in the West. In Russia the contrast of the old and the new resulted in such severe stress on the old social order that it was swept away and the new technical civilization was ushered in with an impetus previously unexampled in history. These developments have made possible rapid population increase such as existed in Western Europe at an earlier period. Despite war and revolution, which apparently cost Russia a total population deficit of 26 millions, including both deaths and loss of births,³ since 1900 the population of the territory of the Soviet Union has grown more rapidly than that of Western Europe. Its present age structure and fertility levels suggest that the present war will not have a serious retarding influence on her future rapid growth. The youth of the Russian population is suggested by the fact that the median age is under 23 years, as contrasted with 32 in Northwestern and Central Europe now and with a median age of 40 in that region by 1970 on a projec-

² Estimated by the author. For method of computation see: Notestein, Taeuber, Kirk, Coale, and Kiser, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union: Population Projections, 1940-1970*. League of Nations (Agents: Columbia University Press), 1944. Chapter III.

³ As estimated by Frank Lorimer in his forthcoming work on *Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*.

tion of interwar vital trends.⁴ The reported birth rate in the U.S.S.R. for 1938 was 38.3 per thousand population or over twice that of the United States in the same year.

Ignoring the war and assuming fertility declines comparable to those experienced in Western Europe at the same level of fertility, the population of the Soviet Union in 1970 would exceed 250 millions. The war will reduce the growth potential, but barring a demographic catastrophe greatly exceeding that of World War I and the Russian revolution, the U.S.S.R. gives every promise of growing more rapidly than the remainder of Europe. In 1939 the U.S.S.R. had twice the 80 millions living in the area of Greater Germany. In 1970 it will probably have three times as large a population, and there will probably be no Greater Germany. What these differences can mean in terms of military potential may be indicated from the trends of manpower. On the assumptions of growth suggested the U.S.S.R. by 1970 would have more men of prime military age, 20-34, than its six closest rivals in Europe combined. The increase in the number of men of this military age by 1970 would alone be as large as the total German military manpower of that age today, or that to be expected from any reasonable demographic trends to 1970.

As long as the Russians were poor, illiterate, and thinly scattered over an enormous area, their numbers were not very effective against the industrialized nations of the West except in terms of resistance through sheer inertia of size. Even in the present war, distance and weight of numbers have been an important element in the Russian successes. But the Soviet Union is moving into a position in which it will be able to make its people as effective economically, person for person, as those of Western Europe in general and Germany in particular. Since the Russian manpower of a generation hence will almost certainly be greater proportionately than it is today, a future German challenge to Russia and the world along the lines of

1914 and 1939 seems improbable. Demographic trends alone suggest that this conflict is Germany's last chance for European and world domination.

To say that Russia will be powerful is, of course, not equivalent to saying that she will be a threat. Large population growth in Russia does not involve the serious difficulties that it would, for instance, in Germany. In the Soviet Union rapid growth for some time to come is probably necessary for the maximum development of large available resources in relation to existing population. It should present no greater problem than it did in the United States after the Civil War. Russia has ample resources, ample territory, and a great need for labor to develop unexploited areas in Asia and in the Arctic. The problem is not one of resources or of territory. It is rather that of converting a population only two or three generations from serfdom into a literate, physically healthy, technically competent, urban people. At least that is the job as seen by the Russians themselves according to many reports, and it is a job certainly appropriate to the predominant values of our own world.

POWER IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION TRENDS: EUROPE AND ASIA

A less certain, but ultimately equally significant development is the eastward movement of power, not only in Europe, but in the world. As long as Western European civilization was able to maintain an effective monopoly on the industrial techniques that give power in the modern world, numbers were relatively unimportant in the relations between Western countries and the densely populated Orient. Numbers are an element of power in any social group. But to be effective they must be implemented with resources and skills, and cemented by social cohesion and unity of purpose. Clearly numbers are of little importance when two civilizations of very different values meet. The domination of India by a handful of Englishmen is an obvious case in point. The British had at their command a great technical superiority of weapons and a social organization directed at the achievement of material

⁴This and other references to projected future populations of Europe are drawn from Notestein, et al. *Op. Cit.*

ends. The British and the Indians simply were not interested in the same things: the goals and values of their respective societies were almost diametrically opposed. To most Indians the assumption of political control by the British was a matter of complete indifference.

This is no longer the case. Whether through the success of our own efforts at indoctrination, or through frank admiration for our achievements, Oriental and other colored peoples are absorbing important elements of our civilization. Thus the Japanese have clearly demonstrated, first, that a non-European people can establish an astonishingly strong industrial civilization almost entirely on its own initiative, and, further, that a poor but industrious folk can accomplish this with a poverty of natural resources that would seem hopeless by Western standards. But in terms of a reasonable evaluation of its economic and political potential Japan seems no more formidable in relation to Asia as a whole than would England, shorn of its empire, in relation to a united Europe. And China, at least, seems on the way to achieving a unity that Europe was never able to accomplish.

It is commonly assumed that overpopulation in China, as indicated by the prevailing poverty of the people, will prove a great barrier to the economic progress of the country and hence to its rise as a world power. However, it needs to be pointed out that China is not so hopelessly overpopulated as is commonly supposed and that this condition does not represent an insuperable obstacle to industrialization. It is perhaps surprising to note that the over-all density of population in China is only half that of Europe west of Russia though her total population is roughly comparable in size. Even in China proper population density is much less than in Western Europe. Overpopulation in China, as elsewhere, is indicated by a high ratio of population to developed resources. It has reality only in relation to a given stage of technological development. In other areas technical changes have obviously brought about enormous changes in the carrying capacity of the land. Four hundred

years ago the present area of continental United States supported only 200 or 300 thousand Indians living on the margin of subsistence. With our present technological development, the same area readily supports 130 million or several hundred times as many people, and at a much higher standard of living. In existing circumstances the level of living in a country is much more closely related to its degree of technological development than it is to the absolute numbers of its population. Overpopulation is not a matter of too many people any more than it is a matter of too little economic production.

Considered in this light the problems of the densely populated countries of the Far East take on a much more hopeful aspect than has commonly been attributed to them. Given its present economic structure, it is undeniable that China is overcrowded. But it does not appear fanciful to suppose that at the level of technical efficiency now prevailing in Europe the present population of China could be maintained at something approximating Europe's levels of living. This would assume a potential resource base somewhat comparable to that of Europe west of Russia in an area more than twice as large.

It is obvious that the Chinese population does not now have either the capital or the trained personnel to achieve the present per capita production of Europe in the near future. However, there are compelling precedents in recent history demonstrating that neither of these are insuperable obstacles. In Russia a backward and illiterate peasantry is being converted almost in a single generation into a literate, forward-looking proletariat, rapidly acquiring the skills necessary for efficient industrial production. And on the other side of China is the convincing example of Japan, which has constructed an industrial economy with a paucity of natural resources that would be appalling to any Western people.

In China herself something of the possibilities both for industrialization and for higher per capita output in agriculture have been demonstrated in these war years. In this period China has built up an army of

some 10 million men, chiefly taken from the peasantry and consequently withdrawn from agricultural production. At the same time agricultural production in Western China has apparently remained at least as high as before the war, partly because the men withdrawn from agriculture were inefficiently used in agriculture anyway, and partly because even in the space of five years some progress has been made, especially in the use of better seed. These factors combined are sufficient to free 10 million men as industrial workers in this area after the war. Furthermore, the army was provided with small arms, i.e., rifles and light machine guns, and the appropriate ammunition, almost entirely from domestic production. When it is considered that most of China's prewar industries were located in the coastal cities now occupied by the Japanese, such an accomplishment must be considered a remarkable one. The capital for this achievement was naturally obtained at great sacrifice. But the means of industrialization can be wrung from a people living as close to the margin of subsistence as the Chinese if there is a central government with the necessary will and unity.

In these war years China herself has given ample evidence that with a stable government she is capable of great economic progress, even without effective assistance from outside. However, it is certainly true that unless some check is placed on population growth, her growing masses will ultimately consume the margin of production created by technical progress. Past experience has demonstrated, as in Japan, that even in very poor countries technical progress can outstrip population growth for a time and bring about a rising level of living in the face of large increments of population. Yet this can be no ultimate solution. Population growth, if unchecked, must ultimately destroy the gains of more efficient production, and through that destruction hinder and perhaps eliminate further gains. China's problem, then, is a combination of the economic and the demographic. Her material progress will depend on how quickly she is able to make technical advances in produc-

tion. It also depends upon how quickly she absorbs the pattern of birth control.

Whether Asia will follow the course set by Western Europe in the decline of the birth rate is obviously a crucial question. Where birth control runs counter to the prevailing values, as in India, its diffusion may be slow. However, the influences operating against the acceptance of birth control probably also operate against economic develop-




FIGURE 1. Birth and Death Rates in Japan, 1921-1924, and England and Wales, 1881-1939.

ment and against further declines in the death rates. The only Asiatic country to have undergone sufficient industrialization and urbanization to offer a test case is Japan. In that country birth control had apparently established itself before the war. In Japanese cities, where birth control would most likely first achieve general use, the prewar fertility seems to have been only about five-eighths that in the rural areas. In the country as a whole the age distribution and vital trends in the interwar period were similar to those

of England between 1880 and 1900, and indicate a stage of demographic evolution comparable to that of England in that period (Figure 1). The Japanese case is not conclusive, but it is illuminating; it suggests that the barriers between the Western and Eastern worlds are not too great to prevent the diffusion of the birth control pattern.

The decline of the birth rate in Asia is eminently desirable as long as the continent faces elementary difficulties in feeding its huge population. Emigration is no real solution for the future. There are no longer empty countries either willing or able to welcome the surplus populations on a scale sufficient to afford relief. The economic problems are serious. And yet it seems probable that given a modicum of political stability, the Oriental countries will be enabled to experience both a rising level of living and rapid population increase for a time. It is true that they have less of a margin above subsistence than the Western countries had at a comparable stage of economic development. But it is also true that they have the experience of the West to draw upon in the solution of their difficulties.

Asia as a whole appears to be on the verge of a great awakening. This awakening may take many generations and undoubtedly will not occur evenly throughout the continent. But the tempo of change has been so increased that it seems possible that this awakening will occur with tremendous explosive force, and much sooner than is commonly supposed. If the modernization of Asia follows the course that it took in Europe it will be accompanied by large population increase. Increase of population, and the very mass of the Asiatic population itself, could be ignored in the past as unimportant in the balance of world power. But with the prospect that the Asiatic masses will ultimately learn to forge the tools that will give them power, the differential population trends may become of very great importance. Population increase has been part and parcel of the spread of European populations over much of the globe. In the past European popula-

tions have been growing very rapidly in a relatively slowly growing world. The present outlook is for relatively stationary or declining populations among Western European peoples in a rapidly growing world. Western European peoples will almost certainly become a smaller part of the total population of the world. To the extent that numbers are a factor in the distribution of economic and political power, there will be some redistribution of power from old to new centers.

CONCLUSION

What all this means for the future is that we are not going to see again a world in which huge areas inhabited by non-European peoples may be casually regarded as the political playthings of Western European and American powers. The day is rapidly passing when a handful of Europeans, equipped with superior weapons and a complacent and somehow contagious faith in white supremacy, can expect indefinitely to dominate the half of the world that is occupied by the colored peoples. Either we must be prepared to meet the emerging nations halfway, helping them willingly along the road we have travelled to higher standards of living, and the more efficient creation of a better human product, or we must be prepared to maintain white supremacy by force of arms, and in defiance of our own conception of human rights. In the latter case, we would probably be faced with the prospect of an inter-continental conflict that might well dwarf the present war in ferocity and in its threat to the values that are considered the foundation of our society. If we choose to take the path of friendly assistance we will enjoy economic benefits through the rapid expansion of markets and trade. We will probably be serving our own ultimate political interests by speeding the social evolution that will bring about slower population growth. Most important of all, we shall have led all of humanity to new possibilities of life for the common man, freed from the degrading influences of hunger and grinding poverty.

POPULATION TRENDS IN JAPAN*

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IT HAS BEEN customary in certain quarters to regard Japan's recent imperialistic policy of territorial expansion as an inevitable consequence of rapid population growth. In 1940, the population of Japan proper reached a total of 73,114,000 which is approximately double its population as of 1880. While such a large increase no doubt brought in its train serious economic and international problems, Japan's rate of growth was by no means unprecedented, for it lagged considerably behind rates attained in other countries during earlier decades. It required 60 years for Japan to double its population, whereas the United States, during its period of most rapid growth immediately following the Civil War, accomplished this in about half that number of years. The population of the United States increased more than 12 times during the 19th century and during this same period the population of Java increased approximately 10 times. In England and Wales, during the 60 year period between 1811 and 1871, the population increased 125 percent.¹

During the first three quarters of the 19th century, when many countries throughout the world were rapidly increasing their numbers, Japan had a practically stationary population. Japan's population, as a matter of fact, had failed to expand since the beginning of the 17th century. Its population of approximately 30 millions, which remained at about that level throughout the 250 years of the Tokugawa regime, seems to have been the maximum that could survive under economic conditions prevailing at that time. With removal of feudalistic restrictions upon freedom of movement and occupation at the opening of the modern era, and new emphasis upon scientific agriculture, foreign trade, and industrialization, new impetus was given to population growth. Governmental

authorities desired greater numbers of people to strengthen national defense, and expanding economic opportunities made possible the change from the small family to the large family system.

It thus came about that Japan's curve of population growth began to ascend sharply at a time when the rate of increase of population in most western countries showed a marked decline. During the decade 1930-1940, the population increase in Japan proper approximated that of the United States, although our total population exceeded that of Japan by more than 58 million. With only a little over a third of the total population of eleven countries of northern and western Europe, Japan proper had a greater annual increase during the past decade than that of all these countries combined.² If Japan's period of swarming had coincided with that of western nations, a generation or two earlier, it would doubtless have attracted no particular attention. Japan's recent increase in population appears out of line only when compared with present trends in the West toward a declining population. The high fertility of the Japanese in recent years was matched by the high fertility of western nations during a large part of the 19th century. The significant fact to be kept in mind in a study of Japanese population trends is that Japan entered its cycle of population expansion when in western nations their cycle of expansion had about run its course.

An analysis of recent demographic data indicates that Japan's population growth is already slowing down in spite of official efforts to perpetuate the large family system. Until 1935 there was an actual rise in the rate of increase of population. Between 1930 and 1935 the average annual rate of increase was 1.5 percent, while during the next quinquennial period the rate had declined to 1.1 percent. The crude birth rate, which had risen steadily from 22.8 per thousand in 1872-75 to 34.6 in 1921-25, began to decline

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¹ E. B. Schumpeter, Ed., *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940*, New York: Macmillan, 1940, p. 53.

² *Ibid.*, p. 42.

during the latter part of the 1920's, and fell to 27.0 in 1938, the last year for which birth data are available. Between 1920 and 1937, the annual number of births had fluctuated around two million, with only a slight tendency to increase, although there were 2,775,000 more women in the child-bearing age at the end of this period than there were at the beginning. The number of births per thousand women in the reproductive period of life decreased from 169.4 in 1920 to 142.6 in 1935, a decline of 26.8 per thousand in fifteen years. Because of a sudden fall in the birth rate in 1938, there were actually 100,000 fewer births than there were in 1920.

This declining fertility of Japanese women has not resulted in a corresponding decline in the rate of population growth because of falling mortality rates during the past two decades. The crude death rate in Japan was 17.9 in 1872-75; increased to 21 in the late nineties; fluctuated between 20 and 21 until 1915, after which it rose during World War I to a maximum of 23.6 and then declined to 17.6 in 1938.³ Recent studies have shown that mortality data are not reliable prior to 1920, the date of the first Japanese census.⁴ It now seems evident that the gradual improvement in death registration data prior to World War I is the explanation of the early apparent rise in mortality in spite of progress in public health measures and medical care. Since 1920, reliable death registration data and the availability of figures for age distribution have made possible the calculation of specific mortality rates which show a considerable decline in mortality for both sexes and all ages. Notwithstanding the large increase in population between 1920 and 1935, there were fewer deaths at the close of this period than there were in 1920. A large share of this decrease in mortality was brought about by the decline in the infant mortality rate, which fell from 166 deaths per thousand live births in 1920 to 106 in 1937.⁵

This recent decline in mortality which

has largely offset the falling birth rate would likely have continued to fall to a much lower level if the present war had not intervened. The Japanese infant mortality rate is still nearly twice as high as in the United States. The Japanese expectation of life for males at birth according to the 1926-30 life tables was 44.82 years, while in the the United States the corresponding figure was 59.12 (1929-31). Considerable progress was being made during recent years in the conquest of disease and in the improvement of living conditions, and it seems reasonable to assume that eventually death rates in Japan will more nearly approximate those in western countries.

In 1933, Dr. Teijiro Uyeda, Professor of Economics in the Tokyo University of Commerce, made a report to the Banff Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in which he called attention to the declining fertility of Japanese women and predicted on the basis of future changes in age composition that the population of Japan proper would probably not go beyond eighty million.⁶ A more optimistic estimate of future population growth was made in 1937 by the Institute for Research of Population Problems in Japan. According to Mr. Masaji Inouye, the Director of this Institute, Japan's population will reach one hundred million near the end of the 1970's.⁷

These and other similar estimates have of course lost their validity because of the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, but they give evidence of a growing concern by the Japanese about their population problems. There can be no doubt that the forces slowing up population growth in many parts of the world have also invaded Japan during the past two decades. These forces, however, were considerably retarded, as can be seen by the fact that Japan's net reproduction rate in 1930 was 1,571, whereas in the United States the rate was 1,078 at that time.⁸ Japan's rate of 1,571 indicates a population growth of more than 50 percent in the course of a generation,

³ G. Frumkin, "Japan's Demographic Expansion in the Light of Statistical Analysis," *The Sociological Review*, 30: (1938) 1-28.

⁴ See chapter by E. F. Penrose in Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-92.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁶ Teijiro Uyeda, *Future of the Japanese Population*, Japan Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1933, p. 12.

⁷ K. J. Pelzer, *Population and Land Utilization*, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 30.

⁸ Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

assuming that the 1930 birth and death rates remain constant throughout that period. It must also be kept in mind that the present proportion of females in the reproductive period of life is unusually low (23.1 percent in 1930), while the proportion of children under ten years of age is exceptionally high, approximately one-fourth of the total population.⁹ When these children pass through the different age groups and reach adulthood, the number of women in the child-bearing period will be sufficiently increased to offset a very considerable decline in fertility. This result will be greatly enhanced by the rapidly declining mortality rates which will increase the number of those that survive childhood and the middle period of life. In consequence of these changes in age distribution and of better chances of survival, the full effects of the declining fertility of Japanese women will be retarded for several decades. Even though the small family system is coming more and more into vogue, there will be no cessation of Japan's population growth in the immediate future.

But as has already been mentioned, predictions concerning population trends in Japan have been made extremely precarious by the present war. The Japanese government has announced that it is prepared to sacrifice ten million lives in order to win the victory over its enemies. While the Japanese army suffered many casualties in China between 1937 and 1941, their loss of life since Pearl Harbor has not been excessive. The best allied estimates of Japanese losses during 1942 in both China and the South Seas are no more than 250,000. But increasing privations on the home front due to enforced war economies must lead eventually to weakened resistance to disease and a consequent rising death rate. Moreover, maintenance of hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers in places so remote from the home land that periodic furloughs become impracticable must eventually have a depressing effect on the birth rate. Another factor tending in the same direction will be the increasing number of soldiers' widows, who in accordance with long established custom will not likely marry again. When all these facts are taken

into consideration, it would seem safe to conclude that Japan's period of swarming has definitely ended and may be succeeded by a period of actual population decline in the near future.

That the Japanese are deeply concerned with this trend toward slower population growth is evident from recent reports prepared by the Institute for Research of Population Problems and by the Government Planning Commission.¹⁰ Their analysis of Japan's population trends and their proposals designed to stimulate population increase throw a flood of light on the government's population policies built up in anticipation of their plans for far-reaching territorial expansion. In the reports above referred to, the Institute for Research of Population Problems pointed out Germany's heavy loss of life during World War I and called attention to the fact that in 1938 as a result of the Sino-Japanese war, Japan's birth's decreased 250,000 and deaths, not counting those who died in military service, were 50,000 more than during the preceding year. In commenting on the ill effects of this war upon Japan's population increase, the report stated that at the time of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-05, Japan was in a period of population growth characterized by declining death rates and ascending birth rates, a period which was favorable for overcoming quickly the population losses due to the war. The present war, however, occurs when Japan is near the end of what the writer calls the second period of population growth in which the birth rate begins to decline and the death rate declines even more rapidly. In this period, the natural increase is not under ordinary conditions seriously affected, but the war tends to accelerate the declining birth rate which makes it more difficult to overcome the heavy mortality caused by the war. It is highly important, therefore, for Japan to take steps that will insure steady population growth in spite of the inevitable losses caused by the war emergency.

The report further points out that this problem is much more difficult now than it was during the first decade of this century

⁹ Frumkin, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

¹⁰ Published in *Shuho* (Weekly Reports) No. 228, February 19, 1941. (In Japanese).

because of the recent drift of population to large cities to provide the labor force for rapid industrial expansion. City people in Japan, as is the case in the West, seem to have lost their capacity for population increase. Rural birth rates are three times those in large cities. At the end of the Russo-Japanese war only 15 percent of Japan's population was urban, while in 1940 this increased to approximately 38 percent. Half of the urban population (incorporated places over 5,000) resides in the six largest cities, and more than two-thirds of the population increase of the entire country, between 1930 and 1935, was in the urban centers. Between 1895 and 1925 the cityward drift was so great that the rural increase in population was only 14 percent while towns and cities absorbed 86 percent of the total population growth during that period. In the quinquennial census period following World War I, migration to cities brought about an absolute decline in rural population. This extraordinary expansion of urban population has largely taken the form of suburban development. Japan's two largest cities, Tokyo and Osaka, owe their recent rapid growth to extension of their boundaries to include expanding industrial suburbs. In recent years, suburban growth has been six times more rapid than that of central cities. This migration of rural people to industrial cities has been greatly accelerated by the present war. Because of this widespread cityward movement, it will be extremely difficult to prevent further declines in the birth rate, and the government has no choice but to deal drastically with this population problem.

This report notes with satisfaction that Japan's birth rate, in spite of its recent decline to 27 per thousand, is still far above that of western nations. Its writer is disturbed, however, by the fact that other Asiatic peoples seem to have the capacity to breed more rapidly than do the Japanese. At the present time, the high birth rates in China, India, Philippines, and the Straits Settlement, are neutralized by high death rates; but when their economic situation is improved by the establishment of the New Order in Asia, their natural increase will be tremendous. If Japan is to maintain its

proper place of leadership in the Far East, it must have a rapidly growing rather than a stabilized population.

In that part of the report prepared by the Government Planning Commission there is a detailed statement of the methods that should be followed in order that Japan may surpass other countries in reproductivity and secure the large numbers essential for national defense and leadership among Asiatic peoples. The present population goal set by the government is one hundred million, which is to be attained by 1960. To achieve this objective, the average annual rate of increase between 1940 and 1960 cannot fall below 1.8 percent. Since the average annual rate between the last two census years was only 1.1 percent, it is apparent that careful plans must be made and full co-operation of the nation secured if this population goal is to be reached.

The plans for population increase, as outlined in this report and later approved by the Cabinet according to newspaper accounts, lay chief emphasis upon the encouragement of early marriage, strict enforcement of regulations to curb the use of contraceptives, campaigns in the interest of public health, and large expansion of hospital facilities. In 1938 the median age for first marriage among men was 28.4 and for women 24.4. The new population policy calls for a reduction of the median marriage age of men to 25 and of women to 21, a result which is to be accomplished within a ten year period. This proposed change in the age of marriage, it is believed, will increase the average number of children born to a couple during their married life from the present number of four to five. Among the plans for lowering the marriage age are the reorganization of the school system so that students can speed up their education, restriction of employment of young women over twenty years of age, greater economy in wedding expenses, establishment of a government loan fund to help with the cost of weddings, and organized efforts to guide and assist in the arrangement of marriages.

Fertility of married couples is to be promoted by glorifying motherhood and by rewarding parents who contribute more than the average number of children to the serv-

ice of the state. The tax system is to be so planned that tax burdens on large families will be lowered while taxes on bachelors and childless couples will be increased. In addition there is to be set up a system of family allowances for medical, educational, and other expenses of large families. Such families are to be given priority in the distribution of food and household equipment. Government approval of large families is to be further indicated by bestowing appropriate decorations, and insofar as it is practicable, they are to be given better treatment and accorded a higher social status.

While increase in birth rate is placed first in Japan's modern population policy, the necessity for attention to health problems is fully recognized. The report points out that Japan's infant mortality rate is almost double that of England, and that the death rate from tuberculosis is three times that of most western countries. Strong efforts are therefore to be made to safeguard the health of infants and to lower the high mortality caused by tuberculosis and other preventable diseases. The enlarged health program includes new emphasis on health instruction, a more widespread use of day nurseries, enlargement of hospitals and sanitariums, improved national nutrition, and clearance of urban slums.

But however successful the Japanese may be in their fight against disease, they realize that progress in this direction alone is not sufficient to stop the trend toward population decline. The primary requirement, as stated in the report, is to increase births and bring into vogue again the large family system of a generation ago. The Japanese in this war crisis are urged to give up thoughts of their own ease and comfort and to make whatever sacrifices may be necessary in order to raise up many sons to defend their Emperor and native land. And as a further incentive to give obedience to this injunction they are reminded by the Government Planning Commission that the nation needs additional millions of people to carry through successfully the divinely ordained plan for the establishment of the co-prosperity sphere in Asia.

These wide-reaching and determined efforts of the government to overcome the trend toward population decline provide clear evidence that the Japanese authorities have

not at all been troubled by fears of overpopulation. They were fully aware that the population density of Japan proper is considerably below that of England, Belgium, and Holland, and only slightly above that of Germany. Their leaders knew that Japan's change from an agricultural to an industrial economy would make possible the support of additional millions needed to man the expanding factories.

But this growth of industrialization that should have relieved population pressure, has, unfortunately, been widely utilized by vested interests to exploit still further greater numbers of people. As population increased, mounting discontent among those disadvantaged classes, who are denied the privilege of living in decency and comfort, began to threaten the traditional solidarity of the nation. Under these circumstances, it was inevitable that the ruling cliques should look to territorial expansion as a means of solving their ever-growing problems. Military aggression abroad rather than long-awaited social and economic reforms at home was the means adopted to stem the rising tide of revolt among the mass of the people.

The Japanese government was quite willing to take advantage of the widespread interest in population problems and encourage the belief both at home and abroad that their economic difficulties were largely an outgrowth of overpopulation. That they were in reality not at all disturbed about dangers of overpopulation is now evident from their recently adopted program calling for a population in Japan proper of one hundred million by 1960. Here stands out quite clearly their real conception of their population problem, which is to combat the declining birth rate and to augment their fighting strength by increasing numbers of people. Should the Japanese win the present war and make themselves masters of all Asia, their recent plans for more rapid population growth will provide evidence of their remarkable foresight in preparing for expanding responsibilities overseas. On the successful outcome of their battle for Asia, they are making a great gamble, and the future alone will reveal the wisdom or the folly of their present population policies.

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THE LOCALITY GROUP STRUCTURE OF BRAZIL*

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MAN in his relationships with his fellows always divides the earth's surface up into areas of mutual aid, common living, and human association. In addition to the family, which is the smallest social grouping whose interests and activities converge in a definite locale, human societies are always segmented into neighborhood and community groups. Like the family, each of these occupies a definite part of the earth's surface, is an area of human association. The three together comprise the fundamental cells and tissues out of which the State and the Great Society are constituted. Even though the latter may disintegrate or fall into a state of anarchy, the smaller locality groups remain. This paper contains a brief analysis and description of Brazil's locality group structure.

THE SIMILARITY OF LOCALITY GROUPS IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES

Because in the colonization of Brazil, as in the settlement of the United States, extensive use was made of single farmsteads for arranging the population on the land, there have arisen many similarities between the locality group structures of the two countries. For the same reason Brazilian locality groups do not resemble closely those of Europe, or those that are found in most of the Spanish-speaking countries of America. Upon close inspection Brazilian neighborhoods and communities will be seen to possess characteristics which are very similar to those of the corresponding locality groupings in the United States and Canada, and to exhibit few affinities with those of the Old World. Along with our own locality groups and those of Canada, Brazil's farms, neighborhoods, and communities bear the stamp "Made in America."

When colonization was begun in the

Western Hemisphere the farm in both Portugal and England consisted of a home and garden plot located in a hamlet or small village, plus several pieces of arable land scattered about in the fields that surrounded the residential center. Communal rights to the use of pastures and woodlands were customary. In other words, the farm, the smallest locality group, was not a clear-cut, well-differentiated territorial unit, but was fused with the neighborhood or the community. It did not stand out as an entity as does the *fazenda* in Minas Gerais or the farm in Iowa. The European neighborhood, on the other hand, was more clear-cut than those of Brazil or the United States. It consisted of a number of families whose homes were huddled together in a hamlet or small village, and the tributary farm land, pastures and woods. A sociologist might have had some difficulty in determining whether a given locality should be classed as a neighborhood, or as a larger community, but he would have had none in deciding which houses belonged in the unit.

Observation of locality groups in Brazil and in the United States shows how greatly they have diverged from the Old World patterns. Brazil never knew the village composed of small freeholders. In the Portuguese-speaking giant of the Southern Hemisphere, nucleated settlement patterns are present only on the large estates. Otherwise the cultivators and stock growers live scattered about on the land. The farm or *fazenda* stands by itself, clearly distinguishable, as a fundamental unit. The families who till the soil or manage the herds live amidst the fields and pastures and not in a nucleated center. The Brazilian village or town, like that of the United States, seems to have been an "afterthought"—it arose spontaneously to care for the multiplying social and economic needs of the population. As a result of this scattered farmsteads pattern of settlement, the Brazilian rural com-

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munity is not readily visualized and defined; the village is by no means identical with the rural community. In the days before Dr. C. J. Galpin contributed his illuminating analysis of social anatomy in North America, the Brazilian farmer, like his fellow in the United States, might have been classified as "the man without a community."

The Brazilian neighborhood also differs sharply from the European variety. Like the small locality group in the United States, generally it is not composed of the families who live together in a nucleated farming hamlet. Even when this is the case, the tiny village or hamlet is made up of the homes of workers on a plantation or ranch and is not a collection of the dwellings of freeholders who till the surrounding lands. But usually in Brazil, as in the United States, the neighborhood is made up of a small number of families who live on adjacent farms, whose members frequently come into face to face contact with one another, and who have established a system of mutual aid amongst themselves. Like those of the United States Brazilian neighborhoods owe their integration to a wide variety of causes: to visiting and mutual aid among families who live in close proximity to one another; to the pooling of efforts in order to secure and maintain a chapel or a school; to a mutual dependence upon a landed proprietor, a sugar mill, a cotton gin, a grist mill, a co-operative marketing association, a creamery or a cheese factory, a railway station, a *venda* or store; to the grouping in close proximity of farm families who are intimately knit together by ties of kinship, national origins, language and religion; or to the fact that a few families have been thrown into close and constant contact with one another, and isolated from the larger world, through establishing their residence in a small cove, in a fertile oasis, on a small island, on a high river bank, or even on a *fazenda*.

The Nature of the Brazilian Community. Unlike the old village communities of Europe, Asia, and most of Spanish America, the Brazilian village is not identical with the community. In Brazil the rural community consists of two distinct parts. The first of

these is a village or town nucleus whose principal function is not that of providing a location for the dwellings of agriculturists. Rather it serves as a residence and place of business for tradesmen, men skilled in the professions, money lenders, and workmen of all types; and as a center for schools, churches, and recreational institutions. The church is especially important but in this village or town center all the social and economic institutions converge. The second indispensable part of the Brazilian rural community consists of the farm families who live in the surrounding neighborhoods, who make the village their trading and social center, and who in many cases maintain a "town house" there for use on weekends, holidays, and on occasions of marriages or funerals. As deep rooted as the North American "go to town" is the Brazilian's "*ir ao commercio*" (go to do business). The two expressions have the same meaning. The fact that the Brazilian village or town has as its chief functions those of trade, manufacture, education, religion, and recreation, and that these are carried on chiefly to service the people who live on the surrounding farms or *fazendas*, definitely aligns her rural communities with those of the United States, and sets them apart from those of Europe and most Spanish American countries. Thus it may be said that in Brazil, as in the United States, the rural community is: (1) a geographic area consisting of a trade center and those surrounding farms and neighborhoods whose social institutions converge in the trade center; (2) an area within which there is a general consciousness on the part of the people of belonging together, or at least of identifying themselves with the neighborhoods in which they live, and the larger community area within which their farms and their neighborhood lie and of which they constitute integral parts; and (3) a consensus of opinion among the group of people living in this contiguous area which forms the community's locale that the fortunes of each individual in the locality are closely tied up with and affected by the welfare of the community as a whole.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BRAZILIAN AND NORTH AMERICAN COMMUNITIES

Although the basic similarities are great, there are also some significant differences between the structures of Brazilian and North American communities. These need to be pointed out. In Brazil, as in the Southern portions of the United States, the village-centered community embraces large estates, *fazendas* or plantations, which of themselves may be almost large enough and self-sufficient enough to qualify as communities. Frequently the proprietors of these possess "town houses" in the community center, in addition to their manor houses on the land. The social horizons of these elite members of society are far different from those of the laboring classes. Their attachments and contacts transcend local community and neighborhood boundaries. Sometimes they abandon residence on the land altogether. At best such class differences complicate arrangement of the locality group pattern; in their worse expressions they deprive the land of the watchful eye of its owner, and the local community of its leading citizens.

A second point requiring comment is the progressive tendency for the *município*, the Brazilian administrative unit that corresponds to our county, to function as a larger or *rurban* community. Rather rapidly in southern Minas Gerais and in São Paulo, the seat of the *município* is becoming the economic and social center for all the various communities and neighborhoods within its limits. The fact that Brazil does not allow the *cidade*, which is the seat of the *município*, to separate itself by incorporation from the open country parts of the area contributes to this trend. If the small Brazilian city or town becomes an urban "cyst" in the midst of a large rural population it does so contrary to the spirit of the law, and not with its aid and abetment, as frequently is the case in the United States. As roads and automobiles increase, in south Brazil the *município* will tend more and more to become one large community centered in the *cidade* which is its seat. Such a pattern of rural organization for the United States has

been the dream of Dr. C. J. Galpin, the father of rural sociology.

In addition to the significant differences just mentioned, there are several other fundamental ways in which the Brazilian community differs from our own. First it may be indicated that in Brazil, as contrasted with the United States, the role of the village as a church center seems to be relatively more important. In the old days, before administrative and judicial lines were finely drawn, it was customary in counting the populations of Brazilian centers to include all within *toque de sino* (sound of the church bell).¹ This seems to indicate that the community area was then delineated mostly in terms of the service area of the church. In early days the boundaries of our own communities were thought of in terms of the "team haul." Today, although the Brazilian village may contain a number of churches, except in the South, they are generally all of the same denomination—the Roman Catholic. Furthermore, one of them is the mother church, and the others are its affiliated branches. If there are chapels on the surrounding *fazendas*, they, too, are affiliated with and serviced by the mother church or *matriz*. Because of this homogeneity in religious affairs, the boundaries of the religious community coincide closely with those of the general community.

Another difference that must be indicated is that ethnic and racial heterogeneity do less to confuse community and neighborhood patterns in Brazil than in the United States. Within the limits of the same community there are not many places where overlapping neighborhoods of whites and Negroes may be distinguished, as is so generally the case in the southern parts of the United States, that is, in those parts of our country in which Negroes live in open country areas. Today, as when Koster wrote at the beginning of the nineteenth century, "it is surprising, though extremely pleasing, to see how little difference is made between a white man, a mulatto, and a creole negro, if

¹ Cf. Sir Richard F. Burton, *Explorations in the Highlands of Brazil*, London: Tinsley Brothers, 1861, Vol. I, p. 81.

all are equally poor and if all have been born free."² Where persons of different colors live within the limits of the same community there is no great tendency, in most of Brazil, for the complexity of locality group structure brought about by class and other differences, to be further complicated by lines of cleavage that follow color lines. True it is that class differences are closely correlated with color shades; and any generalization about lack of race discrimination is less valid for São Paulo and the three states to the south of it than for the other parts of Brazil. Nevertheless, the comparative lack of population constellations based on color, and the religious homogeneity make the internal structure of the Brazilian community much less intricate than that of the typical one in the United States.

Finally, there is a great difference between the communities of Brazil and the United States in the relative importance of trade and commerce and in the manner in which they are organized. In the United States trade is the principal function of the village which forms the community's center, while in Brazil the religious function usually occupies first place. There may be exceptions to this rule, but in general it will probably hold true, and it constitutes a fundamental difference.

The organization of business in the trading centers of the two countries also is considerably different. In the United States there is little remaining of the old-fashioned "market" or "fair," an economic institution which provides that on a designated day of the week a certain village or town is the place to which buyers and sellers from a considerable area will resort for the purchase, sale, and exchange of produce and merchandise. Brazil has retained this ancient institution as a keystone in the business structure of its rural areas. Nearly every village and town has its market place, and many of them, especially those in the East and North, have their weekly fairs or *feiras*. To hundreds of small centers would also apply the following description of the trad-

ing function of one of Pernambuco's small towns:

Commerce consists of the local operation of weekly fairs, where the products of the region are sold, others from the outside, such as dry goods, notions, liquids, utensils, etc., which come from the outside, resold, the goods being displayed in mercantile establishments or in temporary sheds.³

According to Vasconcellos Torres "the fair is a complement of rural life in the North."⁴ It comes once a week and its occurrence is the equivalent to a holiday. From all sides of the village arrive persons who come to sell or exchange their produce and to secure provisions for the period of a week. They carry baskets and sacks, and oftentimes travel several leagues in order to reach the market place. In the market place and on the *ventas* trade goes on at a busy pace. But the day is also one of recreation. One of the most popular amusements is that of listening to folk tales which are narrated in song by blind singers who accompany themselves on the *viola* or Brazilian guitar. These songs, dealing with the exploits of such noted characters as Lampeão, or summarizing recent world events such as those growing out of the perfidy of Japan, also are printed in small booklets and sold in the markets. Naturally, such weekly gatherings can serve as fertile spots for the planting of rumors by fifth columnists and these noxious elements have been exploiting them to the fullest extent. From these centers stories have spread that the rural people are to be dragged from their homes and sent overseas, and that those who leave to work in the Amazon Valley are really to be shipped to Africa.

Village and Open-Country Relationships in Brazil. The fullest description available of the relationship of the village to the open country in Brazil is given in Luiz Amaral's three-volume work on the history of Brazilian agriculture. According to this authority

² Sebastião de Vasconcellos Galvão, *Dicionário Chorographico, Historico e Estatístico de Pernambuco*, Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1921, Vol. III, p. 4.

³ In the *Correio da Manhã*, of Rio de Janeiro, for May 26, 1942.

⁴ Henry Koster, *Travels in Brazil*, London, 1816, p. 317.

the Brazilian countryman infrequently goes to town and then only to the more or less obligatory Sunday Mass, on festive occasions, and for marriages and funerals. On Sunday morning everyone goes to the center. The laborers are up early preparing the horses for the *fazendeiro* and the members of his family to ride. The *agregados* and *camaradas* go on foot. Each Sunday morning one may see the numerous processions from the *fazendas* making their ways to the village. At the front of each goes the *fazendeiro*, followed by his wife, and the other members of the family, all mounted on horseback. Behind, afoot, come the workers, men in front, women following, and children bringing up the rear. With them they lug along, or carry on their heads, numerous parcels and bundles—eggs, fruits, vegetables, fowls, pigs, etc. Those belonging to the proprietor are carried as gifts for families who live in the village, mainly for the children's god-mother at whose home the country family will take lunch, and the children will stay when they are in attendance at school. The burdens belonging to the *camaradas* are made up of produce that is being taken in for sale to the village merchants or in the market place.

Each person has the sacred duty of attending the last rites for a deceased neighbor, so a funeral is another occasion on which country people resort to the village or town center. There is a custom prevailing which requires the *fazendeiro* to stand treat at the *venda* or bar nearest the cemetery, whenever one of his retainers is buried. A rum called *cachaça*, made from the juice of the sugar cane, is the drink. On these occasions even the abstemious must partake, for it is a ritual. In some cases excessive drinking takes place, and later on one will see numerous persons lying by the wayside, sleeping off the effects of the alcohol. For the most part, however, Brazil's people are not heavy drinkers.

Visits of church dignitaries and the great religious holidays are occasions when country people put in extended stays in the village. These are the times when the *fazendeiros* open their town houses, for their own

use, to help shelter their friends, and also to provide lodging for their most esteemed *camaradas*.

A marriage between members of the *fazendeiro* class is another event which brings about an influx of country people to the center and the village to take on a festive appearance. Ostentatious displays of food and sweets are brought forth and everyone in the community, both the village and surrounding area, feels entitled to help himself. When a wedding takes place each person must betake himself to the house that serves as headquarters in order to "make an idea of those who do not appear." From this house, which is that of one of the god-mothers in the event the *fazendeiros* concerned do not have a town dwelling, the procession starts for the church, and to it the organized double file of weary persons returns after the ceremony. Heading the procession on its tortuous journey is the bride in white and the "little father" who gives her away. They are followed by the groom and the "little mother"; then come other pairs of adults; and finally, the children two by two, boy with boy, and girl with girl. Other than on such occasions, rural people rarely go to the centers.⁵

Town-country relations in Brazil are not a one-way process. Inhabitants of the villages and towns also make a practice of visiting with their friends and relatives on the *fazendas* that surround the center. Unless the stay is an extended one, as it frequently is, Sundays are popular occasions for such visits, the townspeople going early to the *fazenda* and spending the entire day. Visiting back and forth between upper class families of the town and the *fazendas* is still very common. As yet townspeople have not affected "city airs" to any great extent, and so little town-country conflict has arisen on this score. The diffusion of the auto-bus is facilitating these visits.

People from the village also resort to the open country areas for commercial reasons.

⁵ Cf. Luiz Amaral, *Historia Geral de Agricultura Brasileira*, São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1939, Vol. I, pp. 39-41.

The village functions not only as a trade center to which country people come to buy and sell, but also as the headquarters of numerous peddlers who make regular visits to the surrounding *fazendas* and *sítios*. In former times, especially, the women depended upon these travelling *mascares* for dress goods, fineries, and other articles of conspicuous consumption. Today nearly every city, town, and village is the headquarters for some of these hawkers.

THE NUMBER OF COMMUNITIES IN BRAZIL

The number of communities, rural and *rurban*, in Brazil, cannot be determined with exactitude. Nevertheless these relatively complete social units, more self-sufficient, too, in Brazil, than in the United States, certainly are very numerous. Undoubtedly every seat of a *município* or county is the nucleus of this type of a locality group; together with the families living in its trade, school, and church zones, it is entitled to be classed as a community. There are 1,574 of these, in addition to Rio de Janeiro. A few of them would rank as metropolitan communities, others have a small city as a nucleus. But from one-half to two-thirds of them would be classed as strictly rural, if the criteria in use in the United States were applied.

For example, of the 260 seats of *municípios* in São Paulo at the time of the 1934 State census, 134 contained less than 2,500 inhabitants. Only 44 had a population of 10,000 or more. Since São Paulo is by far the most urbanized state in Brazil, it seems evident that most of the seats of *municípios* form the nuclei of what would be classed as rural or as *rurban* communities in the United States.

In addition to the *cidades*, or seats of *municípios*, many *vilas*, or seats of the districts, also would classify as nuclei of communities, a few as *rurban*, but most of them as rural. Thus of São Paulo's 286 *vilas* in 1934, only nine contained above 2,500 inhabitants. In all Brazil there were in 1940 a total of 3,268 *vilas* and the number has been frozen until 1944. In addition, many coffee *fazendas* and sugar *usinas* could qualify as communities in their own right, and there are also other population centers, not yet en-

dowed with official political functions, which constitute the village nuclei of functioning rural communities. Taking all these facts into account it is estimated that there are at least 6,000 communities in Brazil.

The Importance of the Neighborhood. The role of the neighborhood seems to be more important in Brazil than in the United States. This is to say that the areas of acquaintanceship are small; that the person's social relationships are confined mostly to a small circle of families living near one another; that contacts outside the small intimate circle of acquaintances are of relative unimportance; that many goods, services, and types of association which cannot be provided by or for a small cluster of families must be done without; and that the person and the family are closely identified with and bound up in the life of the immediate vicinity, and only remotely conscious of and rarely participant in the activities of larger and more complete areas of social interaction such as the community. The role of the neighborhood in Brazil is more comparable with that part it plays in the social organization of the South than with its function in other regions of the United States. Over much of Brazil, as in the South, social organization may be said to be in the neighborhood stage.

There is a rich variety among Brazil's neighborhood groupings. Generally speaking, each Brazilian *fazenda* must be considered as a neighborhood, although many of them are sufficiently large and so completely circumscribe the lives of their inhabitants that they rank as communities. This is especially true of the large coffee *fazendas* in São Paulo, and of the sugar *usinas* where the *colony* for the workers is large, a chapel and perhaps a school are present in the plantation's village nucleus, and where the bulk of all supplies is sold at the commissary at which the families are obliged to make their purchases. Certainly if these small social worlds performed the political functions they would rank as communities.

But most of the *fazendas* are smaller, mere nodules of settlement scattered over the Brazilian landscape. In each of these widely separated little localities lives a small cluster

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of families—those of the proprietor, his relatives, and a varying number of retainers, *agregados*, *cameradas*, *moradores* and *parceiros*. To the highly integrated group of families on the cattle *fazenda* Oliveira Vianna, Nelson Werneck Sode, A. Carneiro Leão and other Brazilian writers apply the name of “clan.” This alone is considerable justification for considering it to be a neighborhood. As one passes through or over Brazil’s vast interior he will observe thousands of small settlements. Each *fazendeiro*’s home and the six to fifty or even one hundred *casabres* (huts) clustered about it, is a center from which radiates a network of trails leading off in all directions. That some of them eventually attain the headquarters of another *fazenda* miles away indicates that these neighborhoods are not entirely unrelated; and that some of these trails fuse with others to make a more beaten way to the occasional village or town, demonstrates that they are not completely lacking in community attachments.

Neighborhood groups composed of “intruders,” *sitiantes*, and other classes of the *povo*, who have not been brought under the influence and control of a *fazendeiro* and transformed into his *camarades* and *agregados* are of almost endless variety. Sometimes a dozen or so families of these are clustered together in a mountain cove, or a considerable number of them may have strung their thatched cottages along the sea coast under the coconut trees, or they may have established a line village settlement in a favorable location along the natural levee of a stream, or one can find them grouped about in one of those small clearings in the forest which make one think that they are merely auger holes in the jungle.

Also to be classed as neighborhoods are the thousands of small hamlets and villages that are scattered throughout Brazil. In size and function they vary all the way from a few houses grouped in close proximity to a *venda*, or trading post, to villages serving as trading centers for considerable area and striving to get themselves elevated to the administrative category of *vilas*, which will give them the political function and make the seats of new districts.

Why Brazil Remains in the Neighborhood Stage. In Brazil, as in the United States, the tendency is toward larger locality groups. Neighborhoods are losing part of their integrity and becoming fused into community units. The community is becoming more integrated, gathering strength, and coming to play a more important role in rural affairs. But this process as yet has not been carried as far in Brazil as in the United States. As mentioned above, Brazil still remains, for the most part, in the neighborhood stage of social organization. Even today the Brazilian rural community is still in a amorphous state reminiscent of that prevailing in Midwestern United States until about 1890, in the South until World War I. But whereas the open country church and the one room school have been primary elements in preserving neighborhood units in the United States, other factors have been responsible in Brazil.

Probably the most important of these is the system of communication and transportation. In general the roads, telephone lines, and other facilities for communication and transportation are still in their formative stages in Brazil. This is not to say that Brazil is in the “horse and buggy” stage. As a matter of fact this most valuable means of transportation has been almost entirely unknown in Brazil. The same is true of the wagon, which was almost entirely lacking until brought by German and Polish colonists in the nineteenth century, and still is entirely absent from most of the country. Except in the colonial parts of the South where wagons are used, and parts of São Paulo where there is an excellent system of railways and where gasoline-propelled vehicles are rather common, transportation in Brazil relies mainly upon the oxcart, the pack animal, the small boat or canal, and man’s head. The oxcart is most prevalent in the South; it gives way to the troops of pack animals as one passes North through Minas Gerais; and the human being comes to play his chief role as a beast of burden in the Northeast and North. In the Amazon Valley, in much of Mato Grosso, along the coast, in southern Baía and in Espírito Santo small boats are the most important element in the transportation system. Although members of the *fazendeiro*

class frequently have cars, especially in São Paulo, and there are even to be found localities in that state and in Minas Gerais where trucks make daily collections of milk cans, as in Wisconsin, these are the exceptional cases. Throughout most of Brazil, reliance upon the oxcart, the saddle horse, the pack mule, the small boat or raft, and the head of man for transportation does much to keep Brazil's locality group structure in the neighborhood stage.

The strong role of kinship is another factor that helps produce the same effect. For example, in many *municípios* of Minas Gerais, an immense area formerly was held by one owner in a tremendous estate or *fazenda*. Today, in many cases, this vast terrain has been divided among numerous descendants whose families maintain a very intimate neighborhood life among themselves. Not infrequently such a rural clan will be in open conflict with the inhabitants of the town or community center.

The retention of most of the essential services within the household or in the neighborhood also is partially responsible for the Brazilian rural community remaining in a relatively amorphous condition. Household and *fazenda* enterprises continue to process the great bulk of the products consumed by rural people. For example, tens of thousands of grist mills grind or pound the corn which forms such a significant element in the diet. As one passes through the rural sections of the states from Minas Gerais south, he will see, every few miles, one of these water-driven devices for grinding or pounding corn kernels into meal. Each miller gives a sack of meal for a sack of corn, and keeps the increase for his pay. As he goes north he will see on each *fazenda* the sheds and vats in which *farinha de mandioca*, or mandioca flour, the staff of life from Baía north, is prepared. In other aspects the situation is similar—the Brazilian countryman is largely independent of the economic services offered by villages and towns.

This means that the relative unimportance of trade itself is another factor helping to keep Brazilian rural society in the neighborhood stage. When one leaves the sugar and coffee estates he finds relatively little pro-

duced for the market. Conversely, few things are purchased. The level of living is mostly a function of what is both produced and consumed by the family itself. Sales of produce by many families are restricted largely to those carried in to market on the way to church, and purchases necessarily are limited to a few indispensables. Competition between trade centers, which does so much to expand the horizons of rural folk, remains in a retarded condition. The mail order house, whose catalogues have inspired so many new wants in North American farm families, is practically unknown. The displays of the *lojas Americanas* (American stores), which is the Brazilian name for the 5 and 10 cent emporiums, are confined to a few of the larger centers. For most of Brazil's rural millions the stimuli from such sources remain very much a thing of the future.

CLASS STRUCTURE AND LOCALITY GROUPINGS

As in the plantation sections of our own Southland, there is a great difference between the locality group attachments of the upper, landowning classes and of the families who live and work on the estates. The former are sure to have contacts and attachments outside the neighborhood and local community, in the seat of the *município*, in the larger trade centers of the area to which airplanes make regular visits, and in the state capital. The latter are likely to live in a world whose horizon ends with the neighboring *fazendas* or at the nearest village or town. The world of the small farming classes who are crowded into the mountain coves, into badly cut-up areas, or onto other poor lands, is as restricted as that of the workers on the *fazendas*. The same is true of those assembled in small clearings in the palm forests of the North, strung along the coast amid the coconut groves, or settled along the natural levee of a river. In short, the landowning nobility are among the leading citizens of the state and nation, in whose affairs they participate actively, while the lower classes live, work, and die in locality groups of a very restricted size.

THE EMERGING COMMUNITY

In conclusion one may well ask, What lies ahead? How will the locality group structure

of Brazil be modified as time goes on? A knowledge of the present structural pattern, and some of the factors in operation, gives the basis for venturing certain hypotheses relative to the changes in the near future.

As mentioned above, Brazilian rural social organization lacks certain of the elements that have contributed to the persistence of small locality groupings in the United States and have retarded the evolution of a strong, clear-cut, and closely integrated rural community. It may be said that Brazil has made comparatively little use of the one-room, open country school, with an attendance area that bears little or no relationship to the limits of other forms of human association. Thus the "little red school house" and all its sentimental attachments is not a divisive force in Brazilian rural society. Brazil's problem is to establish schools for its children, not to combine small, poorly taught, and poorly located one-room units into centralized schools rooted in the neighborhoods and serving the community; nor to remold those social monstrosities which have been foisted upon the public as "consolidated schools," in the name of progress, into units that can come to be functional parts of community groupings. In other words, the rural educational problems are neither those of our own midwestern and northern states, nor those of the South. As her schools are multiplied they are being located in town, village, and hamlet centers, frequently at the seat of a *fazenda* or *usina*. The attendance area of the school is not being drawn so that it cuts across the lines bounding other areas of association, but is being made to conform with them. This should contribute to the development of a well-defined, closely integrated rural community. Nor does the persistence of open-country churches maintained by a denomination long after an old population group has retreated before a new one, or constituting the rallying point for a nationality or language group that holds apart from the local community, or kept alive by the circuit rider who has substituted the automobile for the horse in making his periodic visits, retard the integration of the Brazilian rural community. Religious ho-

mogeneity, and the fact that the *matriz* in the village or town center is the mother church and servicing agency for all the chapels and *oratorios* on the surrounding *fazendas*, have already made for well-defined church communities. There is every opportunity for the areas of these to become those of the evolving rural communities.

Finally, the organization of the Brazilian *município* or county offers promise for the continued development of rather large, closely integrated, functioning rural and *rurban* communities. Of tremendous significance is the fact that the seat of a *município* is not permitted to draw apart from the open country, to encrust itself by separate incorporation. Where density of population is high, *municípios* small in area, and transportation fairly well developed, as in parts of southern Minas Gerais and São Paulo, the *município* already is a fairly well developed *rurban* community. This trend can be expected to continue, and the pattern will diffuse. Its pace will be determined by the extent to which transportation and communication facilities are improved, and education brings to the masses of the rural people new wants and instructs them in the productive skills and techniques essential for securing the means to fill them. As work becomes more efficient, and labor alone ceases to be the dominant element in the productive process; as regular work activities become necessary to keep pace with the Joneses and to comply with the minimum standards of the group; and as all of these in combination create more wants, greater productivity, and more trade, this larger community will become much more highly integrated as a functioning social group. In the future, Brazil may come near realizing Dr. Galpin's dream of what might be in the United States. A large share of the small *ciudades* may come to be rather complete social and economic social centers for all the *sítios*, *fazendas*, hamlets and villages in the *municípios* which bear their names. These *rurban* communities then will consist of a town center plus a surrounding tributary zone lying within a radius of 10 or 15 miles of the center in which the institutions converge.

PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY*

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FOREIGN policy, like all national policy, endures and is made vital by the consent of the governed. There was a time, not long ago, when foreign policy was only nominally the concern of the people. But a shrinking world is robbing the professional diplomatist of his exclusive domain. What the public thinks now and is likely to think in the future about America's relations with the world must be of the gravest concern to all.

This paper has to do with emerging public opinion on America's foreign policy. For the purposes at hand, public opinion is here equated with the results of public opinion polling. Briefly, four topics will concern us: (1) the bases of American opinion on foreign affairs, (2) the growth of internationalism in popular thinking, (3) the public's conception of the mechanics of collective, international action, and (4) the dual problem of dominance and sovereignty.

But before we jump into the facts and figures of American public opinion, an assessment of the influence of public opinion on policy may prove salutary.

First, public opinion rarely has a *direct* influence on foreign policy. The President and the State Department have not surrendered their prerogatives through referendum to the people. The influence is indirect. Even in the most effective democracy it takes time "its wonders to perform."

Second, public opinion is effective to the extent that it is organized. Leaders of organized groups may and often do have more to say about policy than The People. A one man poll of the Farm Bureau's Ed O'Neill might yield more legitimate insight into future tariff schedules than would a careful sampling of the total population.

Third, public opinion frequently abates in the face of a *fait accompli*. The less personal the issue, the more likely is this to be true.

* Presented to the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, New York, December 4, 1943.

Foreign policy is notoriously impersonal to John Citizen.

THE BASES OF OPINION ON FOREIGN POLICY

There seem to be six primary factors which influence public thinking on foreign policy.

1. *Our habits of collective international action are of recent origin.* It is quite unnecessary to point out that this country has rarely participated in joint international councils. Our past has been marked by a nationalism tempered with bilateral international agreements. "Entangling alliance" has been the bogeyman both to the school-boy acquiring his first wisdom about America's role in the world and to the average citizen. Let me go back to 1935 for a reminder of our old habits. In that year, this question was asked (AIPO).¹

If one foreign nation insists upon attacking another, should the U.S. join with other nations to compel it to stop?

28% felt that we should join with others, but 67% were opposed to collective action, and 5% were undecided.

Because our habits of collective action are recent, we are still subject to backslidings and, more important, still relatively uninformed about the necessary details of effective collective measures.

2. *The basic American point of view is not isolationism. It is, rather, the belief that we can be isolationist or internationalist, depending upon the advantages inherent in each position.* We shall see shortly that, right now, the overwhelming majority of the American people believe that the most profitable course of action is internationalism. But conditions can change.

3. *Apparent self-interest is the primary fulcrum upon which opinion on foreign poli-*

¹ Abbreviations will be used to indicate the organization responsible for poll results cited in these pages. AIPO is the American Institute of Public Opinion, FOR is the Fortune Poll, NORC is the National Opinion Research Center, OPOR is the Office of Public Opinion Research of Princeton University.

cy turns. Given a situation involving America's relations with other countries, it is our habit to look first and longest at what we get out of it. Apparent self-interest changes with time and is subject to fashions. The extent to which apparent national self-interest becomes identified with collective international self-interest will determine, of course, the degree to which we shall become world citizens.

An example. Consider the sharp difference in the constellation of attitudes held by those who, in March, 1941, favored sending aid to England even if it meant war and those who were opposed to aid (OPOR).

	Those who favored risking war by send- ing aid	Those who opposed risking war by send- ing aid
Germany will attack America in ten years	75%	33%
Germany will control trade if she wins	73	32
Axis victory will re- strict U. S. freedom	72	30

4. *Our desire for action in foreign affairs is influenced only secondarily by abstract ideological doctrines.* Barring the operation of self-interested motives, ideological factors do prevail. They prevail to the extent of enlisting our sympathies. But action and sympathy are not the same thing. Public opinion will reach fever pitch for action on any particular issue in proportion to the dramatic coincidence of apparent self-interest and morality. Where moral scruple and apparent self-interest conflict, the latter and not the former tends to govern. The Darlan deal is still viewed by the majority of Americans as a smart move in the interest of saving American lives. I can illustrate our habits with a little fable for our times. Moral Scruple and Practical Necessity found themselves facing each other on a narrow foot-bridge over a deep gorge. The bridge was far too narrow for them to pass. Each looked at the other, wordless, for a long minute. Then Moral Scruple said, "I'll lie down and you can walk over me."

A negative example. Between May, 1940, and November, 1941, the proportion of Americans holding the view that we should

send aid to England even if it means risking war rose from 35% to 70%. However the rise be interpreted, it is an appreciable growth of sentiment even for a year and a half. To find whether our opinion of Britain's war aims was changing apace, the country was asked periodically whether Britain was fighting primarily for democracy or for the maintenance of her power and wealth. Between March, 1940, and November, 1941, the percentage holding the former view of Britain's war aims rose from 38% to 39% (OPOR).

The consequences of our "apolitical" world view are many. Many of them are healthy. We are not thrown off the track by fine words. But we are also little interested by them. A few weeks after the meeting at sea between the President and Prime Minister in August 1941, some three-quarters of the public knew that a meeting had occurred and that the Atlantic Charter had emerged. Five months later, only a quarter answered "yes" to the question, "Have you heard or read of the Atlantic Charter?" (AIPO).

5. *The primary international peace aim of the American people is the prevention of future war.* As an aim, the prevention of war is negative. A negative aim is not of itself deplorable. Only when there is a hopeless gulf between a negative aim and the positive means through which it can be achieved is there cause for alarm. The American people have some pretty positive ideas about how to achieve the prevention of war. More of that later.

6. *Americans have an admirable faith in the practical kind of internationalism that has worked in wartime.* Wartime collective action is an understandable model, based on the interests of all concerned. Lacking a vivid past history of peacetime collective action, we are slowly but surely adopting the model of wartime co-operation suitable in general terms for peacetime. As yet, the feeling is uncrystallized. It goes something like this. "We all work together when there's a war. Why can't we stick together after it's over to prevent other wars?" Though still vague, this feeling is becoming a potent factor in our thinking about internationalism.

So much for the bases of opinion on for-

eign policy. I could take up the little time remaining in summarizing other, equally important factors. These suffice. Consider now the position on foreign policy to which Americans now adhere.

FOREIGN POLICY: PEOPLES' VERSION

Right now, the great majority of Americans believe it is in our best interest to take an active part in world affairs after the war. To say that is to say a great deal. Ever since Pearl Harbor, the American people have been strong in that conviction. Consider these figures—from Pearl Harbor to the present—in answer to the question whether America should take an active part in world affairs or stay out of world affairs (OPOR and AIPO).

	Take active part	Stay out
January, 1942	72	25
February, 1942	69	21
March, 1942	73	20
June, 1942	68	21
October, 1942	67	26
November, 1943	68	24

The meaning of an "active part" in world affairs has changed under the impact of experience. One week after Pearl Harbor a cross-section of Americans was asked whether or not we should play a larger, smaller, or the same part in world affairs than we did before the war. Fifty-nine percent voted for a larger part at that date. Eighteen months later, in June, 1943, 77% wanted us to play a larger part than before (FOR).

Nor are these opinions merely ephemeral expressions of goodwill. In June, 1942, exponents of interventionist and isolationist post-war sentiments were put through the mill to see if they could be swayed from their position. Those who favored an active part for the United States in post-war world affairs were asked (OPOR).

Have you ever considered the possibility that we might have to keep up a large army, navy, and air force at great expense to help police the world if we want to take an active part in world affairs? Do you think this expense would be justified?

Ninety-three percent of the interventionists thought it would be. Then they were asked, with insidious intent,

If our trade with other countries after the war

gets us involved in entangling alliances and power politics, as Europe always has been, would you still think it would be best to take an active part in world affairs?

Only 20% of the interventionists desert their ship. Sixty-one percent would still want us to take an active part. The rest aren't sure.

The isolationists are just as tough about their position.

If it should happen that there is trouble and other nations get ready for war, do you think we should stay out of world affairs then?

Six in ten of the isolationists are obdurate: stay out of world affairs, regardless. Fewer than three in ten come over to internationalism. Then,

Suppose our standard of living is reduced when we try to get along on what we grow and produce at home. Would you still think it would be best to stay out of world affairs?

Again, six out of ten stand firm. Isolationism would still be best. Barely two in ten are converted. The fortunate thing about all this is, perhaps, that there are better than three interventionists for every isolationist.

Let it be said at once that the resolve to take an active part is not something that goes into operation the day we stop shooting. As far as the public is concerned, the time to begin setting up a new international order was some time back. Three quarters of the nation indicated (AIPO), as far back as a year ago—January, 1943—that they thought the "Government should take steps now, before the end of the war, to set up with our allies a world organization to maintain the peace of the world." And in November, 1942, in the polling booths, the voters of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts voted 75% in favor of a resolution instructing the State Legislature to petition Congress and the President of the United States to "call at the earliest possible moment" a world convention to discuss formation of an organization of nations. Why the legislature failed to do so is a study in machine politics, not in public opinion.

And so we are ready and willing—and the Moscow conference showed us able—to move in the direction of internationalism. But what kind of internationalism? With what sort of machinery?

THE MACHINERY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

The average American, even less than the average Czech or the average Briton, is no expert on how nations can and should work out the arrangements of collective organization. But two things the American people *do* know about international organization. The first is that in order to have an adequate international order, there must be an organization. The second is even simpler: international order must be backed by the threat of force. Consider each of these separately.

First the matter of an organization. The growth of faith in international organization is a tremendous advance, make no mistake about it. In 1936 when a Gallup poll asked the American people whether they thought a league of nations or alliances between strong countries (i.e., a balance of power) was the better method of maintaining peace, two-thirds chose alliances (AIPO). In October, 1943, when polls asked people whether a league of nations or arrangements between individual countries was better for settling international disputes, seven people in ten chose the organizational method (NORC). A complete reversal in seven years. Those of us who make either a profession or a hobby out of the study of social change should be duly and deeply impressed.

I need give no figures here on the number of Americans who favor our joining in a "general organization of nations after the war." The figures run in the range 75%-85% depending on the peculiarities of the question used. All sections of the country, all economic classes, all educational levels, all religious groupings, all occupations, both sexes, and both parties deliver healthy majorities in favor of American participation in an organization of nations. They did before the Moscow Conference, before the Connally Resolution, before the Fulbright Resolution. The people have been and still are well ahead of their leaders on this score.

The conditions of power under which we are ready to join a league are not prohibitive. Sixty-two percent favor joining even if Britain has the same power in league affairs as we do. Fifty-five percent are willing even if Russia wields equal power (NORC, January, 1943).

What functions shall a league have? Regulations of armament in all countries? Almost eight in ten agree. Promulgation of international law? Again yes by an overwhelming majority. Regulation of international commerce? The same thing (NORC, September, 1943).

Are we fair-weather internationalists? Do we really mean all this or would we retreat at the first demand for sacrifice? About a year ago (January, 1943) the nation was asked whether they would be willing to make certain sacrifices if these were necessary to try out an organization of nations (NORC). The results are encouraging. No, we will not make all sacrifices. But we will do plenty. Consider these figures.

To try out an organization of nations after the war would you be willing . . .

	Percent willing
To continue rationing to feed other countries	82
To have part of our army stay overseas	76
To pay more taxes than other countries	64
To consider lend-lease a gift to allies	42
To disarm along with other nations	42
To admit foreign goods without tariff	28
To forget reparations from our enemies	28

Now the second principle of international organization—force. There exists no fair way of measuring the fact, but there is, nevertheless, some reason to believe that our conviction in the necessity of force to maintain international order is stronger than our belief in the efficacy of organization. The willy-nilly appeasement of Munich days still sticks in the throat.

Since our paramount international peace aim is the prevention of war, it is not surprising that peace formulae which provide explicitly for forcible measures against the outbreak of another war receive strong support from the American people. One such proposal—one, incidentally, which has captured the popular mind—is the international police. There has not been a time since July, 1942, when three-quarters or more of the American people could not be enlisted in support of American participation in world

policing (OPOR). No section of the country, no social or economic stratum fails to deliver a huge majority in its favor.

In September, 1943, an attempt was made to find out what the public conceived as the *scope* of an international police force (OPOR). Was it to police only the Axis? or everybody? The results were heartening. Respondents who favored an international police force were faced with three alternatives:

- Policing Axis countries only
- Policing Axis countries and small countries
- Policing all countries including United States

Nine percent chose the first alternative—policing the Axis only. Ten percent chose the second. But for the broad conception of universal policing, 76% cast a favorable vote.

A corollary of our conviction in the utility of force for peace-maintenance is our unwillingness to see general disarmament adopted as a principle after the war. Disarmament is without question a black sheep among peace plans. Eighty-seven percent of the population were opposed to universal disarmament in the fall of 1942 (AIPO). They are opposed even if a successful international police force is created (OPOR, September, 1943).

There is much that is contradictory in American opinion on post-war foreign policy. We want policing but we want our own army too; we want others to have a say but, as we shall see, we want to be top dog. In a sense, these *are* contradictions, but they are also symptoms of our state of mind. We are shopping for insurance against war. We no longer have faith in an isolationist policy. Like most people, we would like to have many forms of insurance against war—a big army, an international police force, etc. What we have yet to learn is that too many forms of insurance against war can also be dangerous.

That, in brief, is the picture of opinion on the machinery of co-operation—organization and force. Consider now two matters which, of necessity, will temper opinion on all foreign policy questions. The first is the question of U. S. dominance. The second, closely related, is "national sovereignty."

DOMINANCE AND SOVEREIGNTY

Were it not for the fact that "apparent self-interest" is so central in our thinking about America's relations with the rest of the world, the question of dominance or position would not be so urgent. But important it is. Take as the first axiom that the American people will either take no interest in, fail to support, or resist a world order in which the United States does not play a dominant part or does not play it conspicuously. Consider some of the facts.

First, compare American and British public opinion. Which country should have the most to say about the peace? Eighty-two percent of the American public, scarcely batting an eye, name the United States (FOR, April, 1942). Forty-three percent of the British public name Britain (FOR, September, 1942). Which country will have the most to say? Six in ten Americans think they will (FOR, April, 1942). But only three in ten Britons think England will go on ruling the waves (FOR, September, 1942).

America's animal spirits may be difficult for other nations to understand. Figures presented before—our willingness to join a league on equal terms with Britain and Russia—convince me, at least, that our animal spirits are not necessarily malignant. The problem is to find the proper outlet for those spirits, to achieve a formula of co-operation with others which provides a "moral equivalent for dominance." A vigorous and enlightened information policy, one which allows Americans to understand their country's real influence and stake in world affairs would help. Such an information policy we do not now have.

The problem of protecting our sense of national sovereignty in cotton wool I would rate as less important than the question of canalizing our will to dominate. But sovereignty, if ever it did get to be an issue, could do more to wreck our chances of effective participation. Much nonsense has been talked about America's sense of sovereignty. I should like to state a few simple propositions concerning it.

First, normally, the sense of sovereignty, in America at least, is in no sense a conscious,

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active attitude. Properly speaking, it is a frame of reference of which we become conscious only under certain circumscribed conditions.

The conditions which arouse the sense of sovereignty, bringing into play our national prides and prejudices, are two: *threat* or *actual attack*. An activated sense of national sovereignty is a symptom of insecurity.

Second, *any* issue of foreign policy contains two emphases: one concerns the effect of the settlement of the issue on our sovereignty; the other has to do with the *intrinsic* merits of a possible solution. A trade pact may be viewed either from the point of view of limiting our freedom of action or benefiting the machine-tool industry.

Third, the extent to which the second, intrinsic emphasis is brought to the fore will control the degree to which sovereignty can be an issue. Intrinsic emphasis—apparent self-interest, if you like—can be brought to the fore only if the public is well informed. The public can be well informed only if foreign policy is the object of a vigorous and well-contrived information policy. It goes without saying that the higher the level of information of the public on foreign affairs, the easier it is to inform the public about the intrinsic pros and cons of a particular measure and, consequently, the easier it is to forestall a battle on sovereignty.

Finally, as Sumner Welles so ably pointed out in his address before the Foreign Policy Association in October, 1943, we have gracefully relinquished sovereignty every time this country entered with another country in an agreement or pact or protocol or treaty. The barrier of novelty is no question.

Now what can be said of public opinion on the matter? That America feels relatively safe about her place in the post-war sun is obvious. That type of insecurity, in the political sphere at least, is not likely to stampede us into tall talk about sovereign and inalienable rights. Where we don't feel secure is in the military realm. We know now that getting into war is like falling off a log. It is much too easy. A majority of Americans believe that there will be other wars (NORC, September, 1943). But it is almost

because of this type of insecurity that the intrinsic merits, the apparent self-interest, of binding ourselves with others outweighs the dread of entangling alliances. We have come to fear war more than we fear the loss of sovereignty entailed in "entangling alliances."

Our ardor to prevent war through the use of force is such that questions which might normally evoke a flood of sovereign righteousness no longer have that effect. We have seen, for example, that the majority of the public conceives of a police force in inclusive terms—we, along with others, are to be policed. How strong shall the police force be, say, in comparison with the post-war American Army? A majority of its adherents believe that it should be as strong or stronger than our own armed forces (OPOR, September, 1943). Finally, the public was asked whether a strong police force might be a threat to the United States. Only a quarter of the population agreed that it would be (OPOR, September, 1943). If sovereignty doesn't materially warp our conception of how military power shall be allocated after the war, need it rise in other spheres where the danger to America is less apparent?

CONCLUSIONS

The picture presented permits a happy prognosis. There is, to be sure, many a smoke filled room, many a green table, between public opinion on foreign policy and foreign policy itself. But if public opinion does not write the peace, at least it suggests the phraseology to those who do. In closing, I should like to make several suggestions which, I think, grow out of what has been presented here.

1. To capitalize fully upon the powerful support of public opinion as much of the peace as possible should be written *now*. Interest may lag later. Demagogues may confuse us. The pressure of public opinion should not be allowed to dissipate.

2. It is imperative that the machinery for ratifying treaties be revised so that the will of the people can be more directly felt. This need not mean ratification by referendum. A majority of the American people favors a constitutional amendment providing for

treaty ratification by the President and a majority of both houses of Congress (AIPO, September, 1943). There is still time to get such an amendment before final peace terms are submitted.

3. Because informing the public on foreign policy in this shrinking world is such an important function, and because we have been doing such a lamentably poor job at it, I

suggest that there be created an Under Secretary of State whose only domain shall be information. It is not a new suggestion. But it is better than ever.

4. If public opinion, so favorable to international collaboration, is to be maximally effective, it will have to be organized. That task still lies in the future.

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RELIABILITY OF THE IDEA-CENTERED QUESTION IN INTERVIEW SCHEDULES*

MORTON B. KING, JR.

Mississippi State College†

THE FUTURE of Sociology lies in the continued expansion and fullest use of quantitative research. However, so-called sociometric techniques are still in their early development. We can now use them only on carefully selected problems, usually directed at the study of a limited aspect of some more complicated phenomenon. This is to be expected. We shall have to build long and diligently before these techniques can be applied to more complicated problems with much hope of success.

Yet, the practical problems about which our advice is often asked involve just such complex phenomena. Especially in times like these laymen, public officials and we ourselves would like to know more about forms of behavior on which we are not able to use what we consider our best, maybe our only good, tools. How, then, can we produce socially useful research until that day when we and our research methods come of age?

This paper describes an attempt to study a complex social phenomenon as objectively and as quantitatively as was possible in the absence of applicable tested techniques. A study of the public relief activities in a rural county was being made, partly because of a request from the state department of welfare.¹ One phase of the project was to find out how local citizens thought the relief problem should be met, what kind of relief agency and program they wanted. This meant an opinion study of a cross-section of the county's population, including illiterates, sharecroppers, housewives, factory workers,

grocers and doctors—not all of whom are noted for being handy with paper and pencil. In addition, it was not a single, simple issue to which reaction was desired, but rather the several aspects of a complex and very “live” situation. The existing literature on attitude and opinion measurement yielded no wholly suitable method of attack. The use of accepted techniques would have involved constructing about 15 Thurstone-type scales and administering them to many persons unable and/or unwilling to respond to them.

A method was needed which would be flexible enough to secure reliable responses in a variety of reaction situations. It also had to provide the basis for valid comparisons. In developing such a method an attempt was made to use accepted *procedures* of quantitative research, even though corresponding *techniques* were not applicable. The resulting approach is admittedly often crude and rule of thumb, but it is believed that it proved practicable and useful.

A schedule was prepared and administered in relatively free interviews. The main feature of the method is that it was *idea-*, rather than *word-centered*. The wording of the schedule was for the interviewers, to suggest to them the ideas central in each question and in the alternative answers to each question. These ideas were then conveyed to the interviewees in whatever “language” was necessary to put them across. The vocabulary used therefore varied with the universe of discourse and experiences of the person whose opinion was sought. The schedule was a guide for the interview and a rigid framework for recording the responses obtained.

Devising the Schedule. On the basis of reading and of experience as a relief worker, a list of about 20 aspects of the relief situation was prepared, those which seemed the most important issues involved. These covered questions of finance, control, adminis-

* Presented to the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, New York, December 4, 1943.

† On leave.

¹ “Public Relief in Marshall County, Tennessee.” Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin Library, 1940. The field work was supported by a research fellowship of the Julius Rosenwald Fund, to which grateful acknowledgment is made.

trative organization, rules of eligibility, and kinds and amounts of aid granted. With this as a basis, the county was toured and informal discussions were held in cross-roads stores, fence corners, barber shops and on the court house yard. These "bull-sessions" were guided over the list of issues and the various solutions offered to each were jotted down in a notebook, usually after the conversation. This was continued until representatives of most occupational and both racial groups had been interviewed.

A study of these notes served two purposes. First, a general idea of the "relief problem" as it existed in the minds of local residents was obtained. The phases of the situation considered important and vital by local people was determined. A number of the original issues were discarded when it was discovered that folks were not interested in or concerned about them. Others were added because they were being discussed and argued about in the county. In the same manner the solutions being proposed for each issue were determined. In the end 14 issues were formulated and there were 22 complete interviews covering all of them. Secondly, when the solutions to each issue were tabulated, ways of categorizing each set could be determined. The number of categories for each issue varied

from 2 to 9.² Thus the questions and alternative answers for the schedule was formulated, not theoretically, but less arbitrarily, in terms of the local "definition of the situation" and were phrased in the "folk categories of thought."

Preliminary schedules were successively administered to three test samples³ of 28, 35, and 30 family heads. After each test sample, improvements were made in the questions and their alternative answers, and in the interviewing techniques. Two of the 14 questions were dropped because they failed to meet the standards of reliability to be described below.

² These volunteered opinions did not fall into anything like a graded series—contrary to one of our pet assumptions. There seemed, rather, to be a few sharp positions for a citizen to choose between. Often a dichotomous choice was all he saw before him. This is not surprising, however, when we remember the part emotional stereotypes play in the behavior of publics.

³ See final schedule. Sampling was done from a limited universe composed of the heads of the county's 4,257 families. Except for the first test sample (selected purposively), the sampling was simple random using random numbers. Four tests were made on the study sample of 426, 10 percent of the universe, which showed it adequately representative. On no test was the chance factor small enough to disprove the hypothesis that the sample was drawn from the universe as defined.

FIELD SCHEDULE

- I. Should Tax Funds (), Organizations (), or Individuals () help the majority of those in need?
- II. Should public relief be supported by: County (), State (), or Federal () taxes?
- III. Main control over relief should be exercised by: Federal (), State (), County (), or Local () authority?
- IV. The best form of local organization would be: County Court (), Full-time Staff with office (), Citizen in each community (), County Citizens' Committee (), or Private Organization ()?
- V. Workers should be:
 - a. Paid full-time (), Paid for days worked (), Volunteer ()?
 - b. Average citizen (), H.S. graduate (), Attended college (), Social Worker ()?
- VI. In what condition should a family be to receive public relief?
 - (a) When it approaches destitution.
 - (b) When it lacks food, clothing, or shelter.
 - (c) When it lacks a decent standard of living.
- VII. —(a) Should help be given to a drinking man and his family?
 - (b) Should help be given a farmer owning his own equipment?
 - (c) Should formerly self-supporting families and indigent ones be accepted for relief on the same basis?

Poorhouse. Cash. No Cash. Work for: Cash. No Cash.

- VIII. ABFM
- IX. Aged
- X. Widows

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- XI. Which items are necessary enough to be supplied from public funds? Food (), Clothing (), Shelter (), School Expenses (), Medical Expenses (), Miscellaneous ().
- XII. In the main, do you approve or disapprove of the following as a way of helping people in need?
 Poorhouse WPA Social Security

COMMENTS: Coherence; Grasp of problem; Relief or unemployment experience.

1. Composition of Family:

Relation to head	Employable	Employed
Adults		
Children		
2. Sex 3. Race 4. Age 5. Grade in school finished
 (Degree)
6. Occupation (15 years)
 (Tenure status and acres managed if farmer)
7. Present Employment: Full (), Part (), Unemployed and seeking work (), Independent income (), Unemployable ().
8. Residence: Open country (), Hamlet (), Chapel Hill (), Lewisburg (), Cornersville ().
9. What taxes do you pay? None (), Real (), Personal (), Income (), Other ().
10. Number of miles to Lewisburg?
11. Number of newspapers read regularly? County (), Daily (), Weekly (), Other ().
12. Do you vote regularly?
13. In the main, are you for or against Roosevelt and the New Deal?
14. List organizations to which you belong. Check those you are active in.
15. Could you count on help from relatives to keep off relief?
16. Social visiting (); Swap work (); Mutual aid (); Community ().
17. Who finances: OAA (), WPA (), Red Cross ()?
 Who are the people who are supposed to get on: WPA (), OAA ()?
 In what ways does the county help needy people ()? TOTAL ()

Testing for Reliability. With this idea-centered method, the reliability of the results depends not on the schedule alone, but on the schedule-based interview. The reliability of the questions and the interviewing techniques must be tested together. The more interviewers used, the more difficult it is to obtain reliable data. Two took part in this study. On the second test sample (35), each interviewer visited all the family heads. About two weeks elapsed between the first and second interviews. When the responses were compared, the amount of agreement—while low on some questions—justified enough faith in the method to continue. The schedule was “polished,” interviewing experiences were shared, and the test repeated on another sample.

On this test 25 pairs of matched interviews were obtained. A comparison was made of

the answers recorded by the two interviewers. The number of times they obtained the same response from the same interviewee was tabulated for each question. The ratio of the number of such agreements to the total number of respondents to a question was taken as an index of the reliability of that question. These were expressed as percentages. The ratios of agreement thus obtained ranged from 60% to 100%. Nine of the 15 ratios were over 80%.

An analysis of the instances of disagreement indicated that some of them should not be charged to faulty methods. There were, for instance, cases where the interviewee had said, “I don’t know” on the first interview, but had given a definite answer on the second. This seemed to result from the fact that a new issue had been called to his attention and the two weeks period gave

him opportunity to reach some conclusion about it. In other cases a person would state on the second interview, "The other day I said so-and-so, but I've changed my mind and now this is what I think." If such differences as these are charged to different response situations rather than to interviewing techniques, then the method appears more reliable. Omitting these types of differences, the ratios of agreement on the questions ranged from 72% to 100%. Only two were below 80%.

The fact that the percentage of agreement was 80 or above on all but two questions was considered to demonstrate a workable amount of reliability in the method. However, before the study sample was interviewed, a further attempt was made to increase the reliability of the study. Ten persons who appeared to present special interviewing problems were purposively selected. The interviewers called on these together, interviewing alternative subjects. While one conducted an interview, the other sat unobtrusively in the background making notes. After each interview, the techniques used were criticized vigorously and discussed thoroughly. Attention was given even to words, gestures, and inflections used—trying to determine the most effective ways of getting the ideas across and of recording the responses. It was the writer's belief then, and is now, that the reliability of the study sample was greater than that of the last test sample.

Testing for Validity. During all of this preliminary work it became apparent that there were at least two distinct and conflicting points of view on what the public relief program should be. These were represented on the one hand by the type of public assistance provided by the FERA, Social Security and WPA programs and on the other by the traditional charity list and poorhouse of the Poor Law. It was known that the opinions of the state department of welfare staff favored the first, or public security approach. It was believed that the opinions of the members of the county assembly, the magistrates, responsible for the administration of the Poor Law favored the latter. If the schedule-interview would show a clear divergence between the responses of these two groups

and would provide each with the categories necessary to express their opinions, its validity would be satisfactorily demonstrated.

The finished schedule was given to eleven case-workers: the two who composed the county staff and nine from a nearby city agency. They were in almost complete agreement on all the questions, and stated that their answers were not "cramped" by the categories of the schedule. The eleven oldest magistrates were also interviewed. It was soon found, however, that their personal opinions varied somewhat. They were therefore asked to respond to the schedule according to the way they actually administered the Poor Law. Nine such schedules were obtained. The amount of agreement between answers was very high. It was believed that if the schedule-interview provided categories for distinguishing the practice of the Poor Law from the opinions of case-workers, its validity would still be demonstrated.

The high degree of consistency in the answers of each group indicated that the method provided for an adequate description of each position. Further, the two groups consistently selected *different* answers to the questions. In all, 240 choices were made. In only two instances did a person in one group select an answer which was the norm of the other group. This was considered a satisfactory demonstration that the schedule-interview measured what it set out to measure: opinions on how the relief problem should be met.

Analysing the Results. The main question which this study tried to answer was: What kind of a relief system or program do the people of this country think best? Auxiliary to this was an attempt to discover if persons of different social and economic backgrounds had different opinions. Thus the focus of attention was not on the answers to separate questions. The unit of analysis had to be an individual's response to all of the questions taken together. However, the raw data of the study were the separate non-quantitative answers to 12 questions by 426 family heads. And these could not be combined into numerical scores.

After considerable study of the completed schedules, ways were found to classify the

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SAMPLE FREQUENCY SCATTERGRAMS

FIGURE 1. Sample Table of Machine Sorting of Opinion Schedules Showing Agreement on the *Public Security: State Control* Pattern.

Eligibility	Kinds and Amounts of Relief ^a								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1		1							
2			2	2					
3			6		1	1	1		
4			3		1		1		
5				1	1				
6				1					

FIGURE 2. Sample Table of Machine Sorting of Opinion Schedules Showing Little Agreement on the Opinion Categories Indicated

Organization	Kinds and Amounts of Relief ^a								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1									
2							1		
3			1				1		
4									
5			1				1	1	
6									

^a Other two factors held constant.

interviewees' answers into mutually exclusive qualitative categories which could be handled statistically. The first step was to determine those persons whose answers to the 12 questions described some reasonably coherent relief program. This was tackled first on an impressionistic basis. The writer studied each schedule and sorted out those which seemed to offer any solution, however, fantastic, to the relief problem. These were those which seemed to have some internal unity because of the dominance of a central idea.

It was obvious, however, that a certain percentage of the questions would have to be answered to leave any impression at all. It was decided that if more than 4 questions were left unanswered, the person had no coherent solution to offer. The schedules were punched on cards and those with 8 or more questions answered sorted out. When these were compared with the impressionistic selection, there was disagreement on only 10 cases. These were resolved by further qualitative consideration. This gave 58 (14%) of

the 426 persons classified as having No Definite Opinion—meaning on the problem as a whole.

The next step was to discover what solutions or programs were offered by the 86% having fairly coherent opinions. Examination of the schedules revealed 4 solutions on each of which a number of persons were in substantial agreement. These were the Poor Law; a public security program (social security and work relief) under federal control; a public security program under state control; and a public security program entirely under county control. To check these judgments, the punched cards were used again. The answers were summarized for each of the sections of the schedule: finance and control, organization and personnel, eligibility requirements, and kinds and amounts of relief. Each summary was punched in one column and each column sorted against the other three. When entered in frequency tables, the results formed a kind of scattergram. See Figures 1 and 2. Concentration of frequencies in a cluster of cells

indicated a group of persons with similar opinions. There were five such clusters. Four were the ones already found by inspection of the schedules. The fifth was characterized by a belief in the policies of a public security program administered, however, by the existing machinery of the Poor Law—the county assembly of magistrates. The ideal pattern for each of these was constructed by determining the answer to each question which represented the norm for that group.

Forty-nine (49) percent of the cases were classified into these 5 categories. This left 32 percent who had proposed fairly coherent relief programs, but none which corresponded

county's family-heads had some fairly coherent solution to offer to the relief problem; that 71 percent of those having definite opinions formed them entirely out of elements of existing programs; that 49 percent agreed on one or another of 5 solutions, while the opinions of the remainder were either vague or unique; and that the largest single group agreeing on a program (16 percent) favored a public security program under federal control.

These 8 opinion categories were tested for possible relationship with each of 28 socioeconomic variables. This was the main statistical analysis attempted by the study. The

TABLE 1. TYPES OF OPINIONS SHOWING NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS HOLDING EACH OPINION, WITH STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE AND 3 ϵ RANGE FOR EACH*

Opinions	Number in Sample	Percentage	Standard Error of Estimate for Universe	Range of 3 ϵ
1. Public Security: Federal Control	67	16%	1.7	12.4-19.1
2. Public Security: State Control	36	8%	1.3	5.9-11.0
3. Public Security: County Control	36	8%	1.3	5.9-11.0
4. Public Security Policy: Poor Law Machinery	39	9%	1.3	6.5-11.8
5. Poor Law	32	8%	1.2	5.1-9.9
6. Unclassifiable: Novel Elements	105	25%	2.0	20.7-28.6
7. Unclassifiable: Traditional Elements	53	12%	1.5	9.4-15.5
8. No Definite Opinion	58	14%	1.6	10.5-16.8
TOTALS	426	100%

* The percentages are smoothed figures. Standard errors and ranges are exact to one decimal. Errors were calculated from the following formula:

$$\epsilon_p = \sqrt{\frac{pq}{n} \cdot \frac{N-n}{N-1}}$$

to the above 5 categories or agreed with each other to any significant extent. These "unclassifiable" opinions were divided into 2 groups: one, 12 percent of the total, contained programs which represented different combinations of features to be found in existing public relief programs—as did the 5 solutions already mentioned. This was labeled, Unclassifiable: Traditional Elements. The other, 25 percent of the total, contained programs which combined aspects of related behaviors such as Community Chest, Red Cross, mutual aid practices, etc. with elements of existing programs. This was designated Unclassifiable: Novel Elements.

Table 1 shows these 8 categories, those used in subsequent analysis, and the percent of cases contained in each. It is worth noting that the large majority (86 percent) of the

variables ranged from age and sex of the interviewees, through occupation and economic status, to residence and reading habits. The chi-square test was used to make this analysis. Two types of chi-square tables were used: the "2 by r" in which the opinion categories were related to a dichotomy (e.g. sex) and the "r by r" in which they were related to a quantitative variable (e.g. school grades completed) or to a non-dichotomous qualitative variable (e.g. occupation). The .05 level of significance was used throughout. Tables 2 and 3 will illustrate the type of analysis used.

Table 2 shows type of opinion by sex. The chi-square for the table indicates a significant association between the sex of the interviewees and their opinions in general. The nature of the relationship is not clear. It will

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be noted, however, that the chi-squares of two rows are also significant. This indicates that more women (than would be expected by chance) have no solutions to offer, while more men favor public security policies administered by the local magistrates. Table 3 gives the types of opinion by size of family. The table chi-square shows that in general there is no significant amount of association between them. However, a significant relationship is indicated between family size and one opinion category. Heads of families with 5 or more members tended to advocate a program approximating existing WPA and Social Security practices more often than heads of smaller families.

activities, regular readers of newspapers, regular voters, heads of normal (unbroken) families and those employed full-time (as compared with the unemployed and persons with independent incomes) tended to offer more coherent solutions to the relief problem.

Four factors were found to be related to approval of a public security program under federal control. Those tending to favor this solution were the better informed about current relief activities, regular readers of newspapers, the full-time employed and the unemployed (as compared with persons of independent income) and persons who said they paid no taxes.

TABLE 2. TYPES OF OPINION BY SEX*

Opinions	Number in Sample	Number of Males	Expected Number of Males	X ²
1. Public Security: Federal Control	67	62	57.6	2.4
2. Public Security: State Control	36	29	30.9	.9
3. Public Security: County Control	36	30	30.9	.2
4. Public Security Policy: Poor Law Machinery	39	38	33.5	4.3*
5. Poor Law	32	30	27.5	1.6
6. Unclassifiable: Novel Elements	105	96	90.2	2.7
7. Unclassifiable: Traditional Elements	53	41	45.5	3.2
8. No Definite Opinion	58	40	49.8	13.7*
Totals	426	366	366.0	29.0*

$$(f_o - np)^2$$

* The formula, $X^2 = \frac{(f_o - np)^2}{npq}$, was used. Thus the cell chi-squares equal t^2 . When looked up in the regular chi-square tables with one degree of freedom, they show the amount of association of the column factor with the opinion category in that row. See Fisher, R. A., *Statistical Methods for Research Workers* (3rd Ed.), p. 70.

* Chi-squares showing significant associations (.05 or below) are marked with an asterisk (*).

The hypothesis tested by this procedure was that each type of relief opinion was held by persons with similar socio-economic backgrounds. On the basis of the analysis, it can not be said that this hypothesis is correct. No pattern of opinion represented the views of a single type of person. Nor did groups of similar individuals have characteristic opinions. However, the data indicate that certain factors were related to opinions, although the nature of the association was usually obscure. Some of the relationships found will be briefly summarized.

Several factors were found to be related to the coherency of the relief solution proposed. Women, farmers, persons over 55 and those with 7 or fewer years of schooling tended to give less coherent answers. Those with the best knowledge of current relief

Five factors were related to approval of a public security program under state control, the nearest approximation to existing Social Security and WPA programs. Those tending to favor this solution were: laborers, domestics and clerks; persons of low socio-economic status;⁴ persons who did not vote regularly; Negroes; and heads of families which were or had been relief recipients.

Factors which were not in any way related to relief opinions, according to this study, were: farm tenure, attitude toward the New Deal as a whole, and participation in organizations—including neighborhood mutual aid groups.

Conclusion. The problem faced by this

⁴ Edwards, Alba, "Socio-Economic Classification of Census Occupations," *J. of Am. Stat. Assn.*, V-38, No. 184, 1933, pp. 377-87.

study was that of obtaining the opinions of a heterogeneous population on a complex public issue. The method developed to do this places its reliance on the careful selection and definition of the ideas, rather than the words, contained in the schedule. By presenting these ideas verbally in an interview, the flexibility necessary for dealing with a cross-section population is achieved. The reliability of the method depends on the careful definition of both questions and their alternative answers, and particularly on the interviewing skills and techniques. It proved

justified in view of the roughness of the data themselves. At any rate, the study findings were pronounced of practical value by the cooperating state department of welfare. There is reason to believe that they influenced its policies, especially those pertaining to its public relations. In addition, the data proved useful (as a part of the larger study) in testing and perhaps extending our theory of institutions, particularly those composed largely of stateways.

It is believed that the method will produce more reliable and valid results than un-

TABLE 3. TYPES OF OPINION BY NUMBER IN FAMILY^b

Opinion	Number in Sample	One & Two Member Families	Expected Number	Three & Four Member Families	Expected Number	Families with Five or More Members	Expected Number	X ²
1. Public Security:								
Federal Control	67	27	26.0	28	24.1	12	16.9	2.4
2. Public Security:								
State Control	36	11	14.0	9	13.0	16	9.1	7.1*
3. Public Security:								
County Control	35*	10	13.5	13	12.6	12	8.8	2.1
4. Public Security Policy:								
Poor Law Machinery	39	11	15.1	15	14.0	13	9.8	2.9
5. Poor Law	32	12	12.4	12	11.5	8	8.1	.0
6. Unclassifiable:								
Novel Elements	105	46	40.8	41	37.8	18	26.4	3.6
7. Unclassifiable:								
Traditional Elements	53	21	20.6	17	19.1	15	13.3	.3
8. No Definite Opinion	58	27	22.5	18	20.9	13	14.6	1.3
Totals	425*	165	165.0	153	153.0	107	107.0	19.7

* One person omitted because of incomplete schedule.

^b The formula used was $X^2 = \frac{(f_o - np)^2}{f_e}$, where $f = \frac{n_r \cdot n_c}{n}$. The sum of the cell chi-squares in any row was looked up in the regular tables with $n - 1$ degrees of freedom (n equals the number of columns), testing the association of the column factor with the opinion category in that row. See T. C. McCormick, mimeo material for Statistics 232, University of Wisconsin, 2nd Semester, Sheet 14, p. 2.

* Chi-squares showing significant associations (.05 or below) are marked with an asterisk (*).

possible to devise rough tests of the reliability and validity of the results obtained. These show that at least two interviewers can be trained to elicit and record reasonably similar and reliable results. Also shown is the ability of the method to distinguish between patterns of ideas or activities known to be different.

The method did not, and perhaps cannot, produce quantifiable data. However, its data can be classified into qualitative categories which lend themselves to simple statistical analysis. Statistical tools more powerful than

guided interviewing and observation can obtain. It will also avoid that spurious exactness which is probably the fate of paper and pencil techniques when administered to non-academic populations. If this is so, it is a tool of practical value with some degree of scientific exactness, and is suitable for tackling some of the problems which now elude our more refined methods. It therefore illustrates a kind of work at which we should spend a part of our research time, while we labor mightily the remainder to construct sharper and more efficient tools.

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TECHNIQUES OF SOCIAL REFORM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW PROHIBITION DRIVE*

ALFRED McCLUNG LEE

Wayne University

THE WAVES of Prohibitionist and anti-Prohibitionist agitation that have swept the United States during the past century and more furnish significant case materials on aspects of cultural change, cultural lag, and social control. These materials are illuminating, in my estimation, in connection with such general subjects as these: (1) the nature of reformist movements, in their societal, social psychological, and psychological aspects; (2) the relationships between moralistic-emotional and scientific opinions in Dry and Wet propagandas and strategies; and (3) the probable consequences of educational and legalistic efforts at social change, such as the Drys and the Wets have promoted, in terms of anticipated and unanticipated goals and consequences.

Within the necessary limits of a paper, it is hoped to touch upon some conclusions reached along such lines during a detailed survey of Dry and Wet agitational work, with especial reference to the new prohibition drive.¹ Naturally only samples and brief

summaries of data may be given here, but it is hoped that the quotations and summaries capture and transmit pertinent characteristics of the originals. Care is taken in footnotes to refer the reader to both objective and partisan documents and summaries.²

For the sake of brevity, this paper sketches and seeks to analyze these factors bearing upon the new prohibition drive: (1) major strategies, (2) the drives for the Eighteenth and the Twenty-First Amendments compared with the present prohibition drive, (3) the groups involved in the present struggle, an anatomy of agitation, (4) their philosophies, and (5) their tactics. Adequate treatments of the historical perspectives into which the present drive should be fitted, of the characteristics of the specific pressure groups involved in the struggle, of the propaganda theories and techniques used by

New York; E. M. Jellinek, Director, School of Alcohol Studies, Yale University; Charles R. Jones, Executive Vice-President, American Business Men's Research Foundation, Chicago; A. J. Kane, Conference of Alcoholic Beverage Industries, New York; Laura Lindley, Research Secretary, Anti-Saloon League of America; Irving D. Robbins, Institute of Public Relations, New York; Anne Roe, Psychologist, School of Alcohol Studies, Yale University; L. A. Schaeffe, International Reform Federation, Washington; Fred D. L. Squires, Research Counsel, National Woman's Christian Temperance Union; and Harry S. Warner, Treasurer, Scientific Temperance Federation, Columbus, Ohio.

² Particularly useful objective studies of the general field are: John Allen Krout, *The Origins of Prohibition* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1925); Peter H. Odegard, *Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1928); Clark Washburnton, "Prohibition," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII (1934), pp. 499-510; Dayton E. Heckman, *Prohibition Passes: The Story of the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment* (MS. Ph.D. Dissertation; Columbus, Ohio State University, 1939); and Frederick W. Adrian, *The Political Significance of the Prohibition Party* (MS. Ph.D. Dissertation; Columbus, Ohio State University, 1942). A mine of Dry material is the partisan *Standard Encyclopedia of the Alcohol Problem* (Westerville, Ohio, American Issue Publishing Co., 1925-30), 6 vols.

* Presented to the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, New York, December 4, 1943.

¹ This paper is a digest of sections of a forthcoming book tentatively titled *Techniques of Agitation: An Analysis of the New Prohibition Drive* (to be published by Dryden Press, New York). The materials upon which this larger study is based include extensive newspaper and magazine clipping files, volumes of the back numbers of Dry and Wet publications, and pamphlet and book collections as well as first-hand observation by the author of the work of Dry and Wet organizations, especially in Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Kansas. The following persons aided with comments and suggestions and in making materials available: Alfred Abrahamson, Secretary-Treasurer, National Grand Lodge, Independent Order of Good Templars, West Hartford, Conn.; Dwight Anderson, Director, Public Relations, Medical Society of the State of New York; Edward E. Blake, National Chairman, Prohibition National Committee, Chicago; W. Roy Breg, Executive Secretary, Allied Youth, Washington; T. J. Donovan, General Counsel, Allied Liquor Industries, New York; Hugh Harley, Brewing Industry Foundation,

these groups, and of other pertinent matters cannot be treated within the limits of an article, but it is thought that the discussion of the aspects chosen permits certain generalizations concerning techniques of social agitation that might be suggestive in the study of other pressure programs.

1. *Major Strategies.* Dr. Purley A. Baker, General Superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League of America at the time, outlined the whole sequence of steps in Dry major strategy at the League's Victory Convention in Washington in 1919 as follows:

When we had township option we could do little with wet townships about us:

When we had municipal local option we could do little with wet cities about us:

When we had county option we could do but little with wet counties around us:

When we had state option we could do little with wet states around us:

And now, what does it mean to have wet countries around us with the system of transportation now in the world?

For a hundred miles down in Texas and Louisiana and all those border states rum would rule in pandemonium as it comes across the border.

Mexico must be cared for. South America must be cared for. The nations of the earth must be helped.

This outline of the steps in Dry strategy naturally oversimplifies the whole program. It leaves out of consideration the rôle of the manufacture of bootleg liquor and many of the consequences of the greater ease with which "high-powered rot-gut" can be transported secretly than the more bulky wines and beers. But it gives the steps taken in the thinking and action of the Drys as they drove on for the Eighteenth Amendment in the years before 1919 and also since repeal as they have begun to seek the restoration of nationwide prohibition.

The major strategy of the anti-prohibitionist forces is not so programmatic. It consisted before 1919 and it still consists chiefly of fighting the efforts of the Drys to extend the prohibition areas and the scope of restrictive legislation, of precipitating efforts to repeal local-option prohibition laws and ordinances, and of generally discrediting pro-

hibition as a technique for the promotion of temperance or abstinence.

In the light of such high strategies by the protagonists in the struggles, let us attempt to sum up the influence of ten major factors in bringing success first to the Drys, then to the Wets, and to examine the operation of these ten factors today in the new prohibition drive:

2. *The Drives for the Eighteenth (Prohibition) and Twenty-First (Repeal) Amendments Compared with the Present Prohibition Drive.* Here are ten factors that apparently contributed powerfully to the success of Dry strategy in the drive culminating in the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment January 16, 1919:³

a. *Drink and religion are competitors.* As William James⁴ has pointed out, the "sway of alcohol over mankind is unquestionably due to its power to stimulate the mystical faculties of human nature, usually crushed to earth by the cold facts and dry criticisms of the sober hour. . . . The drunken consciousness is one bit of the mystic consciousness, and our total opinion of it must find its place in our opinion of that larger whole." In other words, religious mysticism and alcoholic mysticism can only be understood psychologically as phases of mystical experiences generally. Thus, as Clark Washburn⁵ points out, "liquor dealers, religious organizations and the moving picture exhibitors are natural competitors for patronage." And it has taken a long time for all three to come to some recognition of this competitive situation and for some workable adjustments between them to appear. The first adjustment attempted by the ministers was to

³For more detail, see especially John Allen Krout, *The Origins of Prohibition* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1925), and Peter H. Odegard, *Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1928). For a partisan (Dry) treatment, see Ernest H. Cherrington, *The Evolution of Prohibition in the United States: A Chronology* (Westerville, Ohio, American Issue Press, 1920).

⁴*The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1902), p. 387.

⁵"Prohibition," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII (1934), pp. 499-510, p. 504, quoted.

eliminate what they regarded as an unnecessary and vile competitor to their search for souls to convert to Christianity, with the Saloon representing most directly the Devil.

b. *The farmers and villagers wanted to maintain the influence of their ideals over the country.* The first prohibition drive was also a part of an attempt by rural and village people to regain something of their waning influence in the United States and to impose their way of life upon urban dwellers. What seems to objective observers to have been a quixotic waste of Protestant reforming energy upon the subduing of a windmill, looked to the country folk as a way of preventing American cities—to which their children were being drawn—from going the course of Sodom and Gomorrah and taking the whole country with them.

c. *Evangelical Protestants raised the cry of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion."* With the Roman Catholics not showing in general any enthusiasm for prohibition and with many Irish and other Roman Catholics identified with the Saloon, the evangelical Protestants turned to the old nativist appeal with the cry of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion" and its equivalents, especially in the extremely rural and Protestant districts. The fact that the Protestant Episcopalians also did not show any enthusiasm for prohibition was discounted on the grounds that they are "tissue-paper Catholics" and tend to identify themselves with the Anglican Catholics of the Church of England. The anti-Roman-Catholic enthusiasm of the old Protestant nativist movements that went into the Ku Klux Klan during the period immediately following World War I was thus canalized into the prohibition movement before and during that war.⁶

d. *Prohibition gained greatly from votes against the excesses and political power of specific saloon keepers.* Every sizable community contained at least one "bad saloon" that came to typify in the minds of the

citizenry the evils of the Saloon System and the Whiskey Trust. As William Allen White wrote in the *Chicago Tribune* of March 10, 1908, "It is not a prohibition wave but an anti-saloon wave, a protest against the product of the liquor business as it has developed in this country." And Peter H. Odegard⁷ points out, "Moderate drinkers and total abstainers, who balked at the idea of absolute prohibition, were willing to admit that the American saloon had become a noisome thing." In other words, there is general agreement that a large share of the vote against Liquor in the first prohibition drive was a vote against the excesses and political power of specific "poor men's clubs," certain especially obnoxious saloons.

e. *Business interests looked upon drinking as bad for their employees.* Drinking employees, they thought, were both inefficient and dangerous. They looked upon them as improper workers in a machine civilization and also as probable agitators and strikers. Representatives of management believed before 1919 that saloons in working-class districts were hotbeds of agitation for shorter hours, improved conditions, and higher wages. They therefore believed that prohibition would help to "civilize" their employees. Representatives of other business interests, such as the vendors of non-alcoholic beverages, also looked upon prohibition as a means of diverting funds from Liquor to "more useful" outlets. And so did some who were interested in savings, home-construction, food, automobiles, etc.

f. *Prohibition appealed to southerners as a way of keeping the Negro "in his place."* This was especially true in the urban districts where Negroes had a tendency to "get ideas" and to "get out of hand." As Clark Washburton⁸ notes, "In the first prohibition wave, when the Negroes were under the complete domination of plantation owners, and in the second, when they still resided chiefly in the rural areas and the domination of white landlords was almost as complete

⁶ Noel P. Gist, *Secret Societies: A Cultural Study of Fraternalism in the United States* (Columbia, University of Missouri, 1940), esp. chap. 4; J. M. Mecklin, *The Ku Klux Klan* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1924).

⁷ *Pressure Politics* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1928), p. 38.

⁸ "Prohibition," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII (1934), pp. 499-510, p. 504 quoted.

as under slavery, the south was virtually untouched by the movement. But with the migration of the Negroes to urban areas, drunkenness and crime associated therewith became serious Negro problems. The third wave of state wide prohibition began in the south and by 1917 the entire section was legally dry. Throughout the south state laws and national prohibition have been enforced more stringently among the Negroes than among the white population." Suppressed and frustrated Negroes, members of a submerged caste, with some release given to them through drink, sometimes threatened to forget to "stay in their place," and the whites handled the situation in the same fashion as they had handled the problem of Negro voting: with laws that applied to Negroes, not to whites.

g. *Professional evangelists, reformers, and other demagogues found in the Dry drive an attractive and profitable outlet for their talents*, especially under the auspices of the W.C.T.U. and the Anti-Saloon League. They therefore flocked to it and gave it power and direction.

h. *Large contributors to political movements and campaigns found that the Drys offered a more attractive issue than did those who stressed issues more fundamental to the control of our economic and political institutions*. The "era of the muckrakers" of about 1901 to 1912, so labeled by Theodore Roosevelt, struck many business leaders in particular as having an unsettling tendency. The Prohibitionists merely attacked Booze, the Saloon, the Whiskey Trust, and the Brewers, but Lincoln Steffens, Ray Stannard Baker, Upton Sinclair, and others went after the political bosses, the public utilities, patent medicines, advertising, and even capitalism itself. Let the reformers have Booze and the Saloon! Let that keep them busy!⁹

i. *The identification of beer with German immigrants to this country and of those immigrants with pro-Germanism in World War I reacted to the discredit of Booze and the Saloon*. Many breweries were owned by Americans of German birth or ancestry, and

the group was represented in part by the National German-American Alliance, which carried on propaganda against prohibition. As a result, Congressional investigations¹⁰ (then as now a prime way to provide a sounding board for propaganda) firmly identified in the minds of many the breweries with the enemy, by derivation all Liquor with pro-Teutonic influences.

j. *Liquor became a wartime sacrifice*. In World War I, as in World War II, Americans deprived themselves of many things to defeat "the Kaiser" in a great upsurge of courageous and puritanical self-sacrifice, and Liquor was one of these sacrifices. As Harry Elmer Barnes¹¹ has it, "Prohibition was sneaked over under the cover of the prevalent hysterical tendency of the people of the United States to save and sacrifice to defeat the Kaiser. Prohibition was part and parcel of war idealism, as much as the freeing of repressed peoples, the sanctity of treaties, the battle for democracy, and the like."

And so wartime Prohibition came, and then as Prohibitionist Irving Fisher¹² of Yale University admitted in 1926, Constitutional "National Prohibition came prematurely, before a proper try-out of War-time Prohibition had sufficiently prepared the population of the large cities for Constitutional Prohibition." A more objective student of the subject, John Allen Krout,¹³ observes that Federal Prohibition through the Eighteenth Amendment came to many Americans in 1920 "with something of a shock. Though they were aware of the political power possessed by the enemies of the liquor traffic, they had not realized that the reformers were so near the goal." Naturally the super-pres-

⁹ See, for example, U. S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda* (65th Congress, 2nd Session, pursuant to Senate Resolutions 307 and 439; Washington, Government Printing Office, 1919), 3 vols.

¹¹ *Prohibition Versus Civilization: Analyzing the Dry Psychosis* (New York: Viking Press, 1932), pp. 122-23.

¹² *Prohibition at Its Worst* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 83.

¹³ *The Origins of Prohibition* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1925), p. no. not given (Foreword).

⁹ C. C. Regier, *The Era of the Muckrakers* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1932).

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sure tactics of the Anti-Saloon League, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, *et al.* had much to do with the surprise factor in this victory, the immediate growth of anti-prohibition agitation.

Let us review now the operation of these same ten factors in the counter-drive for the Twenty-First Amendment. Here is a summary:¹⁴

a. *Drink and religion are competitors.* They continued to be competitors, but ministers and especially laymen were learning that the age-old problems of Liquor cannot be solved by outright and immediate suppression. In a democracy, laws resemble rather closely the mores or they do not "work," and the mores are patterns of behavior and not of idealization.

b. *The farmers and villagers wanted to maintain the influence of their ideals over the country.* During World War I, the world of our villagers and farmers had expanded, and the automobile and radio made it expand even more during the 1920's and early 1930's. What had been thought of as the "urban type of mind" became less bound by geography, more a psychological factor that might and did appear throughout the country.

c. *"Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion."* The Ku Klux Klan reached a peak possibly in 1924 with what may have been as many as 6,000,000 members.¹⁵ It had a resurgence in the 1928 campaign to "Keep the Pope Out of the White House," the contest between Alfred E. Smith and Herbert Hoover (in which Hoover won). But such organizations as the National Conference of Christians and Jews, formed in 1928, were pointing the way toward more sensible relations between our religious and cultural minorities, emphasizing among other things that we all belong to minorities. Organized Protestantism as a

whole had set its course strongly against intolerant movements that capitalized upon such differences, and the wave of new ecstatic Protestant groups that began to blossom in World War II had not gained much prominence as yet.

d. *Prohibition had gained greatly from votes against the excesses and political power of specific saloon keepers.* But the Liquor Gangster, the Beer Baron, and the Speakeasy Mobster now loomed as more horrible persons to dread than the dimming vision of the old-time Saloon Keeper and the Whiskey Trust. On the sound propaganda theory that people would vote against a specific menace under their noses but not necessarily against a vague "system," the Wets did exactly what the Drys had done in the previous drive: they dramatized the excesses and political power of specific speakeasy operators.

e. *Business interests had looked upon drinking as bad for their employees.* Now business representatives had come to at least four conclusions, or their actions and statements suggested that they suspected these conclusions:

(1) that their workers could organize effective unions and strikes without a saloon to help them;

(2) that so-called "private prohibition" enforced upon the employees of a given industry for reasons of efficiency and safety worked as well or better than National Prohibition and the need for such prohibition was not eliminated by National Prohibition;

(3) that the allegation that Prohibition would make workers a better market for consumers' goods did not appear to be as substantial an argument in Depression as were the more direct contributions Repeal promised to make to the offsetting of technological unemployment and to aiding with the mounting tax burden; and

(4) that bootlegging subsidized a power outside of the business community with which it was quite difficult to deal on satisfactory terms.

f. *Prohibition appealed to southerners as a way of keeping the Negro "in his place."* And it still worked that way, especially in the cities. But the southerners preferred to have a Democrat for President, even with Repeal as the cost, and they knew that they would find "ways and means" to keep "the niggers in their place," as they put it.

¹⁴ See especially D. E. Heckman, *Prohibition Passes* (MS. Ph.D. Dissertation; Columbus, Ohio State University, 1939), and Clark Washburton, "Prohibition," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII (1934), pp. 499-510.

¹⁵ M. S. Handman, "Ku Klux Klan," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, VII (1932), pp. 607-09, especially p. 608. See also Frank Bohn, "The Ku Klux Klan Interpreted," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXX (1925), pp. 385-407.

g. *Professional evangelists, reformers, and other demagogues* found themselves up against new competition for adherents and subsidies. The decay of fundamentalist religious beliefs, the rise of the motion picture as a substitute for the sawdust trail, the development of national personalities through the radio as personal leaders for greater masses of people, all these things undermined the followings of the old-time gospel performers who did so much to stir up popular support for the Eighteenth Amendment drive. The modern counterparts of the old-time religious demagogues, too, such as Father Charles E. Coughlin of Royal Oak, Michigan, built up some followings, but they failed as yet to "deliver the vote."

h. *Large contributors to political movements and campaigns* continued to believe that the Drys offered an attractive issue with which to distract attention from issues more fundamental to the control of our economic and political institutions, but to keep prohibition alive as such an issue, repeal also had to be an issue and a live one. Prohibition as an accepted and accomplished goal, if such could have been possible, would have eliminated a valuable issue entirely.

i. *The identification of brewers with pro-Germanism* disappeared as a matter of any significance in the general postwar revulsion against what had become known, with sarcasm, as the "Crusade to Make the World Safe for Democracy." With *Fortune Magazine* and Congressional committees¹⁶ branding wars as the products of the munitions makers, with the American Legion and other patriotic bodies attempting to take the "profits out of war,"¹⁷ pro-Germanism temporarily ceased to serve as a term of rebuke.

j. *Liquor as a wartime sacrifice* naturally was also a thing of the past. World War I was long ago. Few dreamt in those days of

the possibility of World War II.

In the early years of the depression, economists were making estimates that repeal would yield revenues of \$2,500,000,000 to \$3,000,000,000 a year, by analogy with the British tax rate and excise system and barring a return of the saloon. These figures looked inviting to many. As Barnes¹⁸ put it in 1932, "The one possible source of pressure which may achieve repeal or revision of Prohibition lies in the current depression. This, together with the deficit in the federal budget, may suffice to offset the Dry Lobby and give legislators courage to vote as they think and drink." Fletcher Dobyns had a slightly different emphasis, and he explained it seven years after repeal in his book, *The Amazing Story of Repeal* (1940). This lawyer attributed repeal to the machinations of a small group of wealthy men who believed that liquor taxes would relieve them of part of their tax loads. In their enthusiasm over Dobyns's analysis, the Drys chose to forget that it was a Dry, James A. White of Ohio, who invented the slogan, "No money is tainted if the Anti-Saloon League can get its hands on it," a principle that had been very useful in financing Prohibitionists in their drive for the Eighteenth Amendment.

That both National Prohibition and Repeal should have come because people with personal axes to grind interested themselves in these projects is no surprise to a social scientist. A careful student of the subject¹⁹ estimates that "the Eighteenth Amendment, which Wayne B. Wheeler once estimated cost sixty-five million dollars to secure, was repealed at a cost of but twenty million dollars." If such pressure tactics had *not* taken place, the social scientist would have cause for surprise. Motive power for such dynamic promotion must come from somewhere.

So much for a summary of the operation of the ten factors during the drives for the Eighteenth and Twenty-First Amendments. Let us examine their status in the present

¹⁶ As reported for example in U. S. Senate, *Hearings Before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry* (73rd Congress, 3rd Session, Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 206; Washington, Government Printing Office, 1934).

¹⁷ For a retrospect on this agitation, see D. C. Blaisdell and Jane Greverus, *Economic Power and Political Pressures* (T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 26; Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 170-3.

¹⁸ H. E. Barnes, *Prohibition Versus Civilization* (New York: Viking Press, 1932), p. 121.

¹⁹ D. E. Heckman, *Prohibition Passes* (MS. Ph.D. Dissertation; Columbus, Ohio State University, 1939), p. 381.

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drive for the extension of prohibition:²⁰

a. *Drink and religion are competitors.* But organized religion is giving more and more evidence, particularly through pronouncements of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America and of certain denominational spokesmen, that approaches to the liquor problem other than immediate prohibition grow in favor. Alcoholics Anonymous, for example, is a co-operative movement of alcoholics who seek to aid themselves with the help of "a Power greater than ourselves." It has gained wide institutional support (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and other). It points to one of several different religious approaches to alcoholism and the alcohol problem.²¹ The members of Alcoholics Anonymous, incidentally, even though they are seeking to be total abstainers, are as a whole bitterly resentful of the Prohibitionists. As Jack Alexander states in *The Saturday Evening Post* of March 1, 1941, "I met and talked with scores of A.A.'s, as they call themselves, and found them to be unusually calm, tolerant people."

b. *The farmers and villagers* still numbered many who wanted to restore the influence of their ideals over the country. Through the demands of Army, Navy, and factory employment in World War II, however, they continued to become more the members of an urbanized country and less the exponents of a narrow morality that they wished to enforce upon their fellow countrymen.

c. "*Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion*" or

²⁰ Some of these factors are surveyed by Dwight Anderson, "Alcohol and Public Opinion," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, III (December 1942), pp. 376-92.

²¹ *Alcoholics Anonymous* (New York, Works Publishing, Inc., 1937); Jack Alexander, "Alcoholics Anonymous: Freed Slaves of Drink, Now They Free Others," *Saturday Evening Post*, March 1, 1941; A.A. (New York, Alcoholic Foundation, August 1943, pamphlet). For other religious approaches, see Otis R. Rice, "Religion and the Church in Relation to Alcohol Addiction: I, Religious Resources in the Treatment of Alcohol Addiction," and Seward Hiltner, "Religion and the Church in Relation to Alcohol Addiction: II, Aspects Other Than Therapeutic," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, III (December 1942), pp. 393-408.

perhaps some tie-up between Prohibitionism and Jew-baiting or Negro-beating may become a factor again in the promotion of prohibition. Such comments as the following from *Progress: Publication of the International Reform Federation*²² in 1943 are not unusual:

The wets are waking up to the power of protest and are sending in petitions against the Bryson Bill evidently obtained in the saloons from the character of the foreign names attached as well as the sender.

The "character of the foreign names" is a native-American catch-phrase. But such excesses, such divisive tendencies, have had a "lid clamped on them" during World War II. They represent, however, a real danger for the postwar period not only to those fearful of prohibition and its consequences but also to those who dread authoritarianism born of such hysterical scapegoat-beatings. Such events as the Detroit race riots of the week of June 20, 1943,²³ and other racial clashes and frictions may issue forth in a new nativist movement after World War II, similar to the Ku Klux Klan after World War I. Demagogues are now available—Father Charles E. Coughlin, Rev. Gerald L. K. Smith, and Rev. J. Frank Norris, all of the Detroit area, for examples. But then demagogues always arise when the opportunities for their work are present. They can smell societal decay afar, and they swarm to it.

d. *Prohibition had gained greatly from votes against the excesses and political power of specific saloon keepers.* Repeal had also gained greatly from votes against the excesses and power of similar speakeasy operators. Until the distillers and brewers so far forget this point as to think that America has come to like the saloon whether or no, so long as the distillers and brewers put up a reasonably accurate and convincing facsimile of self-regulation, they will keep this irritant within manageable limits.²⁴

²² XLIII: 9 (October 1943), p. 9.

²³ A. M. Lee and N. D. Humphrey, *Race Riot* (New York, Dryden Press, 1943).

²⁴ C. W. Badenhausen, "The Brewing Industry's Program of Action," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, IV (1940), pp. 657-63; Brewing Industry Foundation, *Self-Regulation in Wartime: 1942*.

e. *Business interests* on the whole, as the preceding list (e) indicates, have learned their lesson so far as prohibition is concerned in connection with their employees.

f. *Prohibition still appeals to southerners as a way of keeping the Negro—especially in the cities—"in his place."* With race riots and other evidences of friction flaring in northern cities, the rôle that anti-Negro feeling may play in future Dry agitation—as point (c) above brings out—is uncertain and menacing.

g. *Professional evangelists, reformers, and other demagogues* are likely to find "softer pickings" in movements more strictly economic and political in character than were the old-time Dry revival meetings, the tremendous money-raising orgies of the Anti-Saloon League and its affiliates and competitors, and the W.C.T.U.

h. *Large contributors to political movements and campaigns* may once more find prohibition an enticing political issue, but to be workable such an issue would probably have to come riding back in as a part of the ideology for an authoritarian drive, the kind of abstinence Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Party advocated for the "Master Race."

i. *The identification of brewers with pro-Germanism* did not materialize again during World War II. On the contrary, the inept leadership of the Drys permitted the Prohibitionist lobby to get itself identified with an obviously labeled pro-fascist, "Capt." Edward Page Gaston, United States Director of the World Prohibition Foundation and organizer of the New Vigilantes of America in 1932 and of its successor, the Patriotic Guard of America.²⁵ Pro-Germans also seized upon such foolish and unpatriotic Dry canards as the Pearl-Harbor-drunkenness story²⁶ and used them for subversive purposes. This embarrassed many a sincerely convinced Pro-

hibitionist who was also a patriotic American.

j. *Liquor as a wartime sacrifice* is one of the factors that most nearly approximates its World War I characteristics. If it were not for the bitter experiences of National Prohibition²⁷ and if it were not for the sizable and vocal anti-Prohibitionist sympathies of the Army and Navy, more progress might have been made towards wartime prohibition. As the war goes on, however, indications increase that liquor, wine, and possibly also beer will dry up more and more, and then what? Wartime expedients have a way of staying on and on.

These comparative analyses of the Eighteenth, Twenty-First, and present drives in the light of ten major factors emphasize the roles of life-conditions and events in the success of agitations for changes in law and custom. This material also furnishes background for the other three points to be discussed, beginning with what was referred to above as "an anatomy of agitation":

3. *The Groups Involved in the Present Prohibition Struggle.* The most obvious differentiation between the Dry and Wet movements in the present Prohibition struggle is that the Drys, like so many reformist groups, are led by people who are motivated by a kind of fanaticism; the Wets, like so many conservative groups, are led by professionals who are motivated less by burning zeal and more by finite considerations. Since both movements have some social types in common, it will be useful to characterize first the types to be found in the more complex one, the Dry movement, and then to identify those also found among the Wets.

In such an attempt to sum up observations on the "sorts of people" active in the Dry movement, it is helpful at the outset to discuss what is meant by fanaticism, defined briefly as a "frenzied partisanship or blind zeal in any cause, whether religious, social or political."²⁸ Fanaticism has been further

²⁵ New York Post, January 13, 1942.

²⁶ Apparently first given wide circulation by "Capt." Edward Page Gaston, beginning with a sermon he delivered early in January 1942 in Washington's New York Avenue Presbyterian Church. Later given greater impetus by George Barton Cutten, President of Colgate University, after the canard had been officially disproved by a Presidential Committee headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts.

²⁷ See for examples Frederick L. Collins, "Prohibition—Will It Happen Again?" *Liberty*, June 27, 1942; "Creeping Prohibition," *Time*, November 15, 1943.

²⁸ M. C. Otto, "Fanaticism," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, VI (1931), pp. 90-2, p. 90 quoted.

described in "its authentic occurrence" as "the effect of three passional components," as follows: (1) "extreme narrowness and rigidity of temper," (2) "unyielding determination to make the fixed idea triumph over men," and (3) "callousness to pain . . . uncommonly insensitive to human suffering, often to the point of cruelty."²⁹ In short, as Isaac Taylor puts it in his old book on *Fanaticism* (1834), it is "Enthusiasm inflamed by Hatred."

It is not contended that all Drys are out and out fanatics, specimens of the "authentic occurrence" of fanaticism. The contention is that fanaticism is a variable part of the make-up of Drys, as it is of the mentalities of those dedicated to other Causes of the sort: anti-tobacco, anti-swearing, Sunday observance, anti-card-playing. Rather extreme fanaticism can be illustrated with Frances E. Willard, long-time leader of the National W.C.T.U., who tells in her *Glimpses of Fifty Years* how she decided to side up with the Prohibition Party, as follows:

It was a solemn and exalted hour in which my brain teemed with the sweet reasonableness of such a course, and my conscience rejoiced in its triumph over considerations of expediency. Nothing has ever disturbed the tranquil assurance that I was then helped to make a logical and wise decision inspired from Heaven.

Without dealing further in specific personalities, one can summarize observations on the kinds of personalities drawn into their movement by the Drys by saying that they attract: (1) agitators, (2) professional promoters, (3) bureaucrats, (4) "heelers," (5) "just members," (6) "fronts," and (7) "fellow travelers." These are not mutually exclusive categories. They are rough types. Some agitators are somewhat professional in their grasp of promotional techniques. Some professional promoters exhibit a degree of fanaticism beyond that expected and sometimes beyond that desirable in such a technician. Bureaucrats constitute a special class of "heelers," one might say, and the lines between "heelers" and "just members" and between "just members" and "fellow trav-

elers" have no distinctness. As the term suggests, "fronts" are "fellow travelers" who are sufficiently prominent and unlabeled to give a function broader respectability. In addition, the basis of motivation of a given person may change as time goes on; the agitator may work out a new basis of adjustment for his personality problems and thus develop into a professional promoter and then, as more time passes, he may ripen or disintegrate (as you view it) into a bureaucrat. Others are bureaucrats from the outset, and still others may go through transitional stages from agitator to "fellow traveler."

The agitators, the real fanatics, both paid and volunteer, furnish the emotional drive, the unflinching zeal, the really dogmatic and uncompromising fanaticism that serves as the spearhead of drives and programs. Professional promoters differ from agitators chiefly in being motivated primarily by "professional" (monetary, service, artistic, security-giving, status) considerations rather than by The Cause (a fanatical drive to attain a "necessary" goal). Professional promoters have the talents of public speakers, publicity agents, writers, lobbyists, as do agitators, but the professional promoters also include among them experts in the broader field of public relations, a perspective on society that requires somewhat more objectivity and technical competence than an agitator is likely to accumulate. As a matter of fact, truly professional promoters contribute most importantly an objectivity unmingled with emotionalism that helps to stabilize and direct a movement.³⁰

Trailing behind the agitators and professional promoters in any movement come those of small talents and narrow aspirations, the bureaucrats, those who see opportunities for jobs as such and little more, the people who know the arts of memo-passing, protective-coloration, and self-preservation and who care for little else than the comparative security thus provided.

The "heelers" and "just members" of any

³⁰ See A. M. Lee, "Public Relations Counseling as Institutional Psychiatry," *Psychiatry*, VI (August 1943), pp. 271-6.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

movement are the great rank-and-file, those who for many reasons need the kinds of psychological and social satisfactions a pressure group or Cause organization can offer them. "Heelers" are the more or less faithful foot soldiers of the army; "just members" are the casual contributors, the members of the audiences, the people who "think it's a good thing" and "want to be identified with it." Prohibition and the Anti-Saloon League or W.C.T.U. give the heelers focal points to which they orient themselves and through which they can get a greater feeling of security in an unsatisfactory, vaguely shifting world. For that matter, both agitators and heelers get something of the same satisfactions out of the Prohibition movement that others get out of other forms of religious mysticism or out of alcoholic beverages.

Through visits from traveling leaders and experts on The Cause and through the publications of city, state, and national Dry organizations, their principal media of communication, the propaganda "line" is not only kept constantly before the rank-and-file of the movement, but the "line" is kept fresh in its applications, through constantly relating Dry philosophy to new situations and personalities as they arise. The circulation of *The National Prohibitionist*, the National W.C.T.U. *Union Signal*, and the like is not impressive, but the various types of Dry organization members absorb their contents and pass the propaganda along to the much larger body of "fellow travelers." The way in which Dry propaganda filters, for example, into the elementary and secondary school textbooks of the country has been surveyed by Anne Roe, and this penetration has been tremendous.³¹

The Wets number in their movement chiefly: (1) professional promoters, (2) bureaucrats, (3) "just members," (4) "fronts," and (5) "fellow travelers." During the prohibition period, the Wets numbered some agitators and heelers, but the maintenance of the *status quo* in any field has little attraction for the fanatic and for those en-

tranced by the romance of a Cause. The Wets do not promise human salvation through the achievement of a clearly defined goal; their goals, as they see them, involve merely the promotion of a tolerant society, the provision of a pleasant diversion, the continuance of an ancient industry that pays excessive taxes and provides many jobs.

How do such social types, drawn into the two opposing camps, compete with each other for the support of the vast and indifferent majority? How do they hold their adherents, get new ones, and extend their grasp over the minds and actions of fellow travelers? Their philosophies, stressing the appeal of such philosophies to adherents, will help to develop this picture.

4. *Their Philosophies.* The play, *Ten Nights in a Bar-Room*,³² a propaganda piece that ranks with *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, may be said to epitomize the philosophy of Prohibitionists and the substance of their popular propaganda efforts even today. In it, Liquor and The Saloon lead Frank Slade irrevocably from the ways of Decency to those of Murder and Damnation. There is no compromise, no effort to see the good in the evil person's mind, the evil in the mind of the saint, the brotherhood under the skin of "all God's chillun"; all is Good or Evil. The first sip of beer, even the first cigarette, can thus lead only to the criminal's dock, the gallows, and a forgotten grave.

Dry philosophy succeeds—when it does—because of the hold that one or more powerful appeals in it can secure over the minds of old and new adherents. The following list outlines briefly seven of the chief of such appeals inherent in Dry philosophy:

a. It provides a religiously-sanctioned *Scapegoat* into which frustrations may be projected and upon which pent up aggressions may be vented.

b. It furnishes religiously-sanctioned *Child-Substitutes* into which Drys can project their idealizations, as compensations for their own inadequacies, which sometimes include the lack

³¹ *A Survey of Alcohol Education in Elementary and High Schools in the United States* (New Haven, Quarterly Journal of Studies in Alcohol, 1943).

³² First performed in New York City's National Theater August 23, 1858. W. W. Pratt, *Ten Nights in a Bar-Room, a Drama, in Five Acts* (New York, Samuel French); founded on T. S. Arthur, *Ten Nights in a Bar-Room and What I Saw There* (New York, A. L. Burt Co.).

of children or of the "right kind" of children. In short, having exaggerated or frustrated needs for such satisfactions, the Drys can thus find a channel through which they can express those needs in the attempted management of others.

c. It caters to exaggerated needs for *Perfection*, the sort of thing the late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes summed up in an essay on "Natural Law," published in his *Collected Legal Papers*, when he said, "It is not enough for the knight of romance that you agree that his lady is a very nice girl—if you do not admit that she is the best that God ever made or will make, you must fight." He calls this demand for the superlative the factor that drives some men to drink and points out "that this demand is at the bottom of the philosopher's effort to prove that truth is absolute and of the jurist's search for criteria of universal validity which he collects under the head of natural law."

d. It offers a formula for *Simplification*, a simple and all-explaining ideology, that orients Drys to the world's complexities.

e. It gives a pattern for *Regression*. Individuals frustrated by their daily contacts with unpleasant reality frequently feel a compulsion to go back in their imaginations and behavior to periods at which they fancy they were more content and especially more secure, usually at some period in their childhood. Dry philosophy permits some to take that way of experiencing again some of the joys associated with a sternly disciplined home.

f. It supplies, more generally speaking, a way to flee from reality into its *Mysticism*, a flight from the woes of this wicked work-a-day world to a "finer plane of understanding." This mysticism is part of the sort of thing adherents enjoy in secret societies.³³ It derives in the case of Dry philosophy from certain religious conceptions, theological theorizings, and psychological needs, and it has as one of its symptoms and characteristics a special language, somewhat different in meaning and detail from that defined in the ordinary dictionary.

g. It encourages, through common goals, mystical conceptions, and special language, the *Identification* of adherents with the movement and with one another in a manner that assures at least some of them of a higher degree of psychological security than they might otherwise find.³⁴

³³ Noel P. Gist, *Secret Societies* (Columbia, University of Missouri, 1940), especially chaps. 7 and 8.

³⁴ In this digest of a much longer work, it is naturally not possible to illustrate these points here

As the brief descriptions of these seven psychological appeals indicate, they are not sharply separable conceptions but rather aspects of the whole appeal made by Dry ideology to old and new adherents. The mind cannot be categorized, and these seven appeals are labeled and described merely to indicate seven aspects of certain people's interrelated personalities which—to a greater or less degree—find in Dry philosophy the fulfillment of needs and other satisfactions.

From the foregoing analysis, those acquainted with the psychology of alcoholics³⁵ can appreciate the statement that the mystical appeals of alcohol and of Dry philosophy have much in common.³⁶ The devotees of alcohol also find in it elements that cater to their exaggerated needs for perfection, simplification, and identification.

The appeals of the philosophies of the Wet propagandists are more difficult to analyze because there is no one Wet philosophy, no finely wrought Wet ideology. The anti-prohibition position appeals for reasons ranging from a well-developed thirst for alcoholic beverages to a dread of the societal consequences of prohibition legislation and enforcement, from the psychotic or neurotic or merely emotional to the "normal" and logical. This lack of a well-worked-out set of rationalizations, aside from the intellectual ones provided by tolerant liberalism and the commercial ones supplied by industrial apologists, reflects the conservative character of the Wet position and the rear-guard type of fight the Wets tend to carry on, a kind of combat common among conservative groups when not too hard pressed.

5. *Their Tactics.* The (1) major strategies, (2) events and climates of opinion, (3)

adequately for reasons of space. The author's forthcoming *Techniques of Agitation: An Analysis of the New Prohibition Drive* (New York, Dryden Press) devotes considerable space to this aspect of the subject.

³⁵ H. W. Haggard and E. M. Jellinek, *Alcohol Explored* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1942), especially chaps. 4, 5, and 7; *Alcoholics Anonymous* (New York, Works Publishing Inc., 1937).

³⁶ J. P. Shalloo, "Some Cultural Factors in the Etiology of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, II (1941), pp. 464-78.

groups involved, and (4) philosophies converge upon programs of implementation. And both the Wets and the Drys forward their efforts through the common tactics of (a) publicity, (b) political pressuring, and (c) "boring from within," to borrow another term from those used to describe left-wing political tactics. These means of promotion naturally overlap somewhat, but they provide rough headings under which to sum up very briefly this dynamic aspect of the subject.

a. *Publicity*. Lacking currently as sympathetic treatment in the general-circulation press as they would like to have, the Drys depend chiefly for publicity upon such media as their own periodicals, country and small-town weeklies, their own organizations, public speakers, special holidays, handbills, posters, etc. The Wets, chiefly represented by the manufacturers and distributors of liquors, wines, and beers and their trade associations, distribute their messages through newspaper and magazine advertising, radio, posters, and special devices placed in bars and liquor stores.

Despite the volume and persistence of the efforts of both Wets and Drys, however, the effectiveness of all such publicity projects depends upon the extent to which they can and do make plausible explanations of facts, experiences, needs, events, desires felt by their audiences. When the "climate of sentiment" is unfavorable, the Drys or the Wets beat the winds; when a particularly irritating saloon or other sore-spot helps to change that "climate," the Drys make strides in a given area; when a Dry orator or organization is discredited, the Wets benefit.

b. *Political Pressuring* is the term commonly given to all the ways Americans have devised for forcing politicians to translate their glittering double-talk into behavior representative of special interests, the interests of the pressuring group.³⁷ The partly ac-

curate popular conception is that Booze and Bribery account for the bulk of such pressuring, but the Anti-Saloon League demonstrated from its earliest days the virtues of bludgeoning representatives with petitions, letters, telegrams, and delegations. External pressures brought to bear upon governmental functionaries from Washington to the smallest governmental unit, cleverly organized, plus "horse-trading" and the "right kind" of contacts and friendships have tremendous power in "aiding legislators to decide what the people want and need."

c. *Boring From Within* can include practically everything not grouped under the preceding. No "simon pure" pressure group can obtain a very large audience in terms of its own membership. As a purist sect, its demands upon its membership attract the fanatical minority and repel the tolerant or indifferent majority. Similarly no commercial pressure group can hope to obtain a very large audience in one industry in terms of those directly connected with the business in question. Both seek, therefore, to spread the "message" as widely as possible through "fellow travelers" and "neutral" publicity media, to achieve segments of their programs piecemeal through compromises and deals, and to establish as many "common fronts" as possible with other organizations, and these are the chief "boring from within" tactics. And the public, parochial, and private school systems of the United States are always the first goals for any extensive boring efforts of the sort.³⁸ As Frances E. Willard liked to say, "We must go among the children with our temperance work. Mighty weapons will be hurled against them when they emerge from the sheltering fortress of home—they ought not to go forth unarmed."

Anne Roe, in her *Survey of Alcohol Education in Elementary and High Schools in the*

Brady, *Business as a System of Power* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1943). The outstanding treatments of this subject in the Wet-Dry struggles are P. H. Odegard, *Pressure Politics* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1928), and D. E. Heckman, *Prohibition Passes* (MS. Ph.D. Dissertation; Columbus, Ohio State University, 1939).

³⁸ "Propaganda in the Schools" and "Propaganda Over the Schools," *Propaganda Analysis*, II: 8 (May 1, 1939) and IV: 4 (February 25, 1941) respectively.

³⁷ In this connection, especially illuminating is D. C. Blaisdell and Jane Greverus, *Economic Power and Political Pressures* (T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 26: Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941); answered by John Scoville in *Fact and Fancy in the T.N.E.C. Monographs* (New York, National Association of Manufacturers, 1942). On the broader implications of this type of activity, see R. A.

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United States (1943), tells how the Drys effected the change, repeal, and re-enactment of state laws dealing with alcohol education until now all the states have mandatory legislation in this area. In the materials used recently, the "horror-provoking illustrations of diseased livers, and many sweeping statements, have been discarded along with the purely moralistic orientation." In other words, Dr. Roe says that the public-school program is now alleged to be "'scientific, unemotional, pedagogical,' and great emphasis is laid on these descriptive terms. But in spite of the recognition of the desirability of a scientific approach, the motivation remains essentially moralistic, as is apparent from a scanning of the newer publications." The Roman Catholic parochial schools, Dr. Roe concludes, identify "temperance" with "moderation," not "teetotalism," and she says it appears that their "general position [is] that alcohol is one of God's creations and is therefore not inherently evil, but can be abused." Dr. Roe credits Miss Bertha Rachel Palmer's *Syllabus in Alcohol Education* (published by the National W.C.T.U., sixth edition 1941) with having great influence upon the courses of study throughout the country despite its distortions of scientific fact and other inaccuracies.

While the Wets do not have ecclesiastical machinery for sanctioning their "boring" tactics and can only offer non-emotional scientific and commercial arguments, they try to offset the activities of the Drys in "neutral" territories and to do what boring they can on their own behalf.

* * *

Within the limits of this brief paper, the foregoing attempts to set forth a sketch of some of the things that may be learned from studying such a reform movement as that currently agitated by the Prohibitionists. Naturally this is only one case, even though comparative materials are brought to bear upon it from other cases, directly and by inference, and from more general studies. Also space has prevented adequate treatments of the historical perspectives into which the present drive should be fitted, of the charac-

teristics of the specific pressure groups involved in the struggle, of the propaganda theories and techniques used by these groups, and of other pertinent matters.

Among other things, this type of social-psychological and historical synthesis and analysis has the merit of bringing the sociologist closer to what might be called clinical societal materials than more individualistic and more generalized (including many statistical) approaches. Such a clinical approach, bringing one into contact with vibrant societal struggles and other processes, can perhaps eventually furnish significant data for useful societal guidance in such areas.

As to the relation of such positions as those of the Drys and Wets to coping with the roles of alcohol in modern society, one is immediately impressed by the fact that more energy is expended upon the promotion of pat propaganda theories than upon attempts to work out sensible and workable programs. An outstanding student of social dynamics and of alcohol³⁹ has pointed out that "the public must understand its kinship with the problem drinker before it will be possible for many to accept his difficulties as their own." He believes that this adjustment could be effected through the reiteration of "these 4 kinetic ideas:

1. That the problem drinker is a sick man, exceptionally reactive to alcohol.
2. That he can be helped.
3. That he is worth helping.
4. That the problem is therefore a responsibility of the healing professions, as well as of the established health authorities and the public generally.

The next step that might be taken in this thinking would be to the societal maladjustments of which alcoholics and many other types of neurotics and psychotics are by-products and to an attempt to cope with these maladjustments. In pursuing such lines of thought, however, one quickly leaves the Prohibitionist and the business-as-usual Wet far behind.

³⁹ Dwight Anderson, "Alcohol and Public Opinion" *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, III (1942), pp. 376-92, pp. 391-2 quoted.

WHAT LEVEL OF LIVING INDEXES MEASURE*

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Bureau of Agricultural Economics

THE LEVEL of living concept can be defined broadly or more narrowly, depending on the variety of satisfactions included over and above those obtainable from economic goods and services. It can be interpreted so broadly as to be coextensive with almost all aspects of human behavior, acquisitions, valuations, and social relationships.¹ Even with the broadest definition of level of living, the quantity, quality, and variety of goods and services utilized comprises a very important part of the individual's or family's level of living. This is the part of level of living which has been subjected to measurement most frequently.² It is, of

course, highly positively correlated with a more broadly defined level of living inclusive of other factors, and probably with any of the several factors which might be included in a broader concept.³ Therefore, we assume that a working concept of level of living with sufficiently universal validity may be cast in terms of the level of current consumption or utilization of goods and services, with services being broadly interpreted to include both publicly furnished and privately secured services which contribute to well-being or provide satisfactions.

The level of consumption and utilization of goods and services during a specified period of time is not identical with an income or expenditure level since consumption expenditures may exceed or fall short of the income in the specified period, and since the utility obtained from goods and services currently used is by no means strictly identifiable with current consumption expenditures. Furthermore, a given expenditure level may represent for different families or individuals widely different quantities of goods and services due to differences in costs of living, differences in quantities of goods and services consumed which are not purchased, and differences in budget management. Hence a measure of level of living is not merely a substitute for a measure of income or family living expenditures, since the concept, although closely related, is clearly differentiated.

* Presented to the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, New York, December 5, 1943.

¹ The two following excerpts represent examples of a broad and a narrow definition respectively (the first specifying "plane" rather than "level," a commonly used synonym):

"The plane of living . . . is best evidenced by outcome rather than intake, by the net effects of consumption under the physical, economic, and spiritual conditions in which the consumption takes place. The various end results include health, productivity, satisfactions, and other subjective and objective entities." Joseph S. Davies, "Consumption Level; Consumption Standard; Plane of Living; Standard of Living," *The Journal of Marketing*, VI (October 1941), p. 164.

"Level of living . . . means the variety, amount and quality of economic goods consumed annually by the family." E. L. Kirkpatrick, "The Effect of Minimum and Maximum Status on the Standard of Life," in *Farm Income and Farm Life*, New York: The University of Chicago Press for the American Country Life Association, 1927, p. 126.

² Howard R. Cottam, after defining both "standard" and "level" of living as behavior, "not a collection of material items," goes on to say, "Patterns of behavior or modes of acting cannot, however, be observed directly for a large number of persons over a period of time, and it is necessary to imply from the presence or absence of cultural items (material or nonmaterial) the types of activity in which persons have engaged to satisfy their wants. The level of living is imputed from the possession or nonpossession of goods, services, or statuses." "Level of Living, Social Participation, and Social Adjustment: A Study of the Standards of Living of 299 Ohio

Farm Families," (University of Wisconsin, unpublished doctoral thesis, 1940), page 19. While we have considered level of living as comprised of the satisfaction of wants by goods and services and Cottam has considered it as the "activity" persons engage in to get such satisfactions, the "satisfactions" or the "activity" in each case are considered to be reflected validly by the goods and services.

³ For example, high correlations of level of living with social participation and social adjustment for a sample of Ohio farm families are reported in Howard R. Cottam and A. R. Mangus, "Standard of Living: An Empirical Test of a Definition," *Rural Sociology*, 7 (December 1942, pp. 395-403).

The great variation present among families and individuals in the goods and services entering into their level of living is averaged out to some extent when we deal with groups of families, to which "indexes" of level of living generally relate.⁴ In this paper attention is to be focused primarily on county indexes of level of living of rural families, such as those developed by Lively and Mangus for 1930 and the recent indexes developed by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics for 1940.⁵ Although considerable use has been made of such indexes during the past decade, little has been written on the nature of these indexes or on the concept of level of living as applied to a county average.⁶ While in certain States or areas rural level of living indexes have been constructed for some specifically defined purpose, those constructed for the United States as a whole have been "general-purpose" indexes, used chiefly in delineation of areas or regions for both administrative and research purposes, and in analyses of the relationships of "level of living" to migration, population pressure, and other demographic, agricultural, socio-economic, and cultural phenomena.

In attempting to indicate what level of living indexes measure, we first wish to underscore three points: (1) that an index

is not a direct measure of the actual level of living, but only an indicant of it; (2) that such an indicant for a county is not of the absolute degree of attainment of some external standard, but is expressed in relation to the corresponding degree of attainment for a defined group (e.g. the average of all counties); (3) that the description of level of living here discussed relates only to the average level attained by the specified residence class of the county, and not to variations in the level of living present among the individual families or persons.

Difficult as is the problem of choosing components for an index of level of living when the unit is a county, it is considerably simpler than when the unit is an individual or a family, because unique deviations from common consumption patterns are not likely to affect a county average whereas they might cause individuals or families to be incorrectly rated on a scale if it were not fairly comprehensive as to coverage. Nevertheless, the problem of choice of components for county level of living indexes is difficult, not so much because of uncertainty as to which items should be included, but rather because of the limitations of available data.

The principles and criteria of selection of components for the index are affected considerably by whether there is available a component which adequately reflects the distribution of individuals or families by income available or spent for family living. If such a component existed, choice of additional components could be limited to those which reflect elements in level of living not covered by the income or expenditure component. To the extent that existing data on income fall short of adequately measuring expenditures for living, the choice of additional components must be designed to make up for the deficiencies in the data as well as for the weakness of expenditure data in reflecting completely the level of living. No data exist on distribution of families or individuals by living expenditures for the counties of the United States, although data on gross farm income are available.

Within the limits prescribed by availability

⁴ It is more common for similar composite measuring devices for individual families to be termed "scales." See, for example, William H. Sewell, *The Construction and Standardization of a Scale for the Measurement of the Socio-Economic Status of Oklahoma Farm Families*, Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College Agricultural Experiment Station Technical Bulletin No. 9 (1940).

⁵ C. E. Lively and Conrad Taeuber, *Rural Migration in the United States*, WPA Research Monograph No. XIX, Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1939, pp. 167-168; A. R. Mangus, *Rural Regions of the United States*, WPA Research Monograph, Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1940, pp. 7-40; Margaret Jarman Hagood, *Rural Level of Living Indexes for Counties of the United States*, Washington: Bureau of Agricultural Economics mimeographed report, October 1943.

⁶ The chief exception to this statement is found in Walter C. McKain, Jr., "The Concept of Plane of Living and the Construction of a Plane of Living Index," *Rural Sociology*, 4 (September 1939), pp. 337-343.

of data, the selection of components other than income or expenditures should be governed by the following criteria:

(1) The component should itself indicate possession or consumption of goods or services, particularly those which, in addition to their use value *per se*, yield to the possessor a commonly associated status value.

(2) The component should represent a larger class of associated items indicating consumption of goods and services, some of which may complement or enhance the utility of the chosen item while others may have quite different types of utility.

(3) The component should indicate possession or consumption of goods or services which are generally sought by all groups and classes of people; that is, the evaluation of these goods and services in the sense of benefits or satisfactions derived should have the maximum universality.

Insofar as the items selected meet these criteria, they provide components for a measure of relative levels of living along a national scale which parallels as closely as possible the dominant configuration of our varied patterns of consumption, i.e., that configuration which through its universality comes closest to typifying attained and attainable patterns. In an important dynamic sense, the dominant consumption pattern is one which tends to modify and displace co-existent divergent patterns. Obviously the pattern described will fit with varying degrees of adequacy regional and social groups which depart in their present economic and social well-being and value systems from the dominant national pattern. Such departures, however, affect the adequacy of the level of living measure only to the extent that the regional socio-economy possesses consumption and living standards basically divergent from the dominant pattern, the divergences being of a relatively permanent nature. If the divergences represent merely a state of partial attainment of universally accepted but gradually evolving standards, the level of living measures appropriate to the nationally dominant pattern still have validity, since the value objectives of the social or regional groups concerned are geared to the dominant pattern. No measure of level of living can

be constructed which can simultaneously provide a measure of the nationally prevalent elements of level of living and also measure the unique elements characteristic of special groups or special areas. As a consequence, an index of level of living which is to be applied nationally must, in order to attain validity, be restricted to elements in the national standard of living which have attained general acceptance. For any specific county it will reflect a reduced, even though central, core of the larger complex of components comprising its actual, and, to some extent unique, level of living.

Differences of opinion exist, of course, as to the extent to which a dominant pattern of living can be either identified or described by a combination of components from data currently available for the rural families of counties of the United States. No claim can be made as to the degree of precision with which any particular index approximates the dominant level of living pattern. There will be less difference of opinion, however, with respect to the general proposition that the course of economic and social development has led us far along towards homogeneity with respect to the objectives sought, if not the realities attained, in the realm of the material and cultural possessions conditioning the level of living. The ability of human beings to make a virtue of necessity may have led to the substitution of one set of values for another in less advantaged areas or classes. Such deviations can and do comprise important aspects of diverse living contents and their measurement should by all means receive careful study. The differences, however, should not loom so large as to distort the national perspective either through an overemphasis of temporary rather than more persistent configurations or through an ignoring of the continuing process of historical development.

Within the framework of concepts and criteria stated above, we shall now examine a particular level of living index to ascertain what it measures. We have indicated above what we consider such an index should measure; we can indicate rather precisely in terms of an operational definition what the

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given index does measure; but we can only approach indirectly the question of how closely these two correspond. The problem of validation of a scale or index can be tackled directly only when there exists a previously validated measuring instrument against which the new index can be checked. In the present state of development of level of living measures no such instrument exists. Hence we must instead examine the operations involved in construction of the index for their correspondence with the concepts and criteria set forth. In addition certain partial and indirect checks through correlation of the index with items associated with the concept can afford some evidence.

The particular index to be examined is the rural-farm level of living index for counties of the United States in 1940, developed by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics as a general-purpose index for the types of use indicated above.⁷ The operational definition of what this index measures is as follows:

$$L_{rt} = .467H + .281R + .226I + .403A + 4.351S + 11.6$$

where

L_{rt} = rural-farm level of living index,

H = percentage of occupied dwelling units with fewer than 1.51 persons per room,

R = percentage of dwelling units with radios,

I = percentage of farms with gross income of more than \$600,

A = percentage of farms reporting autos of 1936 or later models,

S = median grade of school completed by persons 25 years of age and over.

The accompanying map of the United States shows county variation in rural-farm level of living as measured by this index.

The problem is to explore what degree of correspondence exists between the rural-

farm level of living for counties differentiated by this index and the rural-farm level of living for counties defined in terms of the level of consumption or utilization by rural-farm families of goods and services. The case for correspondence rests upon the following considerations.

1. The gross income component used reflects differences in the consumption of goods and services entering into the level of living. Even though the component represents only a gross income measure limited to income derived from farming, the following illustrative figures, chosen from many others pointing in the same direction, suggest a high correlation of this income measure with the possession or consumption of goods.


Item	Percentage of farms in the U.S. reporting item*	
	Farms with gross income under \$600	Farms with gross income of \$600 and over
	(Pct.)	(Pct.)
Telephones	13.4	36.1
Electricity	23.7	42.3
Automobiles	40.5	74.9
Milk cows	67.5	87.6
Hogs and pigs	54.0	70.4

2. Each component selected other than the income component indicates *per se* some aspect of consumption of goods and services by rural-farm families. Other aspects of consumption being equal, there is probably no disagreement over the proposition that a county having a higher percentage of rural-farm dwelling units with an adequate number of rooms per person has a higher rural-farm level of living than does a county with a lower percentage. A similar proposition would hold for a higher percentage of dwelling units with radios, or for a higher percentage of farms with late model autos, or for a higher median educational attainment of the adult rural-farm population.

3. Each component selected represents related aspects of consumption of goods and services other than those actually specified

⁷ For fuller treatment of the development of this index, see Margaret Jarman Hagood, "Development of a 1940 Rural-Farm Level of Living Index for Counties," *Rural Sociology*, 8 (June 1943), pp. 171-180, and "Rural Level of Living Indexes," *Rural Sociology*, 8 (September 1943), pp. 292-294; for evaluations of this index for the 3,055 counties of the United States having rural-farm population, see *Rural Level of Living Indexes for Counties of the United States, 1940*, Washington: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, mimeographed report, October 1943.

* Co-operative study by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics with the Bureau of the Census, "Analysis of Specified Farm Characteristics for Farms Classified by Total Value of Products."



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by the component. For example, a county with a higher percentage of dwellings with radios will tend to have a higher percentage with telephones or electricity and probably with electrical appliances, refrigerators, and other conveniences.

4. Each component selected for inclusion in the index measures positively along a dimension assumed to represent the nationally dominant pattern of goods and services comprising rural-farm level of living. Through correlation and factor analysis, an original group of 14 components was narrowed to the 5 chosen through the processes whereby items were scaled as to their efficiency in measuring positively along the dimension which all of them taken together could measure best. Those items which showed a high degree of efficiency in indicating differences along this dimension, and which at the same time did not merely duplicate information supplied by another chosen item, were retained in the index.

5. Each component selected is weighted in relation to its efficiency in indicating degrees of difference along the dimension which all of the selected items taken together best measure.

Preliminary index values for counties resulting from the indicated weighting together of the standard scores on the several components were reduced to a more conventional index form, with the mean for all counties having a value of 100 and the scale unit determined in relation to the variation of all counties about the mean.

We may comment upon the chief limitations of an index so developed which operate to reduce the degree of correspondence sought between the rural-farm level of living it defines and that defined earlier. First of all is the limitation imposed by the data available from the Censuses. An entirely different approach would be possible if we had for every rural-farm family in the United States a record of expenditures for family living during a year, a record of goods and services consumed which were produced by the family's own labor, an inventory of the goods used in family living, and information on consumption of all publicly supplied com-

modities and services. Construction of an index of rural-farm level of living by appropriate methods for such data would afford results more directly and obviously in correspondence with the concept of level of living presented. Any index such as the one under examination must be recognized as a substitute for the preferred type and evaluated as against other possible substitutes, not as against the more direct type of index which, in the present state of collection of data, is not possible.

The second limitation results as one effect of the increasing lack of complete identification of rural-farm residents with the population dependent upon agriculture. A fifth of the employed rural-farm residents in April 1940 were engaged in nonagricultural work and the number is estimated to have increased since that date. Since the proportion of rural-farm persons employed in nonagriculture is by no means the same throughout the counties of the United States, and since important aspects of consumption are known to show considerable variation as between the agriculturally and nonagriculturally occupied, the homogeneity of the varying units (rural-farm populations of counties) has been lessened. This necessarily means some reduction in the core of consumption items which can be regarded as nationally valid for the rural-farm population, or the reduction in the range of applicability of a posited core to certain counties which deviate very widely from the central tendency with regard to proportion of rural-farm workers engaged in nonagricultural occupations.

A third limitation results from the same cause as the second. To the extent that income available for or spent for family living is nonfarm-derived, the gross farm income component becomes a less satisfactory substitute for the actual expenditures. In certain counties where the proportion of total income derived from nonfarm sources is very high, the item on gross farm income may be a poor reflector of the level of expenditures for family living. However, it is precisely in such counties, that certain other items of the index, most affected by nearness to urban centers, may be present to a degree sufficient

to make up for the depressing effect on the index of the farm income component.

Since the index under consideration was developed as a general-purpose index primarily for nation-wide comparisons, it should not be expected to reflect fully certain aspects of rural-farm consumption which may be considered by some as important in level of living but which are not sufficiently widespread throughout the country. Thus it may be argued that a level of living index should allow for real income or consumption particularly of goods consumed which require little or no money expenditures. In the case of subsistence farming, for example, even if information were available of family expenditures for living, it would obviously fail to reflect adequately the actual level of consumption, particularly of food produced on the farm and consumed by the household. The prevalence of subsistence farming, however, is too limited to permit the inclusion in a nationally applicable index of components directly indicating consumption of home-produced goods.

In this connection it might be of interest to note that an attempt was made to introduce into the rural-farm index of level of living components which are characteristic of self-sufficing or subsistence types of farming. Most of these items such as percentage of farms producing vegetables for home use, having fruit trees, chickens, milk cows, etc., were found to be generally negatively correlated with items included in the index for the country as a whole, although they are positively correlated with these items in

certain regions. These items were discarded on the grounds that the index is designed to reflect only nationally prevalent types of consumption. Actually the vegetables, fruits, etc., will be reflected by the selected components in the areas where these are positively associated with the dominant configuration of items making up level of living and they will not be reflected in areas where this is not the case.

For validation of this index by examining its correlation with some already validated measure, it has been noted that the latter does not exist. Two very limited indications may be cited. For the 132 agricultural areas into which the Farm Security Administration divides the United States, data are available on per family expenditures for family living for Farm Security borrowers during 1941 by two classes of borrowers, Tenant Purchase and Rural Rehabilitation. Correlations of the mean rural-farm 1940 level of living index for the counties comprising each area with these two series on expenditures for farm family living in 1941 are .52 and .74 respectively. The Farm Security Administration has also set for each agricultural area a minimum amount which a farm should yield for family living to be approved for purchase in the Tenant Purchase program, and the correlation of this series with the index is .79. Another more limited check, but one which might be explored on a wider basis, afforded a correlation of .92 between the index and a composite of subjective ratings by agricultural technicians for the counties of Connecticut.

CITIES AND TOWNS MOBILIZE FOR WAR*

WLADISLAVA S. FROST

Office of Civilian Defense

ONCE many months ago on my way by train to Kansas City, I was very intrigued, then impressed by a group of about 20 uniformed young men who entered the parlor car shortly after we left Omaha. Some were tall, blond and blue-eyed; some short, dark; some shorter and swarthier and some of Oriental stature and features. They all spoke the same language. There was a cohesiveness—a unity of mind and spirit emanated from that group. They were all Javanese pilots returning to the front.

I have thought often of that incident as I saw citizens in many cities and towns mobilize themselves, reach out across social, economic and cultural lines to work in unison on vital wartime activities.

Countless communities throughout the nation can be proud of the contributions made by their citizens toward hastening the end of the war and toward keeping the home-front strong. Millions of volunteers, members of the U. S. Citizens Service Corps, made possible the record shattering results of the recent Third War Loan Drive. These and other volunteers have kept our industries supplied with needed scrap materials of all types. Victory Gardens together with individual and community canning have not only increased our own and our allies' food supply but assured healthful school lunches for millions of our children.

The dangers of community health resulting from the shortage of doctors and nurses have been lessened materially by the innumerable hours of service given by men and women volunteers to hospitals, clinics and nursing associations. In a Western town of about 8,000, the Health Authorities stated that a serious epidemic of influenza among the children was prevented by the prompt house-to-house canvass and information pro-

gram carried out by Block Leaders.

After weeks of effort by the Social Protection Committee, composed of men and women representing civic and business groups, the Clergy, Health and Welfare Agencies and the enforcement authorities, their city of over 10,000 was finally declared in-bounds by the Commandant of the nearby large military camp. Another town suffering from the same problem brought to it by a large influx of construction workers, through a similar citizen's committee instituted a broad remedial program, financed primarily by city tax funds and contributions from business establishments.

Through a house-to-house educational campaign and through the use of Civilian Defense speakers at various group meetings, volunteer workers of one town saved a strawberry crop, those of another town, the bean crop. Defense plants in many cities secured needed workers through the same assistance from Local Defense Councils.

Many home-owners in industrial centers were persuaded by their Block Leaders to provide shelter for defence workers. Committees of Defense Councils have sponsored city-wide recreation programs for military personnel and for industrial workers.

The above are merely a few examples of the types of war activities being carried out by cities and towns which have established community organization machinery as part of their Local Defense Councils. Such programs are planned and sponsored by Committees of the Civilian War Services Branch of Local Defense Councils and carried out by members of the U. S. Citizens Service Corps.

In the other branch of Civilian Defense, Civilian Protection, millions of men and women after giving hours to training and practice have become air raid wardens, auxiliary policemen, auxiliary firemen, rescue workers, members of repair crews, etc. Through Civilian Protection, cities have pre-

* Presented to the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, New York, December 5, 1943.

pared themselves to lessen the results of enemy action in terms of loss of life and property. Citizens Defense Corps have proven many times their effectiveness in times of disaster.

There are distinct differences in the purpose, organization, and function of these two sections of Local Defense Councils. With the exception of the air raid warden service, all of the other divisions of the Civilian Protection Branch are extensions of existing municipal departments. They are straight-line in organization since, as an example, the Chief of Police is also chief of the auxiliary police and the volunteers are in effect assistants to the regular policemen.

The Civilian War Services Branch is the community organization agency of the local government. It brings together all elements of the community, all groups, agencies and individuals, so that the community as a whole will, first, study, then plan and effect solutions of community problems created by the war; and second give maximum city-wide support to vital national war programs.

In other words, functioning as part of Civilian War Services, there are two major types of committees: those which are concerned with nation-wide programs such as Salvage, War Savings and Victory Gardens and those which seek to solve local community problems in such fields as Health, Housing, Transportation, Recreation, etc.

The Federal Agencies such as War Production Board's Conservation Division, the Treasury, and the Department of Agriculture, have the responsibility for determining the national war needs and to draw up general programs for meeting those needs. The local Civilian War Services Committees decide upon the most effective means of reaching local quotas. Where a local representative of these Federal agencies exists he is a member of the local committee and often acts as executive secretary.

The Civilian War Services Co-ordinating and Planning Committees in such fields as Health, Welfare, Housing and Recreation can secure the services of the different Federal Agency Representatives to assist them in determining the extent and scope of the

problem locally, the adequacy of existing facilities, the need for expansions or additions, and the methods of financing necessary new or additional facilities.

In most medium-sized and large cities, although often confined to the private agency field, a similar type of study and planning for community problems in Health, Welfare and Recreation has been carried on for many years by Councils of Social Agencies—as they are usually called.

In the majority of the largest cities, the planning committees of these private community organization agencies, the Councils of Social Agencies, have become the nuclei of the Civilian War Services Committees in the fields of Health, Welfare and Recreation. Furthermore, professional staff has been loaned for the duration by Councils of Social Agencies to the Civilian War Services branches of the Local Defense Councils.

All Civilian War Services Committees whether concerned with nation-wide programs or with the solution of local problems have several responsibilities in common. Each is responsible for co-ordinating the efforts of all agencies and groups concerned with its field in order to prevent duplication, waste motion and confusion.

Each Civilian War Services Committee is responsible for evolving final plans of action which are practical and applicable to the community conditions and resources.

All committees are dependent upon volunteer men and women to carry out all or part of the work of the Committee, whether it be at the study, deliberation or action phase.

The city or town Local Defense Councils which have most effectively discharged their community co-ordination and planning function, have established a Civilian War Services Board or Executive Committee. Such Boards are composed first of the volunteer chairmen of all functioning committees and in addition have members representing the most important segments of the population such as men's and women's civic organizations, Labor, Management, Churches, city government, etc., when these are not already represented by Chairmen of Committees.

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ices Board is usually an outstanding citizen. He often has a full-time paid director who may be the Executive Secretary or a professional staff member of the Council of Social Agencies.

This over-all planning and co-ordinating body is necessary because some of the committees such as Health, Housing, Welfare, and Recreation in considering problems in their field, naturally find that certain aspects of the problems fall within the scope and concern of another Committee.

Furthermore it is only through such regular, preferably monthly, discussions of all the Civilian War Services activities, that the maximum and most effective use can be made of available man and woman volunteer power, for the action planned by the different committees.

In many cities over a year ago, the different Civilian War Services Committees found that their vital programs of information or action were not reaching all of the citizens through the use of the usual media of meetings, radio and press. This led to the establishment throughout the nation of the Block Organization, as part of the Civilian War Services Branch. The Civilian War Services Board at its regular meetings decides upon the most effective use of this service unit.

The Block Organization in some cities utilizes the most successful methods yet developed in urban neighborhood organization. Rural districts are covered by the Neighborhood Leader system organized by the Extension Service of the Department of Agriculture.

Block Leaders are sometimes elected, more often appointed. In some instances they become discussion leaders of block or neighborhood war clubs. This development of "primary group" cohesiveness has proven to be an important factor in home front activities.

The majority of cities and towns have established a Civilian Defense Volunteer Office which is the one official center where all citizens wishing to participate in some phase of the war effort may register. It is from this pool that all sections of both the

Civilian Protection and the Civilian War Services branches can secure the number and type of volunteers they need. The head of this Division often meets with the Civilian War Services Board to learn of each Committee's future needs for Volunteers.

In the larger cities the Chairman and Executive Secretary of the Civilian War Services Branch meet with the Co-ordinator or Director of the entire Defense Council, the head of the Civilian Protection Branch and with the Head of the Civilian Defense Volunteer Office for periodical progress reports. In some of the smaller communities the Civilian War Services Board as described earlier is also the Defense Council proper with the addition of the Civilian Protection Co-ordinator or Commander and some of his Chiefs.

In the majority of cities local Defense Councils are created by City Ordinance. They receive no Federal funds and in only a relatively few states do they receive any financial assistance from their state governments. They are financed in a variety of ways including city appropriations, proceeds from the sale of salvage, or through funds from War Chests. Many local Defense Councils receive the loan of staff, equipment and space from public and private agencies.

Perhaps one reason why local Defense Councils have so often been successful in community organization for Civilian War Services is that they are war-time arms of local government. All too often have experiments and demonstrations in urban community organization disintegrated when the Foundation grant ceased, mainly because they had not become recognized as a legitimate function of local government.

Most of the 48 State Defense Councils are set up by law. The majority have only an advisory relationship to the local Defense Councils. They seek through bulletins, pamphlets, memoranda and field visits to offer advice and counsel on organization and program matters. The State Defense Councils usually have the same pattern of Committee organization, as is found in local communities. They also receive no Federal funds.

The Federal Office of Civilian Defense

established by Executive Order of the President on May 20, 1941, through written materials and through the service of its Washington and regional staff is assisting States and through State Defense Councils is giving advice and suggestions to local communities about problems of organization and about programs.

By no means all of the cities and towns of this country have as yet established effective community organization machinery in the form of an active Civilian War Services Branch. There are many cities which are outstanding examples of excellent community mobilization for war-time activities and many other communities are in the process of perfecting and strengthening this part of their local Defense Councils.

The slower development of Civilian War Services is due in part to the fact that the major emphasis and sometimes the entire emphasis during the first year of Civilian Defense Council responsibilities, especially true at all levels of government and was obviously necessary especially along our coastlines.

In recent months, with the lessening of danger from enemy attack, State Defense Councils and Local Defense Councils have become increasingly concerned with the Civilian War Services activities. This greater emphasis, of course, is also a result of increasing shortages and other pressures on the home front.

However, the slower growth of the Civilian War Services and its U. S. Citizens Service Corps, I believe, can also be attributed to the inherent difficulties of establishing community organization machinery.

Established organizations and agencies used to working alone were afraid they would lose some measure of their identity, community prestige and perhaps financial support, if they became "one of the co-operating agencies" of a co-ordinated program. With a few notable exceptions this problem exists no longer in most cities and towns. The majority of such dissident groups learned, rather quickly, that they were in the minority and they could not withstand group pressure for a united community ef-

fort. They soon realized that they could receive full measure of credit for their activities as a single agency. Furthermore, they learned that they could secure greater public participation when their programs were considered part of Civilian Defense—directly contributing to the home-front war effort.

Unwise choice of leadership also has retarded the sound development of Civilian War Services branches. Many local Defense Council Chairmen and other officials were appointed before Pearl Harbor and long before the importance and scope of local Defense was placed on Protection. This was in regard to community organization, were generally understood. The interests and abilities of these leaders often lay only in Civilian War Services Volunteer Chairman is straight-line authoritative organization. However, some of them gained an appreciation of the principles of group thinking, planning, and action and others were replaced. A large proportion of local Defense Council Chairmen at present appreciate the importance of all phases of Defense Council work.

Some of the most successful Chairmen or Volunteer Directors of Civilian War Services that I have seen in the larger cities were men and women who had been active members of Community Chest or Council of Social Agencies Committees or who had served on social or health agency boards.

In the smaller cities and towns, particularly, there is great variety in the type of background and experience possessed by excellent Civilian War Services leaders. The Civilian Protection activities and in a leading Protestant Minister in one city of 30,000; an ex-oil operator in a western city of 10,000; a railroad foreman of Czechoslovak parentage in a town of 12,000; a leading grocer in a community of 6,000; a movie operator in a city of 25,000; and a lawyer in a community of 15,000.

The most successful Civilian War Services Chairman is a person who is recognized as a leader by more than one important group or segment of the community. He is vitally interested in at least several of the activities and appreciates the importance of all of them. He is able to delegate responsibility,

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diplomatically secure action and give merited praise. Such a Chairman holds regular, well-planned and skillfully conducted meetings of his Civilian War Services Board or Executive Committee.

Needless to say the Chairmen of functioning committees should have many of the same qualifications as the Chairman of the Branch.

The ineffectiveness of some functioning committees is often due to poor chairmanship or to the fact that they are too narrow or one-sided in representation. Such committees especially in the fields of Health, Welfare, and Recreation produce few tangible results when they are either over-weighted by professional workers or when they have only lay members who are reluctant to seek professional advice.

Some Local Defense Councils which have good structure and personnel in the Civilian War Services Branch still do not have widespread citizen interest and participation. Sometimes this is due to insufficient or poorly managed publicity or interpretation programs.

Another reason, I believe, is the inefficient use of volunteers. They are either chosen unwisely in the first place, they are inadequately trained, their work is planned poorly or they are given no sense of worthwhile participation.

The value of presenting the U. S. Citizens Service Corps insignia as recognition of work accomplished and hours served has been overlooked in some communities. Too often those in authority do not realize that, unlike

themselves, the majority of volunteers need and want this visible evidence and recognition of volunteer service.

According to the best estimates available, there are at present over 8,200 independent local Defense Councils and in addition over 3,000 which are subsidiaries or branches of the others. Over 12 million volunteers are participating in either Civilian Protection or Civilian War Services activities.

The values to the communities and to the nation of this vast volunteer effort cannot be truly measured. There are, of course, counts of victory gardens planted, of jars of home canned foods, of tons of scrap materials, and the number of War Bonds sold. Less tangible but still evident are the results in increased war production due in part to the solution of community problems of Health, Housing, Transportation, Child Care and Recreation.

However, perhaps the most valuable contribution of the Civilian Defense program to the war effort and to "our way of life" is epitomized by the statement of a lawyer in a medium sized town in Iowa. After a long report of the activities of his local Defense Council, and of its many outstanding achievements this Civilian Defense Chairman said: "But none of those is as vitally important to the present and future life of our community as this fact—that for the first time in our history the Scotch Presbyterian Minister and the German Lutheran one have learned that they *can* work together for the common good."

OFFICIAL REPORTS *and* PROCEEDINGS



A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

No one should presume to know when the war will enter its decisive phase nor how quickly things may move to final culmination. It may be when the American Sociological Society next meets that the country will be in the first flush of victory and public opinion will be pressing for "return to normalcy." In the meantime, the work of sociologists in teaching, in inquiry and in administration goes on and their work can be facilitated by contact and communication among those devoted to the methods and goals of science.

It is probably not necessary that sociologists be in agreement, but for the successful prosecution of our science it is desirable that they be in communication. Out of this interstimulation will come the consensus that determines the content of the discipline. In New York December 4 and 5, the resumption of the annual meeting brought sociologists together again for the first time since December 1941. In spite of the difficulties of travel the meeting was successful and President George A. Lundberg had every reason to feel gratified at the response of the membership. Some 350 registered and of these slightly more than one-half were from the Metropolitan environs of New York City—if that area be defined as extending from New Haven to Philadelphia. The Society has never doubted the value of its annual meeting. It has simply in the interest of the war effort accepted the higher necessity dictated by patriotism. The 1943 meeting augurs well for the future of our fellowship.

In spite of war and turmoil the president's annual message on the state of the Society is under no necessity to be plaintive nor pessimistic. Most sociologists are busy at their accustomed tasks and many are busier than ever before at tasks of greater import than usual. Those in the armed service, no doubt, are busiest of all. If sociology has not appeared with ready-made formulae and panaceas for our troublous times neither has its deep-seated realism nor its devotion to human values been discredited by the course of events nor the conduct of its representatives in responsible positions.

On the other hand, no sociologist worth his salt can feel that our specialty has realized its full capacities nor attained its full influence in the determination of social policies. One thing that our members everywhere can well afford to ask, is whether sociology in these times is taking full advantage of the opportunities to make observations and to record and preserve data that will be useful for future studies. The interesting work of amateurs and professionals in the English movement called Mass Observation is well worth notice in this connection.

On reflection it would seem that our members have reason to feel hopeful about the state of the Society. Our ingenious constitution has now been in operation for two years. It is apparent that we have a structure well suited to the growth and activity of our Society. The Regional Societies are represented within the parent organization and yet they have full autonomy in the sphere in which they operate. Our business meetings are less exciting because of the change in annual elections, but the new officers can plan their tasks ahead and more members vote than ever before. At that, the proportion of mail ballots returned is still far too low, being some 55 per cent for the last two elections. **Appointment of the new Committee on Nominations is announced below.** Under its Chairman, Robert K. Merton of Columbia University, the Committee is at work on the problem of increasing our participation in the annual elections. **It is hoped that all who have suggestions as to the next officers of the Society will communicate with members of the Committee.**

If the new constitution has promoted integration and solidarity within the Society, no new device has yet been developed to expand our membership in the face of crisis. The Society once had a membership of some 1600; in 1943 its membership was 1,082. The American Sociological Society has the greatest interest in and the highest affection for the Regional Societies which have recently carried the strength of the movement throughout the Nation. It is interested in the phenomenon of national members who take no part in Regional Societies. By the very nature of things it is interested in those members of Regional bodies who have no affiliation with the national movement. It is in this

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spirit that our new Chairman for the **Membership Committee**, Professor W. Russell Tylor of the University of Illinois, has agreed to carry on the excellent work of previous committees. The Committee is listed below and all well-wishers of the Society are asked to cooperate with this group, especially in the nomination of worthy new members.

As the minutes indicate, the Executive Committee feels that the values of the Society will best be conserved by holding the annual meeting. Under present plans, the Society accordingly looks forward to a meeting in Chicago, the second largest center of concentration, on the probable dates of Saturday-Sunday, December 5 and 6, 1944. One advantage of the Christmas meeting was that the very tradition surrounding the period served to keep the date open to the benefit of our deliberations. It is to be hoped that this early announcement will enable sociologists to keep themselves free from conflicting commitments and thus we can plan for the largest possible participation.

In accordance with the provisions of the constitution, the Program Committee below offers the list of sections that the administration proposes to recognize at the next meeting. If there are suggestions for change, any new section can be added upon petition signed by 25 of the Society's members.

RUPERT B. VANCE

University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
December 10, 1943

COMMITTEE ON NOMINATIONS, 1944

Robert K. Merton, *Columbia University; Chairman*

C. Arnold Anderson, *Iowa State College*

Howard Becker, *University of Wisconsin*

H. C. Brearley, *Peabody College*

Gladys Bryson, *Smith College*

Calvert L. Dedrick, *War Department*

Warner E. Gettys, *University of Texas*

Noel P. Gist, *University of Missouri*

Rudolf Heberle, *Louisiana State College*

Clyde V. Kiser, *Milbank Memorial Fund*

Robert I. Kutak, *University of Louisville*

Richard T. LaPiere, *Stanford University*

Harriet R. Mowrer, 727 Monticello Place,
Evanston, Ill.

Calvin F. Schmid, *University of Washington*

William H. Sewell, *Oklahoma A. & M. College*

COMMITTEE ON MEMBERSHIP, 1944

W. Russell Tylor, University of Illinois,
Chairman; and J. W. Albright, University of Illinois;
Henry Lucian Andrews, University of Ala-

bama; Leonard Bloom, University of California;
E. W. Burgess, University of Chicago; Maurice
R. Davie, Yale University; Alice Davis, Rich-
mond School of Social Work; Kingsley Davis,
Princeton University; Allen D. Edwards, Clem-
son College; Mabel A. Elliott, University of
Kansas; Henry Pratt Fairchild, New York Uni-
versity; Margaret Jarman Hagood, U. S.
Department of Agriculture; Harold Hoffsom-
mer, University of Arkansas; Ruby Jo Reeves
Kennedy, Vassar College; Alfred McClung Lee,
Wayne University; A. R. Mangus, Ohio State
University; Ivan E. McDougale, Goucher Col-
lege; Albert Morris, Boston University; John
H. Mueller, Indiana University; Stuart A.
Queen, Washington University; Carl F. Reuss,
State College of Washington; Raymond F.
Sletto, University of Minnesota; T. Earl Sul-
lenger, Municipal University of Omaha; Ray
E. Wakeley, Iowa State College; Walter T.
Watson, Southern Methodist University; Theo-
dore C. Weiler, Middlebury College; Logan
Wilson, University of Kentucky; Robert M.
Woodbury, International Labour Office, Mont-
real; Verne Wright, University of Pittsburgh.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY 1944 PROGRAM COMMITTEE

The following sections are planned for the
Thirty-ninth Annual Meeting of the Society in
December 1944. See the Message from the
President, last sentence.

Social Research
Population
Social Psychology
Community and Ecology
Sociometry
Social Theory
Family
Latin America
Criminology
Political Sociology
General Sessions

Probably there will be a meeting of the
Executive Committee Friday evening, and if a
sufficient number of members should announce
their intention of arriving Friday, a general ses-
sion might also be arranged for Friday evening.

RUPERT B. VANCE, *Chairman*

CONRAD TAEUBER

JOSEPH K. FOLSOM

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIETY, EXEC- UTIVE COMMITTEE, AND EDITORIAL BOARD

FIRST MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,
DECEMBER 3, 1943

Minutes of the Executive Committee Meet-
ing, held in Room C of the Hotel McAlpin, New

York City, on December 3, 1943.

The meeting was called to order at 7:45 P.M. with President Lundberg in the Chair. Present were: Messrs. Frazier, Hankins, Hart, Himes, Landis, MacIver, Vance, Kimball Young, and the Secretary.

The Committee received the reports of the Secretary, the Treasurer, and the Managing Editor.

It was moved by Young, seconded by MacIver, to ratify the action of the Administration Committee in authorizing that steps be taken toward incorporating the Society in the District of Columbia. Carried.

Moved by Hart, seconded by Frazier, to ratify the action of the Administration Committee in continuing without charge the memberships of persons entering the Armed Forces in 1943. Carried.

Moved by Hankins, seconded by MacIver, to continue the policy of carrying without charge the memberships of members in the Armed Forces, and that the Secretary give members who would be freed of dues payments by this provision, but who have already paid their dues for 1944, the option of having their dues credited as gifts.

The following members of the Society were approved by the Executive Committee as Emeritus Members: Rudolph M. Binder, Frank J. Bruno, Edward Warren Capen, J. McKeen Cattell, John M. Gillette, Eugene T. Lies, Thomas L. Sidlo, and Comer M. Woodward.

Moved by MacIver, seconded by Hankins, that the Society suggest to the Social Science Research Council that we prefer that they refrain from submitting a panel for the election of a representative of the Society to the S.S.R.C. Carried.

Moved by Hart, seconded by Hankins, that the election of a representative to the S.S.R.C. be deferred until the next meeting of the Executive Committee. Carried.

Paul H. Landis was elected as representative to the Advisory Council on Human Relations. Conrad Taeuber was re-elected Secretary-Treasurer for a one-year term.

Conrad Taeuber was re-elected Managing Editor of the *Review* for a two-year term.

Moved by Hart, seconded by MacIver, that the present President, the incoming President, and the Secretary, appoint an Advisory Committee on Sociology in the Secondary Schools. This committee is to study the professional organizations in which the Society might well be

represented; textbooks; and other matters relating to furthering and improving the teaching of sociology in the secondary schools and the relation of the Society to the secondary school situation. Should similar committees of other Social Science organizations be initiated, the committee is authorized to co-operate with them. Carried.

Moved by MacIver, seconded by Landis, to table consideration of the motion presented at the last Business Meeting of the Society, requesting consideration of steps to be taken for the listing of institutions that have adequate staffing and training in Sociology; measures to sustain members from demotion or dismissal from said institutions, and recommending members for jobs in such institutions. Carried.

The President was authorized to appoint a Committee of three persons on steps to be taken for the promotion of greater uniformity in the recording, keeping, and using of statistical records and data among the several organizations whose material is in special demand for social research.

It was voted to recommend to the membership the following amendments to the By-Laws: (The new words are italicized.)

1. Article II, Section 1: Add, at the end of the first sentence, "*for a term of one year. Officers and members of the Executive Committee shall begin their term of office at the close of the annual business meeting of the Society in the year during which they were elected.*"
2. Article II, Section 1, a: Amend the second last sentence of the paragraph to read as follows: "These ballots shall be sent to the membership of the Society by first class mail by May 15 of each year."
3. Article II, Section 1, d: Add the following sentence, "*In case of the death, resignation, or inability to serve of any officer elected before the next annual meeting, the nominee receiving the next highest number of votes for that office shall be declared elected.*"
4. Article II, Section 2: Change the first sentence to read, "All members *whose dues for the current year have been paid by May 1*, as certified by the Treasurer, shall be sent ballots for the election by mail."
5. Article III, Section 2, add i: "*In time of war or other national emergency the Executive Committee may suspend the holding of annual meetings or other regular*

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activities of the Society when such action is deemed to be in accord with the national interest."

6. Article III, Section 2, add j: "*In the event of the suspension of the annual meeting, all actions of the Executive Committee or its Administration Committee which would normally be reported to the Society for its approval shall be published in the next number of the American Sociological Review, under Proceedings, and shall form a part of the Official Proceedings of the Society unless and until revised by action of the Society at the next annual meeting.*"
7. Article VII, Section 1: Add, "*In the event of the suspension of the annual meeting (as provided in Article III, Section 2, i), the Executive Committee may, upon two-thirds vote of its members, submit amendments to the By-Laws to the members of the Society by mail ballots, after publication in the American Sociological Review, and such amendments shall be adopted upon a two-thirds vote of the members voting within thirty days.*"
8. Article III, Section 2, add k: "*All motions for the creation of new committees or affecting the policy of the Society shall be referred to the Executive Committee for its recommendation. The Executive Committee shall report its recommendation concerning such motions at the next business session of the Society.*"
9. Article VI, Section 3: Amend, by striking out the words, "prior to the next annual meeting."

The meeting adjourned at 10:35 P.M.

Respectfully submitted,

CONRAD TAEUBER, *Secretary*

FIRST BUSINESS MEETING OF THE SOCIETY, DECEMBER 4, 1943

Minutes of the Business Meeting of the American Sociological Society, held in the Colonial Room of the Hotel McAlpin, New York City, on Saturday, December 4, 1943.

The meeting was called to order at 9 A.M. with President Lundberg in the Chair.

The minutes of the Executive Committee meeting on December 3 were read and received.

Voted to approve the suspension of dues of members in the Armed Forces.

Voted to approve the election of Paul H. Landis as representative to the Advisory Council on Human Relations.

Voted to approve the election of Conrad Taeuber as Secretary-Treasurer and Managing Editor.

Voted to approve the action taken by the Executive Committee on the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Sociology in the Secondary Schools.

Professor W. C. Waterman presented the report of the Committee on Local Arrangements.

Dr. Bowers presented the report of the Committee on the Census of Research.

Professor Jocher presented the report of the Committee on Membership.

Professor Bossard presented the report of the representative to the American Council of Learned Societies.

Professor Burgess presented the report of the representative to the Social Science Research Council.

The Secretary read the reports of the delegates to the Advisory Council on Human Relations and to the American Documentation Institute.

Voted to receive the reports of the Committees and representatives.

Professor Chapman summarized the report prepared by the Committee on Public Relations for submission to the Executive Committee.

The meeting adjourned at 10 A.M.

Respectfully submitted,

CONRAD TAEUBER, *Secretary*

EDITORIAL BOARD MEETING, DECEMBER 4, 1943

A meeting of the Editorial Board was held at noon on Saturday, December 4, 1943, in New York City. Present were: Miss Elliott and Messrs. Folsom, Lundberg, Schmid and Taeuber.

It was voted to issue a special edition of the *Review* in June on Recent Social Trends in Russia, with Folsom as Editor.

Respectfully submitted,

CONRAD TAEUBER, *Secretary*

SECOND MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 4, 1943

Minutes of the Executive Committee meeting, held in Room C of the Hotel McAlpin, New York City, Saturday, December 4, 1943.

The meeting was called to order at 4:45 P.M. with President Lundberg in the Chair. Present were: Messrs. Frazier, Hankins, Hart, Himes, Landis, MacIver, Sellin, Sewell, Taylor, Vance, and Kimball Young. Also present were Read Bain and the Secretary.

The Secretary read the minutes of the previous meeting, which were approved.

Bain presented the following resolutions for the Committee on Resolutions:

"BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Sociological Society extends its thanks to Mr. John E. Walker, Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C., for the time and care which he has devoted to the task of properly incorporating the Society. We realize this called for expert legal work and we are very grateful to Mr. Walker for carrying it through to a successful conclusion without any fee for professional services."

"BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Sociological Society thanks the management and employees of the Hotel McAlpin for their efforts in making the meetings of the Society pleasant and successful."

It was voted that these resolutions be approved.

Bain presented alternative drafts of a resolution on the universality of science and the role of social science in the post-war organization. It was voted that the Resolutions Committee be empowered to refine one of the proposed drafts and that the matter be referred to the Society at the next Business Meeting.

The election of Edwin L. Earp as an Emeritus Member was approved.

Dorothy Thomas was elected to the Administration Committee for the term ending in 1946.

Joseph K. Folsom was elected to the Executive Committee for the unexpired term of Rupert B. Vance, ending in 1944.

Hankins presented the report of the Committee on Budget and Investment.

Moved by Hankins, seconded by Himes, that the Committee approve the proposal that Life Memberships be amortized at the rate of \$5.00 per year, for twenty years. Carried.

Moved by Hankins, seconded by Landis, that the fiscal year of the Society begin on December 1 and end on the succeeding November 30. Carried.

Moved by Hankins, seconded by Himes, that \$75.00 be allowed the Committee on Sociology in the Secondary Schools. Carried.

Moved by Landis, seconded by Himes, that the amount for printing the *Review* in the next fiscal year be set at \$4,400.00. In that connection, it was suggested that the Editorial Board investigate the possible savings that might result in changing the format of the *Review* to a more economical one. Carried.

Moved by Hart, seconded by Young, that the

appropriation for the Committee on Public Relations be continued at \$100.00, pending careful study of the report from the Public Relations Committee to the Executive Committee. Carried.

Moved by Hart, seconded by Young, that the budget presented by the Treasurer be approved with the amendments indicated. Carried. (The budget as approved appears elsewhere in this issue.)

Moved by Himes, seconded by Hart, that the Committee rescind the action taken at the last meeting with reference to the submission of panels of nominees by the Social Science Research Council. Carried.

Moved by Himes, seconded by MacIver, that the incoming President should express to the S.S.R.C. the feeling of the Society that a better procedure than the present one would be to leave the Society free to select its own representative to the S.S.R.C. without suggesting a panel of names. Motion was lost.

E. W. Burgess was elected as the representative of the Society to the S.S.R.C. for the term ending in 1946.

President Lundberg then withdrew from the meeting and Vice-President Kimball Young took the Chair.

There was some discussion of the proposals relative to the Editorship of the *Review*, but no action was taken.

The meeting adjourned at 6:30 P.M.

Respectfully submitted,

CONRAD TAEUBER, *Secretary*

SECOND BUSINESS MEETING OF THE SOCIETY, DECEMBER 5, 1943

Minutes of the Business Meeting of the American Sociological Society, held in the Colonial Room of the Hotel McAlpin, New York City, Sunday, December 5, 1943.

The meeting was called to order at 9:15 A.M. with President Lundberg in the Chair.

The minutes of the last Business Meeting were approved as read.

The minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee on December 4 were read and received.

Voted to adopt the amendments to the By-Laws as presented at the previous Business Meeting.

Voted to approve the election of E. W. Burgess as representative to the Social Science Research Council.

Voted to approve the election of Dorothy Thomas to the Administration Committee for the term ending in 1946.

Voted to approve the election of Joseph K. Folsom to the Executive Committee for the unexpired term of Rupert B. Vance, ending in 1944.

President Lundberg reported on the elections as published in the October 1943 issue of the *Review*, and presented the following statement:

"In accordance with the provisions of the By-Laws, I have examined the ballots on the election of officers for 1944, and hereby certify that the returns, as reported by the Chairman of the Nominating Committee in the October 1943 issue of the *Review*, are correct."

Read Bain, Chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, offered the following resolutions:

"BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Sociological Society extends its thanks to Mr. John E. Walker, Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C., for the time and care which he has devoted to the task of properly incorporating the Society. We realize this called for expert legal work and we are very grateful to Mr. Walker for carrying it through to a successful conclusion without any fee for professional services."

"BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Sociological Society thanks the management and employees of the Hotel McAlpin for their efforts in making the meetings of the Society pleasant and successful."

Read Bain then presented a resolution on the international character, humane objectives, and similar methods and goals of all scientists in all countries, and on the role of social science in post-war international organization; and moved its adoption. The motion was seconded.

It was moved and seconded to table this motion and the motion to table was carried.

It was moved and seconded that the Committee on Public Relations be instructed to give publicity to the fact that such a resolution had been presented and defeated. The motion was lost.

The meeting adjourned at 10:10 A.M.

Respectfully submitted,

CONRAD TAEUBER, *Secretary*

THIRD MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 5, 1943

Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting, held in Room D of the Hotel McAlpin, New York City, on December 5, 1943.

The meeting opened at 4:50 P.M. with President Vance in the Chair. Present were: Messrs. Bain, Folsom, Frazier, Hart, Himes, Landis, Lundberg, Sellin, Sewell, Taylor and the Secretary.

The minutes of the last meeting of the Executive Committee were approved as read.

Mr. W. Russell Tylor presented a statement on the proposed work of the Membership Committee.

Moved by Lundberg, seconded by Landis, that the committee to select an Editor which was appointed in 1943 be continued and that their recommendation be referred to the Executive Committee. Carried.

Moved by Bain, seconded by Sewell, to authorize Mr. Folsom to continue as Editor of the *Review* pending arrangements for a successor. Carried.

Moved by Himes, seconded by Frazier, that the President appoint a Committee on Co-operation with Latin American Sociologists, this Committee to give special attention to the dissemination of sociological materials from the United States in Latin America. Carried.

Moved by Taylor, seconded by Sewell, that plans be developed for an Annual Meeting in 1944. Carried.

Moved by Folsom, seconded by Himes, that the time of the next Annual Meeting be approximately the first week-end in December. Carried.

Moved by Lundberg, seconded by Sewell, that, subject to transportation and other conditions, the next Meeting be held in Chicago. Carried.

Moved by Himes, seconded by Folsom, that the Secretary be requested to recommend a procedure for balloting to the Executive Committee at the next Meeting. Carried.

Moved by Himes, seconded by Sellin, that the President appoint a Committee on Personnel Training in the Post-War Period. Carried.

The meeting adjourned at 6:20 P.M.

Respectfully submitted,

CONRAD TAEUBER, *Secretary*

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY

FOR THE PERIOD DECEMBER 15, 1942,
TO NOVEMBER 14, 1943

Activities of the Society. The business transacted by the Administration and Executive Committees during 1943 is as follows: The Administration Committee voted to continue without charge the memberships of persons entering the Armed Forces. In June, the Committee voted that steps should be taken to incorporate the Society in the District of Columbia.

Early in 1943 the Executive Committee approved the actions of the Administration Committee during 1942, as published in the February issue of the *Review*, p. 72.

As reported in the *Review* several times during the year, the Executive Committee had considered the changing situation with reference to holding a meeting in 1943 and in August voted to proceed with plans to hold a meeting in New York City in December.

Membership Statement. As of November 14, 1943, the total membership of the Society was 1,082, an increase of 27 members. This results from a gain of 150 new members and the loss of 123. Details of membership for 1942 and 1943 are given in the table shown below. During the year this office continued the policy of considering people as having dropped their membership if they failed to pay their dues or respond to dues notices by the end of June. Details for membership for 1942 and 1943 are given in the table shown below.

The Society is greatly indebted to Professor Belle Boone Beard for five new 1943 members; to Seba Eldridge and Dwight Sanderson for four new members; and to the following additional members of the Society who have recommended one or more new members: Harry Alpert, C.

Arnold Anderson, Arthur L. Beeley, Leonard Bloom, H. C. Brearley, Morris G. Caldwell, Mary E. Cromwell, Joseph K. Folsom, Robert N. Ford, Paul H. Furfey, Noel P. Gist, Edward W. Gregory, Ernest R. Groves, Margaret Jarman Hagood, Howard H. Harlan, C. R. Hoffer, Samuel H. Jameson, Katharine Jocher, John A. Kinneman, Samuel Koenig, J. H. Kolb, F. E. Lumley, George A. Lundberg, Robert M. MacIver, T. C. McCormick, Robert McMillan, J. L. Moreno, Albert Morris, Harriet R. Mowrer, John H. Mueller, Constantine Panunzio, Frederick B. Parker, Percy Robert, Calvin F. Schmid, Edgar A. Schuler, Thorsten Sellin, Luke M. Smith, Jesse F. Steiner, E. D. Tetreau, Dorothy Thomas, W. Russell Tylor, Willard Waller, Bessie Bloom Wessel, and Ellen Winston.

The detailed report of the Committee on Membership has been presented by Miss Jocher, Chairman of the 1943 Membership Committee.

Eight members of the Society have applied for Emeritus Membership. Under the present provision of the By-Laws they are eligible for this status. The year when he first joined the Society is shown following the name of each: Rudolph M. Binder, 1910; Frank J. Bruno, 1918; Edward Warren Capen, 1905; J. McKeen Cattell, 1921; John M. Gillette, 1910; Eugene T. Lies, 1910; Thomas L. Sidlo, 1922; and Comer M. Woodward, 1918.

Necrology. The Secretary regrets to announce the deaths of the following members: Louis J. Hopkins, Edward Lindsey, Eben Mumford, W. B. Stone, Francis M. Vreeland, and Carl D. Wells.

The Secretary has continued to take part in the meetings of the Conference of Secretaries sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies. These annual meetings provide an opportunity to meet with the Secretaries of the

COMPARISON OF MEMBERSHIP, 1942 AND 1943

Changes During 1943

Membership Classes	1943 Total	New	Re- joined	Subscribers Who Joined	Trans- fer	Resigned	Decreased	Dropped	1942 Total
Single	818	56	30	9	—30	7	6	79	847
Student	134	41	0	14	—12	1	0	22	114
Joint	46	0	0	0	8	0	0	8	46
Sustaining	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
Life	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	28
Honorary	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
Exchange	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Emeritus	5	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	3
Free-Armed Forces	34	0	0	0	32	0	0	0	0
Grand Total	1,082	97	30	23	0	8	7	109	1,055

other Societies affiliated with the Council and to exchange experience and suggestions. These meetings have proved very helpful in carrying on the activities of the Secretary's office.

At the invitation of the National Education Association, President Lundberg appointed Professor Stuart A. Queen as the Society's representative at the meeting held in St. Louis on Thursday, February 25, for the Reorganization of the Department of Higher Education. Professor Queen's report is as follows:

"The specific action taken was as follows: A constitution was adopted . . . officers were elected as follows:

President, H. B. Wells, President of Indiana University

Vice-President, Walter Morgan, President Emeritus of Western Illinois State Teachers College

Secretary-Treasurer, Alonzo F. Myers, Professor of Education at New York University

Executive Committee, Eugene Briggs, President of Phillips University; W. M. Mallon, Dean, St. Louis University

The following proposals for action were approved by the group present:

1. It was agreed to urge upon the officers and the Executive Committee of the new Department the desirability of establishing a committee for the improvement of college teaching.
2. It was agreed to co-operate with the N.E.A. Commission in promoting the matter set forth in its statement on colleges and the war . . . this urges upon the President of the United States and Congress and the War Manpower Commission the importance of keeping colleges and universities functioning. It proposes that those not needed for the armed services be assigned on some quota basis to higher education and that scholarships be made available through Federal funds to enable and to encourage eligible youth to enter or remain in college.
3. It was voted that similar action should be undertaken with a view to enabling those withdrawn from college to participate in the war effort later to return to complete their college work. Also that provision be made as promptly as possible for men incapacitated in the armed services. This was adopted as a directive to the Executive Committee of the Department.
4. It was voted as the sense of the meeting

that there should be established after the war an International Education Office similar to the International Labor Office which was affiliated with the League of Nations."

In accordance with the action taken by the Society on December 28, 1940, and the report of the Committee on Incorporation, presented at the December 1941 meeting, steps were taken to arrange for the incorporation of the Society. It appeared that in view of the present location of the Secretary's office, the District of Columbia would be the preferable location. As was pointed out in the December 1941 report of the Committee on Incorporation, the fact that the American Sociological Congress had been incorporated in the District of Columbia was an obstacle to incorporation there. Upon investigation it was determined that the American Sociological Congress was inactive and steps have been taken to have that corporation dissolved, in order that the incorporation of the American Sociological Society may proceed. The matter is in the hands of John E. Walker, Attorney at Law, who has volunteered his services to the Society for this purpose. Hearings for the dissolution of the American Sociological Congress were held recently and it is anticipated that the whole matter will be disposed of early in 1944.

At the meeting in 1941 a good deal of attention was devoted to the service which Sociologists might render in wartime. Since then many members of the Society have been drawn into the Armed Forces and into civilian service with emergency agencies. No complete listing of these activities is available, but from the notes which have been published from time to time in the *Review* it is obvious that Sociologists have found many places in wartime organizations where their services have been and are contributing in a major way to the war effort. This is true not only in federal and regional agencies, but also in many state and local organizations.

Since the attention of many members is largely taken up by wartime duties, some of the normal activities of the Society are in abeyance. This is particularly true of the stimulation of research. As we near the end of the war and the subsequent readjustments, the Society may wish to consider the post-war situation for professional sociologists. Among the questions which suggest themselves are the following: (1) the stimulation of research; (2) the training of personnel, especially the resumption of training for persons whose graduate work was interrupted by war service and those for whom the start of a professional career was similarly in-

errupted; (3) the adequacy of the professional training programs in the light of anticipated demands for training in Sociology; (4) the place of Sociology in the new college curricula; and (5) the opportunities for professionally trained Sociologists in other than academic positions.

Respectfully submitted,

CONRAD TAEUBER, *Secretary*

ANNUAL REPORT, MANAGING EDITOR, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

FOR THE PERIOD DECEMBER 15, 1942,

TO NOVEMBER 14, 1943

Inventory of Proceedings. On November 14 the volumes of *Papers and Proceedings* on hand were:

Volume	Copies	Volume	Copies
I	3	XXI	175
VIII	3	XXII	55
X	29	XXIII	61
XII	5	XXIV	279
XV	120	XXV	297
XVII	8	XXVI	50
XVIII	2	XXVII	239
XIX	154	XXVIII	81
XX	26	XXIX	63

1,650

This is a decrease of 81 from the number a year ago.

In addition to these volumes the Society owns two sets of the *Papers and Proceedings* which are held in the office of the Managing Editor as a permanent file.

The 1943 sale of *Proceedings* amounted to approximately \$90.00. A large order for these volumes is still being filled for a South African book shop.

Inventory of Review. On November 14 the number of copies of the *American Sociological Review* on hand were as follows:

Volume I (1936)	1,521
Volume II (1937)	1,016
Volume III (1938)	686
Volume IV (1939)	1,028
Volume V (1940)	1,743
Volume VI (1941)	1,309
Volume VII (1942)	1,395
Volume VIII (1943)	1,400*

10,098

* Estimated for first five issues.

These figures do not include the bound set of each volume and five copies of each number

which are held as permanent stock. The bulk of these numbers is held in stock at the George Banta Publishing Company; and a supply of each issue, to fill current orders, is stored in the office of the Managing Editor.

Income from individual sales of the *Review* thus far this year was \$176.87.

Two thousand copies of each number of Volume VIII were printed. The average distribution for the year is as follows: Members, 1,082; subscribers, 67; libraries, 504; exchanges, 43; complimentary (includes copies to advertisers), 43; total distribution, 1,739.

Copies of the *Review* are sent to all persons on the membership list of the preceding year in February, but subsequent issues are sent only to persons whose dues for the current year are paid.

In June the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies asked that we send a number of exchange copies to South American sociological journals through the Smithsonian Institution's International Exchange Service. Under this arrangement we are now on an exchange basis with seven journals, two of which were on our exchange list previously. Other new exchanges during 1943 are with The Bureau of Urban Research, Princeton University; the Inter American Statistical Institute's journal *Estadística*; and the Central and Eastern European Planning Board, New York City.

Ten of the libraries receiving free copies of the *Review* sent in paid subscriptions during the year. Five other libraries were added to the free list by the Editorial Board during 1943. The number of libraries receiving free copies at the present time is only 13.

A new exchange advertiser is the *International Labour Review* of Montreal.

This year the American Library Association again purchased fifteen copies of each issue for distribution to foreign libraries after the war. These are being stored by the Managing Editor.

In 1942 the Editorial Board voted to issue the *Review* in a two-column arrangement, beginning in 1943. This arrangement makes much better use of the paper and permits the *Review* to handle in 128 pages the same* volume of material which formerly required 160 pages. In view of the fact that we had made this change, it was not necessary to make any reductions in order to meet the present restrictions on the use of paper. The net saving resulting from this

* The Editor figures about 9 percent more words in the 128 pages, new format, than in the 160 pages, old format. [Ed.]

change, in terms of money, has been quite small, as was anticipated when the change was made. During 1943 each issue of the *Review* consisted of the full 128 pages.

Receipts and expenditures in the operation of the *Review* for 1943 are listed in the report of the Budget and Investment Committee. The auditor's report in the October issue covered these items for the fiscal year.

The income from advertising during this past year has been less than in any other year since the *Review* was founded. Letters from advertisers in response to solicitation indicate that during the war the amount of advertising will probably continue to be less than it was in pre-war years.

The practice of offering student subscriptions to the *Review* at \$2.50 appears less necessary now that student membership is only \$3.00. Whenever feasible, persons inquiring about student subscriptions have been urged to become student members, and in most cases they did join as such. At present we have only six student subscriptions, four of which expire with the December issue. It is recommended that the present practice of offering student subscriptions be discontinued.

Respectfully submitted,
CONRAD TAEUBER, *Managing Editor*

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TREASURER

FOR THE PERIOD DECEMBER 15, 1942,
TO NOVEMBER 14, 1943

The report of the Society's finances for the fiscal year ending June 14, 1943, was published in the October issue of the *Review*. Estimated expenditures for the year 1943 are \$6,278.20, compared with \$6,400 as allowed in the 1943 budget, and actual expenditures of \$6,252.57 in 1942. The estimated income for 1943 is \$8,633.71, compared with \$8,668.00 as estimated

in the 1943 budget, and the 1942 income of \$8,932.91. The "Excess of Income Over Expense" in 1943 is estimated at \$984.76; the comparable figure in 1942 was \$588.97. Cash on deposit on November 14 was \$3,762.48. A more detailed statement of Income and Expenditures is given in the Report of the Budget and Investment Committee.

Following the instructions of the Executive Committee at the 1941 meeting, the Budget and Investment Committee reviewed the investments of the Society and recommended that no changes be made at that time. The investment portfolio, therefore, remains the same as was reported in the February 1943 *Review*. The interest rate on the Hyde Park Baptist Church bonds has been decreased from 6 percent to 4 percent.

At present the operating year and the fiscal year of the Society are not identical; the operating year is a calendar year and the fiscal year runs from June 15 of one year to June 14 of the succeeding year. As a result, there is always some difficulty in presenting the financial reports to the Society. At the time of the Annual Meeting in December the audit report is six months old, and an estimated report for that period must be presented if up-to-date information is desired. The budget is made up for the calendar year. Therefore, it does not correspond to the fiscal year, and the auditor's report cannot be directly compared with the budget. To avoid further difficulty on this point, it is recommended that the fiscal year be defined as from December 1 to the following November 30, and that the audit report and the budget be on the basis of the year so defined. If this were done, it would be possible to present an up-to-date, audited report at the time of the annual meeting.

Respectfully submitted,
CONRAD TAEUBER, *Treasurer*

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND INVESTMENT

BUDGET FINANCIAL STATEMENT FOR 1943 AND PROPOSED BUDGET FOR 1944

	1943 Budget	1943 Estimated Account	1944 Budget*
<i>Income</i>			
<i>Treasurer's Account</i>			
Dues	\$5,700.00	\$5,850.00	\$5,700.00
Proceedings Sold	50.00	60.00	50.00
Income from Investments	138.00	124.00	124.00
Royalties	30.00	57.14	30.00
Miscellaneous Income	11.45	...
	<hr/> \$5,918.00	<hr/> \$6,102.59	<hr/> \$5,904.00

<i>Review Account</i>			
Subscriptions	\$1,700.00	\$1,760.00	\$1,700.00
Sale of <i>Review</i>	175.00	185.00	175.00
Income from Advertising	875.00	577.00	450.00
Miscellaneous Income	9.12	...
	<u>\$2,750.00</u>	<u>\$2,531.12</u>	<u>\$2,325.00</u>
<i>Total Income</i>	<i>\$8,668.00</i>	<i>\$8,633.71</i>	<i>\$8,220.00</i>
<i>Expenditures</i>			
<i>Treasurer's Account</i>			
Clerical Aid	\$ 500.00	\$ 425.00	\$ 500.00
Postage, Telephone, Telegraph	200.00	125.00	125.00
Printing & stationery	200.00	186.96	200.00
Office expense	50.00	15.40	25.00
Travel, Secretary	100.00	50.00	50.00
Annual Meeting Expense	50.00	50.00	50.00
Dues & subscriptions	35.00	35.00	35.00
Bank Charges	5.00	.25	5.00
Auditor	100.00	100.00	100.00
Bad Debts	10.00	5.00	5.00
Election of Officers	100.00	109.89	125.00
Public Relations Committee	110.00	100.00	100.00
Committee on Membership	25.00	10.00	25.00
Census of Research	80.00	74.24	80.00
Personal Property Tax	84.01**	55.00
<i>Proceedings</i> Purchased	25.00	...	10.00
Miscellaneous Expense	30.00	...	75.00
Committee on Sociology in Secondary Schools	75.00
	<u>\$1,620.00</u>	<u>\$1,370.75</u>	<u>\$1,640.00</u>
<i>Review Account</i>			
Editor—Clerical Help	\$ 350.00	\$ 312.20	\$ 350.00
Postage & incidentals	150.00	100.00	100.00
Travel	50.00	...	50.00
Book Review Editors—Clerical	325.00	300.00	325.00
Postage & incidentals	50.00	50.00	50.00
Managing Editor—Clerical	500.00	425.00	500.00
Postage, tel. & tel.	100.00	95.00	100.00
Printing & stationery	150.00	51.45	75.00
Miscellaneous	50.00	...	50.00
Travel	50.00	...	50.00
George Banta Publishing Company	4,500.00	4,789.55	4,400.00
Discounts Allowed	125.00	155.00	150.00
	<u>\$6,400.00</u>	<u>\$6,278.20</u>	<u>\$6,200.00</u>
<i>Total Expenditures</i>	<i>\$8,020.00</i>	<i>\$7,648.95</i>	<i>\$7,840.00</i>

* As approved by the Executive Committee.

** Includes \$54.25 tax for the year 1942.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL RESEARCH

The Committee on Social Research conducted the Census of Current Research Projects. A listing of the projects was published in the August issue of the *American Sociological Review*. The Schedule was revised to attempt to obtain more adequate reporting particularly of

projects of a non-quantitative nature. The Committee also canvassed Federal Agencies more widely and obtained reports from a great number of them.

The Schedule included a question on the relationship of the reported project to the war or to postwar problems, as well as a question on its sponsorship by a governmental agency. A

hand tabulation of the results of this question was likewise published in the August issue.

RAYMOND V. BOWERS, *Chairman*

Members of the Committee: J. E. Bachelder, Jr., Jessie Bernard, Robert N. Ford, Joseph B. Gittler, Delbert Miller, Donald D. Stewart, Paul Walter.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON MEMBERSHIP

During the year 1943, 28 area representatives assumed responsibility for recruiting new members and renewing interest among inactive ones. Of these, 20 carried over from 1942, while 8 new appointments were made to fill vacancies created mainly by entrance into government and military service.

Last year, in addition to extensive canvasses in some areas, the Committee concentrated upon inactive and suspended members of the Society, while this year the main effort was directed toward members of regional societies who are not members of the national organization. On the whole, therefore recruiting has been intensive rather than extensive. In most cases personal letters were written, since these have always proved more effective than circular memoranda. In many instances, where no response was had, follow-up letters were sent. About two-thirds of the Committee members reported active participation. It was particularly gratifying to have reports from areas that had not responded in 1942. In numbers, this year's results are not as impressive as last year's. Since last year's report, 1942 Committee members are responsible for 6 additional 1943 members bringing this total to 42; while to date, the 1943 Committee has secured 18 new members, 3 renewals and 14 new 1944 members. However, in view of the difficulties inherent in membership campaigns and recruiting in the present emergency, numbers alone cannot be regarded as the only measure of success. Evidence that repeated letters and approaches sometimes net results at a later date is in the hands of the Secretary of the Society as well as of the Committee. Representatives have reported not only on the number and kind of letters written but, in some cases, have lists of good future prospects to pass on to the incoming Committee.

Experience over the past two years indicates that:

1. The earlier the new Committee gets under way the better.
2. Although new personnel are of value in

bringing in fresh points of view and ideas, members can and do serve effectively, in most cases, for at least two successive years. Not only is continuity achieved but contacts made the first year can be followed up during the second, particularly where a prospect indicates that he might be more receptive the next year. However, it does not seem advisable to carry a member indefinitely, without an intervening period.

3. The Chairman of the Committee, if selected from among the area representatives of the preceding year, has experience and a good starting point from which to plan and organize further activities of the Committee.
4. In addition to supplies and postage, some provision should be made by the Society for clerical help. The Chairman can scarcely carry on without secretarial assistance since the responsibilities of this Committee entail constant and frequent correspondence. The work is continuous. Many members of the Committee deserve special commendation for the many letters they have written without any secretarial help.
5. Files should be passed on, not only by the retiring chairman to the new chairman, but by retiring area representatives to the new representative. Here is another reason for clerical assistance.

In addition to the untiring services of the area representatives, Dr. Conrad Taeuber, Secretary-Treasurer of the Society, has given generously of his time and energy. Grateful appreciation is expressed for his continued helpful suggestions, encouragement, and efficiency, without which the Committee could not have functioned effectively.

KATHARINE JOCHER, *Chairman*

REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES, 1943

The annual meeting of the American Council of Learned Societies was held in New York City at the Pennsylvania Hotel, January 27-29, 1943. The two delegates from the American Sociological Society were Dr. George Lundberg, President of the Society, acting as substitute for Professor Harold Phelps, and the undersigned.

The effect of the War upon the proceedings of the Council was evident at every turn. The work of the committees of the Council was

rather restricted, with staff members in service and with the inability to hold sessions due to transportation difficulties.

The chief concern of the meeting was the future of the Humanities in a world at war. This was the theme of the annual dinner of the Council, and cropped up in the discussions of all of the meetings. On the one hand there was a full appreciation of the difficulties which the present emergency creates; on the other hand, there was a general feeling of confidence and buoyant hope that the Humanities would survive this, as they have done other crises.

A further outstanding impression gained at the meetings was the increasing role of the Council and of its constituent societies in an advisory capacity to the Federal Government. Apparently there is an increasing recognition by the Government of the services which the Council and its constituent societies can render in the present emergency.

JAMES H. S. BOSSARD, *Representative*

REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

After twenty years of existence the Social Science Research Council has demonstrated its value as an agency for promoting the combined interests of the special social sciences.

In its early years the Council was granted considerable sums to finance large-scale projects to be selected by it but carried on under other auspices. Among these were the studies of Pioneer Belts, migration, crime and international relations. These and other projects were given careful planning by Council committees and constitute valuable contributions to knowledge.

With the exhaustion of general project funds and the realization that they would not be renewed, the Council made a review of its policy in the light of the changed situation. It became clear that the administration of large-scale projects had absorbed the energies of the Council and, perhaps deflected it from its major objective, namely, the advancement of methods of research and the exercise of the function of intellectual leadership in the field of social sciences.

Acceptance of the primacy of this objective has not meant that the Council has not assumed, from time to time, the sponsorship of projects of practical importance which promised also to make a contribution to knowledge. This has been done in the cases of the series of important projects on social security and

public administration, of the study of social trends, and at the present time, of significant studies in the field of economic history. But it has meant that for some time the Council has been placing its major emphasis upon activities and projects which, in the judgment of its committees, promise to raise the level of social science research. A few of the ways in which the Council has been carrying out this purpose will be briefly outlined.

1. *Training social science personnel.* From the very beginning of the Council, advance in the training of the younger social scientists has been one of its most important activities. The attempt has been made to select able young people, both at the pre-doctoral and the post-doctoral level, and give them advanced training in research through various opportunities as field training, European experience, and training in another discipline. Recently the program has been made even more flexible in order to suit individual needs of those receiving fellowships. During the war there has been a marked falling off in the number of applicants although their quality has remained high. The Committee on Social Science Personnel anticipates a great need of the fellowship program for research training in the postwar period and is already considering the best way to meet the situation of readjusting persons for research and teaching.

2. *Improvement of social science data.* In the past the Council has taken a leading part in co-operation with the American Council of Learned Societies, in developing processes of microfilming of documents, and in a demonstration in the cataloging of local research data. During the past year a pamphlet was prepared on methods of collecting data for state and local histories of the war and plans are now being made to stimulate the securing of material for a comprehensive series of studies of American society, during a period in which the country is at war.

3. *Integration of disciplines.* In many different ways the Council has encouraged projects involving the co-operation of two or more disciplines in the conviction that herein lay one approach to the improvement of research methods. Recently this has been well exemplified in the work of the Committee on Social Adjustment appointed to carry on a program in this field of common interest to cultural anthropology, psychology and sociology. Each of its sub-committees appointed to conduct or to supervise a particular project has been composed

of representatives of two or more disciplines as, for example, in the study of foster children, in the report on the prediction of personal adjustment, and in the survey of objective studies of psychoanalytic concepts. During the last two years a Committee on the Preparation of Memoranda on the Social Aspects of War (L. S. Cottrell, A. I. Hallowell, Donald Young and Kimball Young) were able, despite the involvement of personnel in the war effort, to secure the preparation of six memoranda published in mimeograph form to insure immediate use. These are: "Crime" by Thorsten Sellin, "Internal Migration" by Conrad and Irene Taeuber, "Minority Groups" by Louis Wirth, "Public Opinion" by Floyd Ruch, "Statistical Methods in the Study of a Small Number of Cases" by E. W. Burgess and T. C. McCormick, and "Vital Statistics" by E. P. Hutchinson.

4. *Repetitive Studies.* In the physical and biological sciences the results of one study are not accepted until one or more other investigators using the same methods obtain the same result. In general the social sciences have followed the tradition of scholarship with the emphasis upon each new investigation entering upon a previously unworked field. The result is that we have a great array of insights and impressions but a relatively small amount of tested and exact knowledge. In order to stimulate the spread among social scientists of the scientific folkway of repeating projects by different investigators the Council is encouraging a series of repetitive studies. One of these is a case where two anthropologists have independently and without knowledge of the other's findings studied the same Indian community. The field work of both is finished but the war has interfered with the writing of the reports. A second repetitive project is a restudy of the Angell cases studies which formed the basis for his report on *The Family Encounters the Depression*. These have been restudied by one scholar using Angell's concepts of integration and adaptability and his intuitive method of classifying the families before the crisis, a second research person employing his concepts but using a rating scale for determining the degree of integration and adaptability of the families, and a third investigator unfamiliar with Angell's work, who devises his own concepts and the way in which he wishes to manipulate them. Participating in this restudy were Doctors Ruth S. Cavan, R. K. Merton, and Meyer Nimkoff. The findings of this project will shortly be ready for publication. Other repetitive studies

are now under consideration and suggestions are welcomed.

5. *Appraisal of completed research and research methods.* In the conviction of many members of the Council one of the best ways to advance the standards of research is to appraise what is regarded as one of the best works in a given discipline, as was done with notable success in the critique by Dr. Herbert Blumer of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* by Thomas and Znaniecki and in the symposium upon it participated in by several scholars in sociology and other disciplines. Since the work of Thomas and Znaniecki gave a great stimulus to the systematic use of the human document, the Council decided to appraise its use in the intervening period. Consequently we now have an excellent critique by Gordon W. Allport on *The Use of the Personal Document in Psychological Science*. Similar reports in preparation and soon to be published are *The Personal Document in Cultural Anthropology* by Clyde Kluckhohn, *The Personal Document in History* by Louis Gottschalk, and *The Personal Document in Sociology* by R. C. Angell. Proposals are now under consideration for new types of appraisals, one of which is the selection of a work in one field to be evaluated by representatives not only from the same but from different disciplines.

6. *Research planning reports.* Two demonstrations were made of the value of selecting a particular field of investigation as the subject of a research planning report. One of these was published early this year is a *Research Planning Report on the Etiology of Crime* by Walter C. Reckless. This report, which was critically reviewed in preliminary draft by outstanding criminologists in psychiatry, psychology and sociology, included not only an analysis of recent trends in research, but located gaps in our knowledge, indicated deficiencies in research methods and in organization for research, and called attention to promising future leads, particularly through co-operative research among disciplines which had previously worked independently upon these problems. The second research planning report by Roy F. Nichols upon the status and trends in American history with special reference to its value for other social sciences will not be published but has served as subject matter for an informative informal discussion at a conference between historians and other social scientists.

In these and other ways the Council has been continuously active in its endeavor to raise re-

search standards. At the same time, as suggested by certain activities listed above, the Council has been concerned with the assistance it might render the nation in the present emergency. Its director is in frequent communication and conference with the executive heads of the other Councils and several enterprises have resulted from this association; notably the establishment of the National Roster of Scientific Personnel. For nearly two years the Council has maintained a Washington office in charge of Donald Young for the purpose of assisting the government in the most effective use of social science personnel in the war effort and in such other helps as might be given by conference and memoranda.

At the present the effects of the war and the postwar periods upon our society, upon education, and upon research can not be fully foreseen. Many trends already present before the war have been accelerated, a few have been retarded and some new ones have perhaps emerged. But whether the changes to come will be greater or less than we anticipate, one thing seems certain, the need for social science research will be far greater after the war than ever before. We will be the better able to meet the new challenge for research if we put at the forefront of our objectives the constant necessity for the continuous improvement of our tools of research.

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Representative*

REPORT OF THE DELEGATE TO THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS

This is intended as a report of progress. In last year's report, among other things, we gave an account of preliminary conferences held by a member of the Council with a group of social scientists and local representatives of the United States Forestry Service at different points on the Pacific Coast for the purpose of enlisting the interest of these social scientists and others in problems of conservation and, more specifically, their co-operation in conducting regional conferences later in this general area. Later Drs. English, Fryer, and Lively of the Council, Dr. Shea of the United States Forestry Service, and a number of local social scientists and representatives of the Forest Service of the area met for councils in the following places:

Portland, Oregon—January 14-15, 1943

Berkeley, California—January 18-19, 1943

Los Angeles, California—January 22-23, 1943

The major purposes of these conferences were to open new forms of co-operation between Pacific Coast schools and colleges and the Forest Service, with a view to gaining specifically:

1. Increased educational outlets for fire prevention appeals and other messages to the public.
2. Counsel and criticism on the human relations aspects of several Forest Service problems, such as fire prevention, community organization, co-operation with schools and colleges, with hunters and sportsmen, timber owners and operators, and other groups with whom more effective co-operation is desired.
3. Research projects or studies in the human relations aspects of certain wartime Forest Service problems to be carried out by the colleges and universities co-operating with the Forest Service.

The substance of the problems and materials covered by these conferences are very well summarized in topical form, by Dr. Shea at the Los Angeles conference:

1. Is there a functional classification of man-caused fires? (A classification of fires which suggests a specific pattern of action for each classification.)
2. What are the best means of studying behavior of visitors in forests to discover the specific acts which endanger the forests?
3. What do forest residents do—specific acts, specific communities?
4. What value systems and basic motivations can be appealed to in this area to support specific forest policies? What are antagonistic?
5. How can we determine what are the specific attitudes toward specific policies in groups or communities? How determine specific effects on these attitudes of Forest Service practices—rules, regulations, personal activities, posters, publicity?
6. What are the possibilities of laboratory study of smokers' behavior: using groups of students; groups of adults; groups of Forest officers?
7. How may field observational studies of smokers' behavior be made: men, women, children, occupational groups, other groups, general public? What should be featured in publicity?
8. What appeals would be most effective in fire prevention—economic, esthetic, war appeals, self-interest, prestige, etc? Would attitude and opinion surveys offer light on types of appeal?
9. How can we measure the attitude of

people toward fire and its dangers as compared with their attitude toward dynamite and other dangerous things?

10. What may universities do in the preparation for Forest Service human relations activities?

These ten items were divided among a number of appropriate committees for further analysis and thought, looking forward to appropriate action in research or other effort which would promote the larger objectives of the conferences. Furthermore, the organization of local sub-regional advisory councils in these three areas was considered, and such a council for Southern California was voted, with Dr. Franklin Fearing, psychologist of U.C.L.A., as chairman.

Later, on August 1, in response to an invitation of Regional Forester, H. J. Andrews, Professor Lively of the Commission proceeded to Region 6 for a preliminary conference with the regional Forest Service of that area at Portland, Oregon. Then followed a two-day conference, August 10 and 11, in which Dr. John P. Shea, psychologist of the U. S. Forest Service, assisted and to which a number of the social scientists from the colleges and universities of the area were invited.

At this conference two major tasks were performed. First, a Regional Advisory Council was organized with Dr. Howard R. Taylor, psychologist of the University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, as chairman, and Dr. Carl F. Reuss, sociologist of Washington State College, Pullman, Washington, as secretary. Second, regional problems were considered from their research possibilities and a number of feasible projects were stated. Each project was assigned to a council member who was to prepare an outline for its research.

Drs. Lively and Shea, immediately after the conference at Portland, August 10 and 11, visited the regional organization at Los Angeles for the purpose of counselling and advice. Other Regional Councils, such as these, are planned when the time is ripe.

The National Advisory Council of Human Relations held its spring session with the U.S. Forestry Service in Washington on April 30 and May 1, 1943. One of the purpose of this meeting was to review, before the entire Council, the accomplishments of the three regional meetings on the Pacific Coast, previously mentioned. Furthermore, a general review of the actions of the council on former occasions was given by the secretary and recorded in the minutes.

Section D of the latter review, bearing upon

Forest Service personnel, is given here because of its special interest to the American Sociological Society:

1. Make a study of the morale of Forest Service workers for the purpose of locating difficulties in field staff that can be corrected. Add a person to the Personnel Division staff for the purpose. (February 1941)
2. Build a foresters' manual in human relations. (February 1941) Should be a handbook on how to think about and deal with the people served. A specialist should be added to the staff to instruct the field men in the art of dealing with the public. (February 1941)
3. Provide for the induction of a limited number of men in to the Forest Service who have been trained primarily in social science.

Different participators in this conference pointed out the urgent need for more training in the social sciences on the part of foresters generally. Consequently it was recommended that a committee composed of representatives from the United States Forest Service, the Society of American Foresters, and the Deans of the Schools of Forestry should be formed to work out plans and procedures for introducing the social sciences into forestry school curricula.

J. L. HYPES, *Delegate*

REPORT OF THE DELEGATE TO THE AMERICAN DOCUMENTATION INSTITUTE

The American Documentation Institute was organized in 1937 to further all phases of documentation, with emphasis on microphotographic duplication in all its ramifications. Its status as a non-profit organization, formed on behalf of some sixty of the leading scientific and scholarly societies, councils and institutions, placed it in a strategic position to assume a position of leadership and to some extent co-ordination in the field of photographic reproduction when the war made the acquisition of original publications largely impossible. The operations during 1943 represented a continuation of those of previous years. The auxiliary publication of documents, made available as microfilm or photoprints on order, was continued, as was the reproduction of rare and out-of-print journals of a scientific or scholarly nature. Bibliofilm Service, formerly operated by the American Documentation Institute under co-operative agreement with the U. S. Department of Agriculture, is now being

operated by the Library of the Department of Agriculture. The Oriental Science Literature Service continues to publish the quarterly Far Eastern Science Bulletin, making available to western readers, abstracts of the current scientific literature of the Orient. Unfortunately for sociologists, however, the coverage is almost entirely in the physical and biological sciences.

IRENE B. TAEUBER, *Delegate*

REPORT OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS COMMITTEE

TO THE THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

In September the present committee received its commission. We were directed to publicize this meeting and to prepare a memorandum for the use of the Executive Committee in formulating an official public relations policy for the Society. We undertook our specific assignment with a budget of \$62, a five year record of solid achievement by our predecessors, the good offices of our Society's President, Secretary, and *Review* Editor, and ten weeks of active working life before us.

It seemed to us that the second part of our assignment was the more important. It was the only work available until the October *Review* appeared with the preliminary program. No program papers were sent to us until November 10. By the fifteenth (the deadline fixed by our Secretary) seven papers had arrived. The nineteenth arrived on December 1; the twenty-first on December 3.

In September we set about preparing the Memorandum now in the hands of the Executive Committee. We began by finding out how our fellow social science learned societies handled their public relations. We discovered that the anthropologists do nothing with either public relations or publicity, that without a formal program the historians are accomplished at both, that the economists do nothing with public relations specifically but provide "an appropriation of a couple of hundred dollars at the time of our annual meetings for 'publicity,' which means primarily seeing that the papers get our stuff straight."

Three of our members have served on previous committees and have devoted thought, work, and conversation to the problems involved. Two of us are former newspapermen with experience in both publicity work and public relations. All but one of us has taught. We have corresponded with and talked with sociologists, other social scientists, lawyers, edi-

tors, public relations counsel, teachers, reporters, and editors. Many persons, to numerous to list here, have been particularly helpful in the task of preparing our Memorandum.

Our deliberations ran something like this:

(1) Publicity is something that will happen to us as a Society and a profession, whether we want it or not. We would therefore do well to assist it to be helpful, constructive, understanding, and professional in tone.

(2) If we are going to take an active part in our own publicity, we will do well to keep the various sections of our professional fraternity informed of each others' existence and activities; to make the larger public aware of as many worthwhile, solid, interesting professional activities as possible.

(3) The choice of what activities we will publicize signifies what we as a society and a professional group are content to have typify us. In other words, we have, at present, a *de facto* minimum policy.

(4) Our policy can, however, be a self-respecting, constructive, and vigorous one. It can, to summarize a few points from the Memorandum to the Executive Committee, include the following:

- (a) A Public Relations Committee with a chairman who has had training as a publicist and who can expect to serve for a term of years rather than a single year;
- (b) A Public Relations Council, of the functioning officers of the Society and the Public Relations Committee Chairman, to co-operate so that information and news be automatically available for interpretation and publication as well as for action;
- (c) An annual budget of at least \$200, with provision for the conference expenses of the chairman of the committee and if expedient one working member;
- (d) A rule that to be available for annual meeting use, papers must be filed with the section chairmen and the committee at least one month before the meeting—except at the discretion of the Public Relations Council;
- (e) Extension of the work of publicizing the *Review* and the inclusion in the program, if feasible, of other periodicals devoted to the scientific study and practical application of sociology;
- (f) The coverage of between-conference activities of the profession—in research,

publication, teaching, government service, nongovernmental applied fields;

- (g) The enlargement of the scope of the present unusually informative and interesting News and Announcements department of the *Review* and the transfer of responsibility for it to the committee;
- (h) A bulletin of current sociological research to provide an index and report of projects and their status—on inception, scope, completion, and publication.

In a word, our memorandum presents the possibility of a year-round program of announcing the superlative, the interesting, the constructive, the socially approved, and above all the scientifically significant activities of the profession. It suggests the desirability of a realistic and minimally adequate provision to implement the program: time, facilities, and funds essential to realize the possibilities.

This report has confined itself to one of two committee assignments—the Memorandum on public relations program and policy (which was unanimously endorsed by the committee). A supplementary report will give an account of the limited results of the publicizing activities possible with the limited funds available.

STANLEY H. CHAPMAN, *Chairman*
For the Committee

Members of the Committee: Mirra Komarovsky, Charles B. Lawrence, Jr., William E. Lawrence, Jeremiah P. Shalloo, Willard Waller.
December 4, 1943.

INCORPORATION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The necessary steps for the incorporation of the American Sociological Society have now been completed and the Certificate of Incorporation will probably have been issued by the time this note appears in print. At the request of the President of the Society the following residents of the District of Columbia served as incorpo-

rators for the Society: Raymond V. Bowers, Margaret Jarman Hagood, Frank Lorimer, Rev. Bernard C. Mulvaney, Carl C. Taylor, T. J. Woofter, Jr.

In order to incorporate the Society in the District of Columbia it was necessary to have an earlier corporation, known as the American Sociological Congress, dissolved.

The American Sociological Congress was incorporated in July 1920. Its purpose was stated in the Articles of incorporation in the following language:

"The particular business and objects of the said corporation shall be: to promote health, justice, patriotism and training for citizenship; to teach the sacredness of law both as to person and property; and to foster loyalty to home, church and government; throughout the domain of the United States."

The incorporators of the American Sociological Congress were: Wade H. Cooper, Edwin C. Dinwiddie, and James E. McCulloch. Colonel Cooper was of considerable assistance in having that organization dissolved. The other two incorporators are deceased.

ELECTION OF EDITOR, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

The Executive Committee has elected F. Stuart Chapin of the University of Minnesota to be Editor of the *American Sociological Review*, with authority to appoint George B. Vold as co-editor. Dr. Chapin will assume his duties beginning with the preparation and publication of the August 1944, issue. The Book Review Department will also be located at the University of Minnesota. This election follows the recommendation of a special committee appointed by ex-President Lundberg to assist in the selection of a new editor, consisting of Read Bain, Chairman, Frank H. Hankins, and Joseph K. Folsom.

CURRENT ITEMS



COMMUNICATIONS AND OPINION

A NOTE ON THE COMPLAINTS OF ANTHROPOLOGY

Dr. Eiseley's point* is well taken; that whatever superior *scientific* prestige anthropology may enjoy in the eyes of sociologists, or generally, its *economic* position vis-a-vis sociology is distinctly inferior. Here, anthropology is beholden to sociology for teaching positions and generally occupies a subsidiary position within sociology departments. This is not healthy for either subject.

Granted this, yet the conception of sociology's position may well be exaggerated. If Dr. Eiseley will examine college catalogues he will note that not so many colleges have independent departments of sociology. In many institutions sociology is a subsidiary section under economics, history, government or philosophy. The writer's own department became independent only three years ago. Nevertheless there has been a steady trend toward independent status for sociology. One main reason for this may be suggested.

Sociology began with grandiose claims to everything in society, reaching into all the social sciences. It was grudgingly accorded a subordinate place within one or another of the established subjects. Sociology has attained independence in proportion as it has abandoned these claims, relinquishing much as extraneous, redefining and concentrating itself about specific problem areas peculiarly its own. Whatever place sociology has made for itself, it has earned that place by gradually marking off its separate field. Anthropology's problem may well be similar.

What was the curriculum to do with a science making even broader claims than sociology, a science embracing all the social sciences and humanities plus much anatomy, physiology and palaeontology? Either all these sciences must abdicate or else severally absorb the newcomer. Consequently aspects of anthropology are now taught under sociology and also under history, philosophy, biology and geography, often by persons unqualified as anthropologists.

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It would be presumptuous for sociologists to suggest how anthropology should solve this problem, whether by narrowing itself by relinquishing large areas or by re-orienting itself around some more distinctive approach to its various materials. What is suggested here is that when such a demarcation process will have progressed sufficiently the economic problem of finding the anthropology teacher an independent place will begin to solve itself.

ADOLPH S. TOMARS

College of the City of New York

TO THE EDITOR:

No responsible educator can read Dr. Wilbur Brookover's paper, "The Social Roles of Teachers and Pupil Achievement,"* without protest.

In this paper one is amazed to find that "efficient teaching," "effective teaching," "good teaching," "learning," "learning more" are synonymous with "mean gains in pupil information." Apparently education here becomes the accumulation of facts; learning retrogresses to rote learning.

To be sure, the author of the paper tries at the end to save his research labors by very briefly referring in a general way to other possible results wrought by the "friendly teacher." Here, however, he does not use the phrase "better teacher" or "efficient teacher." And so the earlier impression is maintained rather than corrected.

What has happened to such vital product-components of the learning process as understanding, judgment, appraisal, reasoning, wisdom, attitude, value? The learner—and teacher—may pile up all the facts that his industry can muster and still not know what the score is!

Every teacher and student is aware of the evanescent nature of factual knowledge. The crammed stuff that too often makes up the content of the student's mind soon evaporates. Who remembers this date, that event, this place, that name after an examination? In history especially, which is the field of study covered by the paper in question, do we find the rapid loss of factual learning.

If, however, a critical, appraising judgment

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has been built up, the individual does not lose that; and it stands him in good stead in sizing up future "facts."

Of course, as Dr. Brookover's paper tells us, the dictatorial teacher gets more facts "learned" (memorized should be the word). That's what he's usually after. It's easier and quicker to force students to memorize facts than to improve their thinking, develop their critical judgment, broaden their understanding, or have them acquire more reasonable attitudes.

What is this respect that students are supposed to have for teachers who make them pile up facts? Might it be the awe that unsophisticated persons have for the man of many words, facts, and figures? The inanities of the radio quiz programs seem to get a lot of awe and respect. But is this education?

I once knew a history teacher who spent days and nights working out examinations that were factual crossword puzzles. He was quite proud of his achievements. The students had to match names with dates with places with events with more names. Did the students get the facts? Yes. Did they understand what the facts meant? No. After regurgitating the facts, they wanted no more of them: they were too nauseated. Yet they did respect the teacher. He was a "whiz" on facts, a walking gazetteer.

Yours respectfully,

ARTHUR KATONA

Ohio University

NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

The annual meeting of the *Eastern Sociological Society* will be held at the Men's Faculty Club of Columbia University, New York City, on April 22 (3 sessions) and April 23 (1 session). Professor Maurice Davie is chairman of the Saturday morning session concerned with reports on current sociological research, and members and advanced graduate students having projects to report should communicate with him. The meeting is being held at the Faculty Club because more ample meeting and lounge rooms and less expensive meals can be arranged there than in a downtown hotel.

Michigan Sociological Society. Leonard C. Kercher, Western Michigan College of Education was elected president at the fall meeting of the Michigan Sociological Society on November 26, in Ann Arbor. Other officers elected were: Henry Warren Dunham, Wayne University, Vice-President; Norman Daymond Humphrey, Wayne University, Secretary-Treasurer; Amos H. Hawley, University of Michigan, and Alfred McClung Lee, Wayne University, Members of Executive Committee.

The program of the meeting was as follows:

Vernon Fox, Psychiatrist, Michigan State Prison, Jackson, "The Classification System at Jackson Prison"; Edward C. Jandy, Wayne University, discussant; Edward J. Humphreys, Psychiatrist, Michigan State Home Training School, Coldwater, "Sub-Average Groups in the Organization of Society"; Gunnar Dybwad, University of Michigan, discussant; Amos H. Hawley, University of Michigan, "Ecology and Human Ecology"; Ernest B. Harper, Michigan State College, discussant; panel discussion of "Sociological Implications of the Race Riots in Detroit," led by Norman Daymond Humphrey, Wayne University, and participated in by: Richard Myers, University of Michigan; Leonard C. Kercher, Western Michigan College of Education; H. K. Fox, Adrian College; A. D. Vestesk, Jackson Junior College; Isaac Franck, Jewish Community Council of Detroit; and Frank Hartung, Wayne University. Albert H. Burrows, Northern Michigan State College of Education, gave a public lecture on "Social Problems of the Northern Peninsula" which was sponsored jointly by the Society and the University of Michigan. A. E. Wood, University of Michigan, presided at the meetings.

The *Pacific Sociological Society* has elected the following officers for 1944: President, William C. Smith, Linfield College, McMinnville, Oregon; Vice-Presidents, Northern Division, Robert H. Dann, Oregon State College; Central Division, Richard T. LaPiere, Stanford University; Southern Division, Ray E. Baber, Pomona College; Secretary-Treasurer, Calvin F. Schmid, University of Washington; Members of the Advisory Council, Dorothy S. Thomas, University of California, and Erle F. Young, University of Southern California.

Survey Associates, Inc., 112 East 19 Street, New York City, announces a special number of *Survey* Mid-monthly on Juvenile Delinquency, scheduled for release on March 15. The issue is designed to stimulate community planning and action to deal with wartime delinquency and provide the framework for continued action during the postwar period. It is a number which merits the widest possible distribution among people who are concerned about the rise in delinquency among young people. It is being sold at 30¢ a copy or \$1.00 for 4 copies.

The *Sociology Club of Pittsburgh* has elected the following officers for 1944: R. Maurice Moss, Urban League of Pittsburgh, President; J. Warren Matson, Pittsburgh Housing Authority, Vice-President; Mrs. Gladys Walker White, Pittsburgh Office of Price Administration, Secretary; and Joseph A. Homer, Juvenile Court of Allegheny County, Program Chairman. Verne Wright of the University of Pittsburgh is the retiring president of the club.

Acta Americana, a new inter-American journal published in Mexico, D.F. by the Inter-American

Society of Anthropology and Geography, devotes a part of its space to sociological materials, especially those most closely related to problems in anthropology and geography. Scholarly articles on problems in the Americas in English, Spanish, Portuguese and French are accepted for publication. Sociological news and items of Pan-American interest may be sent to the collaborating editor for sociology, Dr. Leonard Bloom, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles 24, California.

The *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* Vol. V, number 2, 1943, contains articles (translated into Spanish) by Edmund deS. Brunner and George A. Lundberg.

The *Australian Institute of Sociology* launched a journal, *Social Horizons*, in July, 1943. This number contains 106 pages, 13 articles, a long book review, and several short book notices, and is priced at two shillings. The editors say:

"This publication has been made possible by a donation from a member of the Institute, and also by the consent of the Department of Import and Procurement to release paper for the purpose. The Council of the Institute is much encouraged, for both the donation and the consent are an indication that the importance of sociology in this crisis of the age is becoming appreciated. The title, *Social Horizons*, implies that we are not merely searching around, and encouraging thorough social research in the present, but also that we have our eyes open to the horizons toward which we move, to the changes which lie ahead and to all that is denoted by the word 'reconstruction'."

The articles are: "The Need for Sociological Research in Australia," by A. P. Elkin; "Sociology in Australia; A Plea for its teaching (1912)," by the late Sir Francis Anderson; "Rural Sociology," by J. G. Crawford and Betty E. Henderson; "The Reaction of White Groups in Country Towns of N.S.W. to Aborigines," by Caroline Kelly; "The Morale of the Industrial Worker," by W. G. Shearer; "The Housing Problem," by Mona Ravenscroft; "The Family and the War," a Committee Report; "Morale," by L. R. Coleman; "Politics and Post-War Education," by R. G. Staines; "The Scholar in Reconstruction," by Kenneth Henderson; "Some Aspects of Migration Policy," by P. Steinberg; "Bronislaw Malinowski—A Citizen of the World," by Phyllis M. Kaberry; "Social Research—What Do We Mean by It?" by Aileen Fitzpatrick.

Chief of the "Office-Bearers" of the Institute is the President, A. P. Elkin, Professor of Anthropology in the University of Sydney, who is also one of the "Editorial Committee" of three. In the Australian universities there are departments of law, history, philosophy, education, psychology, anthropology, political philosophy and science, economics, and "social studies," but none of sociology under that name, although back in 1912 Sir Francis

Anderson made a plea for its introduction.

We cordially salute our newborn antipodean brother-journal, even though in so doing we must lie on our stomach and face downward which is also upward toward the Australian skies. May this homely geographic paradox score another point for Korzybski against Aristotle, and help to save our Australian brethren from the conceptual neuroses and un-semanticized psychoses which so affect *Homo Sociologicus Americanus*!

Federal Security Agency. A new movie short entitled "When Work Is Done," has just been released by the Office of War Information in cooperation with the Division of Recreation, Office of Community War Services. It is a stimulating presentation of the important role recreation is playing in war production. It is suitable material for general group programs and discussion meetings. Organizations interested in borrowing prints should address their request to the OWI film distributor nearest their community.

The **Committee on Food Habits, National Research Council**, has published its 1941-1943 Report, *The Problem of Changing Food Habits*, as Bulletin of the National Research Council No. 108, October 1943. A limited number of copies are available for free distribution at the office of the Committee, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C. The Report is a summary of significant anthropological, sociological, and psychological research findings bearing on the problem indicated.

American Service Institute of Allegheny County. Dr. Collerohe T. Krassovsky has been appointed Consultant to the Staff of the American Service Institute, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The function of the Institute is to serve as a consulting agency to other social agencies in the community, the Board of Education and others interested in the relation of cultural factors to the adjustment of the individual in the community as well as to community planning. The Institute is sponsoring at present a series of lectures, seminars for social workers, librarians, administrators in education. Dr. Krassovsky is responsible for the organization and administration of all the courses and seminars as well as for the teaching of a large number of the courses.

National Civic Federation. Dr. Morris G. Caldwell, formerly Director of the Division of Corrections, Wisconsin State Welfare Department, has been appointed National Chairman of the Council on Youth Delinquency of the National Civic Federation. He will spend most of his time organizing and developing a youth program in high schools.

The **Population Association of America** is to meet at the Hotel New Yorker in New York City

on May 12 and 13. The program for the meetings is to be announced shortly.

Duke University. Professor Howard E. Jensen has been appointed Professor of Sociology and Mental Hygiene in the Duke University School of Medicine. In addition to his duties in the Department of Sociology, he is serving as sociological consultant to the Psychiatric Clinic, and is collaborating with the staff of the Department of Psychiatry in the training of medical students in that field.

Hofstra College (Hempstead, Long Island). Joseph S. Roucek will serve as Visiting Professor in the University of Wyoming and San Francisco State College in the summer session of 1944. He is editing the March (1944) issue of the *Annals of the American Academy* on "Central-Eastern Europe," for which President Benes of Czechoslovakia and other internationally known authorities have contributed special articles. On December 4, under his direction, the Metropolitan Conference of International Relations Clubs, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Institute of Central and Eastern European Affairs held its annual meeting at Hofstra College, some 100 representatives from thirty colleges and universities in and around New York City discussed "The Basic Principles of Post-war Planning."

University of Kansas. Recently on the recommendation of the Department a Junior Curriculum in Professional Social Work was initiated. It is expected that eventually a Graduate School of Social Work will be established.

Three members of the staff are engaged in different phases of the war effort. Dr. Carroll D. Clark is Captain in the Army Air Forces, stationed at Selman Field, Monroe, Louisiana, where he is Wing Planning and Training Officer for the Pre-Flight School. Dr. J. Mapheus Smith is on leave, serving as Chief of the Occupational and Reemployment Section of the Division of Research and Statistics of the Selective Service System, at national headquarters in Washington. Dr. Marston M. McCluggage is Lieutenant (junior grade) in the Navy and is serving as Executive Officer in the Navy V-12 Unit, College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota.

During the past summer Dr. Mabel A. Elliott, with the aid of a research grant by the University, made case studies of women offenders at the Federal Women's Industrial Reformatory at Alderson, West Virginia, and at the Municipal Women's Prison in New York City.

University of North Carolina. In line with his recommendation for an expanding program in regional research and widening opportunities for the utilization of research materials in the field of education, planning, and regional development, Howard W. Odum announces the return of Gordon W. Blackwell to the University of North Carolina

Institute for Research in Social Science as Research Professor, elected also as Director of the Institute, the duties of which he will take over at an early date. Dr. Blackwell, a former staff member of the Institute, holding the Master's Degree from the University of North Carolina and from Harvard University and the Ph.D. Degree from Harvard, has had adequate experience in research in various fields in both State and national agencies.

Katharine Jocher and Lee M. Brooks have been promoted from associate professorship to professorship in the Department of Sociology.

Rupert B. Vance's book on *All These People: A Study of the Nation's Resources in the South* is now in press and will appear in the spring.

The American Family Magazine Book Foundation announces the publication of a special volume, *Understanding Marriage and the Family*, in honor of Ernest Rutherford Groves.

Harold D. Meyer has been appointed by Governor Broughton as Executive Secretary of the North Carolina Recreation Committee.

The University of North Carolina Press has announced the publication date of Howard W. Odum's *Race and Rumors of Race: Challenge to American Crisis* as December 1. His volume, *The Way of the South: A Biography of the Southern United States*, will not be published by Macmillan until next year.

Pennsylvania State College. George E. Simpson has been promoted to the rank of professor of Sociology and is serving as active head of the Department. Linvill F. Watson has been appointed Instructor in Sociology.

Professor Kingsley Davis is on leave again this year doing research work in the Office of Population Research, Princeton, N.J. Wilbert E. Moore, assistant professor of Sociology, is on leave for the current academic year, and is also engaged in research work at the Office of Population Research.

University of Pennsylvania. Hugh Carter is now acting as a Hearings Officer for the National War Labor Board and continues a member of the Board of Arbitrators of the American Arbitration Association. Jeremiah P. Shalloo and Ray Abrams are teaching part time at Bryn Mawr College, in addition to their regular full-time work at the University of Pennsylvania.

J. McKeen Cattell, Chairman of the Board of the Science Press, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, died on January 20 after a long illness. He was a former president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Dr. Cattell joined the American Sociological Society in 1921 and was accepted for Emeritus Membership at the last Annual Meeting.

Robert E. Park died at Nashville, Tennessee, on February 6, at the age of 80. He was the fourth President of the American Sociological Society.

Percy Robert died on February 12.

BOOK REVIEWS



BOOK REVIEW EDITORS

HOWARD BECKER AND THOMAS C. MCCORMICK
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The New Europe. By BERNARD NEWMAN. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1943. Pp. viii + 568. \$375.

We have never learned that international peace is not a posy that springs from gentle wishes or flourishes in a vacuum. It is an exceedingly pragmatic and complex problem, of which the moral urge is but a minor element. But this moral element appears most important to all philosophers and "well-wishers" who insist that life is far simpler than it is, that it can be immediately reduced to order by the application of certain liberal principles, and that man is really amenable to reason, even in matters relating to sex, race, and war. Just now we are passing through an era dominated by numberless such well-meaning "peace-planners"

whose intellectual gymnastics are based on the most idealistic and philosophical premises of "what ought to be" but who, in most cases, do not bother with "what is" since some facet or other of so-called human nature might make their well-laid plans go sour. Instead of treating "what is" as an unknown factor to be found by painstaking research, they usually discard "what is" altogether and spend their time telling us about "ifs" ("if the people of the world would not fight, there would be no wars") and "musts" (the world *must* federate, if the future wars are to be prevented"), convinced that their patent medicine *must* work—even if it does not work.

Newman's volume is pervaded with the same religio-moralistic tone as all such works are.

He tries very hard to impress the reader with his knowledge of "what is" and even more with his ability to relate it to "what ought to be." The results are often confusing and produce such dialectic gems and other inconsistencies as: "My own opinion agrees that such (a European Federation) is not merely possible, but inevitable. Yet I do not believe it will be attained yet; nor, perhaps, is it wise that it should" (p. 7). Or Newman's inconsistency induces him to warn us that "a surprising number of British and American people responded to German propaganda claims that the majority of the ills of Europe were due to the Peace Treaties which concluded the first World War" (p. 2); yet, chapter I opens with the statement that "Some of the primary causes of the present war are to be found in the treaties which finished the last" (p. 1).

Enticed with the idea "the fashioning of frontiers is only a modest contribution to the peace of Europe but it is primary and vital" (p. 29), Newman proceeds to give us a Baedeker-like tour of the various frontiers and various information on the history of the countries from the Baltic to the Balkan region, and concludes with chapters on France, Italy and Germany. Although Newman wants us to understand that many considerations must be weighed in determining a boundary—history, physical geography, economic considerations, language, religion, ethnic lines—he emphasizes that the *sentiments* of a population, its wishes and aspirations, are most important. He attempts in particular to elucidate the desires of the people in the various districts.

Obviously, Newman is interested in the various forms of Europe's nationalism. But, again, the reviewer feels that the treatment of this modern cementing phenomenon by Newman seldom brings it into the proper focus, that the treatment is often carelessly phrased, paying too much attention to some aspects and not enough to others. Take, for instance, the chapter on Czechoslovakia. Newman claims that the Czechs probably came from Ruthenia (p. 369); but the Czechs agree that their origin can be traced to southern Russia. Masaryk is to Newman a "Slovak professor" (p. 375); but on page 396 we learn that Masaryk "was the son of a Slovak father and a Czech mother, and was born in Moravia." The Czechs themselves consider Masaryk a Moravian Slovak (since he was born in Hodonin in Moravia), but more of a Czech than Slovak. Newman claims that Masaryk began in 1914 "to organize forces of

Czechs and Slovaks from American emigrants" (p. 375); actually, there were very few American Czechoslovaks in Masaryk's army, which was composed mostly of the Czechoslovak deserters from the Austro-Hungarian armies. To claim that "had the Poles stood by the Czechs, there might have been no Munich" (p. 1) is misleading supposition; Newman needs to read up on the recent admission of Hitler in regard to the plans for invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Obviously, the book is loosely written, prone to overstatement and full of assertions that are not properly substantiated. It is perhaps unavoidable, in compressing the history of Europe within one volume, to shear facts away from flat statements, make apparently arbitrary connections between causes and events, and rely to some extent on second- and third-hand digests rather than on fully detailed research. It is a readable book and full of interesting facts which are or will be in the headlines soon. Those who have never found time to go through other books on its various topics will doubtless learn from it much that they never knew. But the author has failed either to achieve a penetrating analysis of the already available facts or to make any very important contribution to them. Nor has he succeeded in writing the story of Europe's numerous brands of nationalism in spite of his obvious efforts.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

Hofstra College

The Problems of Lasting Peace. (Rev. Ed.) By HERBERT HOOVER and HUGH GIBSON. New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1943. Pp. 303, \$2.00.

Our thirty-first President and his chief diplomatic collaborator devote about two-thirds of this book to a brief survey of familiar political history since the American Revolution. The last third of the book deals with the principles upon which they think the peace should be organized after this war has run its course.

The whole analysis turns upon the notion that there have been seven dynamic forces at work in the world: ideologies, economic pressures, nationalism, militarism, imperialism, the complexes of fear, hate and revenge, and the will to peace. The authors describe the ebb and flow of these seven dynamic forces in modern history, which is divided into four periods, the 140 years before 1914, the First World War, 1918-1919, the period of the Armistice and Peacemaking, and 1919-1939. Just why modern

history was broken up in this curious fashion is not made clear.

Some points of view expressed in this book stand out. The authors rightfully ascribe a great deal of importance to the psychological factors which make for war and peace. They believe that one of the serious shortcomings of modern civilization is its attachment to materialism. They are of the opinion that the absence of the United States from the League of Nations was not a decisive reason for its failure. They make much of the refusal of France to make concessions to Bruening as an important factor in Hitler's climb to power. They believe strongly in the necessity of working out methods for achieving peaceful change in the field of international relations, and that one of the central weaknesses of the League was its inability to implement the high promise of Article XIX of the Covenant. They denounce managed economies and plead for a return to free enterprise, which is taken to mean not "*laissez faire* or capitalistic exploitation," but rather "economic freedom regulated to prevent abuse." How much regulation the economic system can take without interfering unduly with private enterprise is admitted to be a delicate question.

The book abounds in sweeping *ipse dixit*s which one may care to debate. We are told that nationalism has existed "since the dawn of civilization," and we are confidently assured that it "will continue as long as man inhabits this earth." This is bad history and risky prophecy. Again, it is remarked that "like individuals, some peoples are naturally pacific and some, naturally aggressive." This depends upon what is meant by "naturally." The authors also assert that the 1918-1919 revolutions in Germany, Hungary, and Austria "dismissed the last shreds of despotism," but that "unfortunately, they went too far and nullified much of the good that might have been achieved by more moderate measures." Many take the view that these revolutions did not go far enough. ("The Kaiser goes, the generals remain.") Furthermore, we are solemnly assured that "Fascism came to power largely as the result of middle-class despair over the failures of representative government to repel the inroads of Communism." Mussolini and Hitler went far with this myth. And again: "In France, the attempt by Blum to mix larger doses of totalitarian economics into free economy contributed to the demoralization of the country." No mention is made of the weighty contribution of the "Two hundred families" to the demoralization. One

may also care to debate this vignette from economic history: "America could have recovered from its own misdoings in a year, but with the European collapse, we were dragged into the depths of the depression." We are also informed that "Russia was expelled" from the League of Nations. The date is not given. Finally, attention should be called to the loose and uncritical use of the word "race" to describe indiscriminately racial, national, linguistic, cultural and political groups. Just what, one may ask, is meant by the "German race" or the "French race?"

The many ideas of Hoover and Gibson about a proper peace settlement seem to center around a few general propositions. Germany must be treated generously and encouraged to develop representative government. This means, *inter alia*, an immediate cessation of the blockade once the shooting stops, instant relief for the population, no dismemberment, no reparations. They also insist upon total disarmament, to be followed by a quick disarmament of the victor nations, and upon the punishment of the enemy leaders as "common criminals conspiring to murder." They emphasize the importance of economic measures: the restoration of international trade to free enterprise, with the abolition of all quotas, cartels, monopolies and special trade privileges, the achievement of monetary stability, making raw materials available to all in a free market. However, tariffs are treated with considerable tenderness. They believe that immigration should be directed to undeveloped countries, notably in South America and Africa, and for the vexing problem of mixed areas they boldly accept the "heroic remedy of transfer of populations." They favor international government for at least some of the colonial areas. Finally, they believe that the peace-making should proceed in three stages: first, "a conditional peace," instead of a military armistice, for the settlement of urgent problems; secondly, an intermediate period for the rebuilding of political life and economic recovery; and thirdly, a settlement of long-view problems.

But what about the broader political outlines of the new order of peace? Here the authors fall back upon familiar ideas; national sovereignty, self-determination, disarmament, arbitration, peaceful change. They seem to look with some favor upon the idea of regional organization, though the point is not developed with any clarity. But on the crucial issue of the nature of some future world-wide organization

they are very vague indeed. They simply say that there must be "some sort of international machinery or organization for preserving peace." The question then still remains: What sort?

DAVID FELLMAN

University of Nebraska

Europe, Russia, and the Future. By G. D. H. COLE. New York: Macmillan, 1942. Pp. 233. \$2.00.

Cole's interpretation of the inner meaning of the war will have little novelty for those who are familiar with the general thesis which he has propounded in innumerable books over a period of many years. In the present struggle, he sees an opportunity to build a European order which will have all the advantages of constructive socialism, and none of the disadvantages of Soviet Communism. To that end, he battles valiantly as always in favor of an enlightened Socialist order in which nationality as a basis for statehood will have been discarded in favor of large supra-national units which will have exclusive control of certain functions of government, leaving to traditional units only certain administrative and cultural functions.

Briefly, he proposes that Europe be divided into an enlarged Soviet Union in the East, a substantial Central European state, and a third state which would include all Western Europe. These new units would possess extensive governmental powers, but certain functions would be delegated to a supra-national authority and would be removed entirely from state control. Thus, all military force would become a monopoly of the authority, all colonial administration would be exercised by it, and, most important of all, it would have vast powers of coordinating the economic policies of the component states. For example, a state would still have the right to impose its own tariffs, but only if its proposed schedules were approved by the supra-national planning body.

The rôle of Britain in this process of reconstruction is crucial. If Britain should still be under the influence of those who wish to prop up its decaying capitalism and in consequence should turn to close association with the United States, the leadership of Western Europe will fall to France, and if France should fail the restoration of German leadership is inevitable. Therefore, the author believes that it is essential to "shake this power of British capitalism—now, while the war is in progress . . ." for this is the only basis on which there can be an

assurance of British leadership in the reconstruction of Europe.

To this reviewer, at least, Cole's book is an interesting intellectual excursion into a world which does not exist. One may argue at the intellectual level *ad nauseam* that nationality is demonstrably unsatisfactory as a basis for statehood, but this conclusion is of little practical value in a world in which the overwhelming majority of the people believe in nationality as the prime basis for political organization. Moreover, there is something vastly wrong with any analysis which disregards completely the realities of power politics. States contend with one another for something more than the assertion or preservation of a particular economic system, and these other values, which are essentially non-economic, have a determining influence upon national policies. This is elementary common sense, but the economic determinists seem convinced that it may be safely ignored.

GRAYSON KIRK

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The Christian State. By AUGUSTINE J. OSGNIACH, O.S.B. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1943. Pp. xix + 356. \$3.75.

This book is a philosophical essay on the nature and functions of the state written from the standpoint of St. Thomas Aquinas by one of his modern disciples. It is a protest against political absolutism in the name of the freedom and personal dignity of man. But unfortunately, it presents a type of social theory which would redeem man from serving "inexorably only as a cog in the machinery of the State," only to leave him a cog in the equally inexorable machinery of the Church.

The author has much that is wise and sound to say about the disastrous consequences of the divorce of economics and politics from ethics, and the natural affinity of political power systems which respect neither the integrity of the human personality nor the unity of the human community for types of social theory that would reduce everything to a naturalistic level and banish from scientific consideration the moral and spiritual values that are implicit in all human relationships. But he is less successful in his constructive contributions. A mere restatement and logical defense of the medieval doctrines of natural law and natural rights will hardly suffice as a corrective to contemporary trends. At least since Giddings many sociologists

have dissented from the relentless attacks of the extreme forms of positivism and ethical relativism of nineteenth century social theory upon all vestiges of natural law and natural rights and its reduction of morality to whatever custom approves. Giddings was confident that sociology is beginning to disclose the "natural norms of positive right," which he defined as "socially necessary norms of right enforced by natural selection in the sphere of social relations; and in the long run there can be neither legal nor moral rights which are not grounded in natural rights as thus defined," while Ellwood, Hobhouse, Cooley, Wallas, Barnes, the writer, and others, have sought to show that the material conditions of existence and the biological and psychological nature of man are such as to set certain limitations upon social conventions and institutions which they must respect at the risk of sacrificing intra- and inter-group harmony and efficiency, or even group survival itself. Only if social theory can discover such norms can it provide a basis for social guidance and hence for rational social control. But such norms must be established inductively by critical reflection upon the widest possible range of human experience. They can not, as our author supposes, be established by deduction from a metaphysical system of values exempt from free critical inquiry, revealed in the Holy Scriptures and interpreted by the Church.

For to our author the formulation of the natural law is the exclusive prerogative of the Roman Catholic Church. Although he insists that the State is as supreme in civil matters as is the Church in religious matters, yet it is the Church which determines what both civil and religious matters are. The State is "within the Church," "lower than the Church," and in any conflict of authority must yield to the Church, yet those who hold that such doctrines are detrimental to the sovereignty and independence of the State are accused of "either a crass ignorance of what the Church and her outstanding theologians have always held as a fundamental principle of political philosophy, or a sectarian hatred which attributes to the Church aims she has never claimed." But is there not a third alternative? May they not have made a realistic appraisal of the contrast between the charitable teaching of the Christian religion and its perversion by an ecclesiastical hierarchy whenever the latter has acquired sufficient temporal power to impose its own interpretation of its own interests upon the civil society?

Realistically, the deepest and most funda-

mental bond that unites men is their loyalty to the community. The State is grounded in the necessity of a unified authority to maintain social control in the community interest. No person or group can exploit its members without economic and moral injury to the community. But people living side by side can hold different beliefs and cherish different values without injury to one another, and therefore without reason for the State to interfere, or to prefer one set of beliefs and values to another. May not this cultural pluralism in America, which our author rejects as contrary to the "genuine Catholic teaching on this subject" of the relation of Church and State, account for the otherwise somewhat anomalous fact that "religious conditions in the United States are in general better and more favorable than in many Catholic countries"?

The theological and philosophical sections of the work give evidence of careful and painstaking scholarship, but its historical and scientific data are cited from secondary and tertiary sources in an inexcusably slipshod and careless manner. Two examples must suffice. In discussing the impracticability of sterilization as a means of eliminating hereditary feeble-mindedness, our author quotes Ryan's miscalculation based on Jennings' misinterpretation of Fisher's original work to the effect that "To reduce the proportion of inherited feeble-minded by only 10 percent *would* require about 68 generations or about 3,000 years." If our author had consulted the sources he would have found that Jennings' interpretation of Fisher's data (which Fisher later rejected) was to the effect that hereditary feeble-mindedness would be reduced from 1 per 1,000 to 1 per 10,000 (or 90 percent) in 68 generations. Ryan miscalculated Jennings' ratios in terms of percentages, and Osgniach quotes Ryan's error! Again, in discussing birth control Osgniach refers, without citing his sources, to "the recent proposal of Mrs. Sanger who would have a law passed making it necessary for married couples to obtain special permission from the State in order to bear a child. Moreover, the granting of such a license would hold for one child only, and the couple would have to renew their request for each additional child." This statement struck the reviewer as so contradictory to Mrs. Sanger's well-known views that he referred it to the Margaret Sanger Research Bureau for comment. He received the following reply:

"Mrs. Sanger has never urged the adoption of any law which would require special per-

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mission from the state in order to bear a child. When authors of books and pamphlets do not give the source of quotations, it would seem that they give out a statement knowing that once it is in print, it can be denied for years but will continue to be repeated because someone saw it somewhere in print. Mrs. Sanger has fought for the right of women to have children when their health and means would enable them to give those children proper care, but she has never advocated state regimentation of child bearing."

There is a Biblical injunction against bearing false witness against one's neighbor. Should it not be extended to cover the careless repetition of unsubstantiated slander?

HOWARD E. JENSEN

Duke University

The Survival of Western Culture. By RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943. Pp. xv + 304. \$3.00.

The Twilight of Civilization. By JACQUES MARITAIN. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943. pp. ix + 65. \$1.50.

These two books raise essentially the same question: Is there any hope that western culture can survive the disintegrating influences which threaten its foundations? Both authors give a cautious but affirmative reply. Both base their hope primarily on the development or resurgence of religious feelings and insights.

Flewelling's book is in part a response to what he considers "the false and misleading analogies of Spengler's *Decline of the West*." He holds that the greatest creative idea of western culture—a sense of destiny—is a linear, not a cyclical idea. Development, to be sure, is irregular; in protesting against the inevitableness of the Spenglerian cycle, Flewelling does not accept an equally inevitable evolutionism. This sense of destiny becomes a creative idea, he holds, only when it becomes cosmic, not parochial, and when it becomes associated with a doctrine of the fundamental importance of the individual. The author traces out the emergence of this doctrine in Greek thought, in Judaism, and in Christianity. He discusses the relationship of individualism to morals, law, education, science, philosophy; showing for the most part, that the civilizing power of the idea of the importance of the individual has not been realized. But, he says, the idea has survived; and therein lies the hope for the future.

Flewelling believes that the task of implementing the civilizing force of the principle

"that the person is of surpassing worth," is largely a religious task. In the discussion he rises rather often into the rarified atmosphere of conjecture, where the reviewer found himself so out of breath that he could not make the leap from Heisenberg's "principle of uncertainty," for instance, or from Planck's "quantum" theory of intermittent energy to theological conclusions. Flewelling spanned the gap easily: ". . . the universal order may be dependent upon a supervising Mind more than upon a continuously uniform energy" (p. 202).

Maritain's little book reaffirms his conviction, expressed at greater length in *True Humanism* and elsewhere, that the present debacle is the fruit of anthropocentric humanism—the cutting off of humanism from its religious dynamic: "The irrationalist tidal wave is in reality the tragic catastrophe of rationalist humanism" (p. 9).

In a brief review one may only say that the premise of both authors that the interests of civilization and democracy demand a renewed emphasis on theocentric religion is not universally shared. Both books, however, are interesting and in many ways penetrating developments of that point of view.

J. MILTON YINGER

Ohio Wesleyan University

The Republic: Conversations on Fundamentals. By CHARLES A. BEARD. New York: The Viking Press, 1943. Pp. xiii + 365. \$3.00.

By means of a series of imaginary seminars with eager citizen-students, Beard is able to present a wise exposition of the fundamentals of our republic in an attempt to resolve—or at least clarify—some of the moot political issues of our times.

The theme pervading *The Republic* has two facets, one directed backwards, historically, in an attempt to define what it is we have in our Constitution and republican form of government, the other looking forward to determine what, on the basis of this past, is possible in the way of preserving and extending the values of constitutional government.

Constitutional government, Beard holds, is dependent upon a degree of democracy, but is not synonymous with it. The essence of constitutionalism is restraint of governing power in the interests of the "fundamental rights" of the people, and this restraint is applicable to the power of democratic governments as well as that of more autocratic forms.

Beard's dialectic in support of constitutional-

ism reaches a climax in his argument that the Constitution is a sufficiently flexible instrument to permit of all necessary adjustment to take up the lag between "Our federal political machinery, devised for a simple agricultural society" and "the issues forced upon government by the needs of our great industrial nation" (p. 246).

When Beard comes to the rôle of *The Republican in the World of Nations*, he disposes of postwar world constitutions, federations, and leagues as neither effective nor feasible, and offers in way of postwar settlement a "brief and simple" ten year, renewable treaty.

The chief weakness of this work is that its scope is, of necessity, greater than Beard, for his purposes, would like it to be; as a consequence, the discussion of many problems is cut short. This is particularly noticeable in the discussion of *The Economic Underwriting of the Constitution* and in the question-begging polemic on immigration policy.

As an instructive tool for courses in what used to be called "civics," *The Republic* is unparalleled. It achieves that rare balance between scholarship and problem-directed earthliness relished by most students.

GWYNNE NETTLER

Stanford University

The Persistence of the Westward Movement and Other Essays. By JOHN CARL PARISH. With an Introduction by Dan Elbert Clark. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1943. Pp. xxii + 187. \$2.00.

This little book is a graceful and deserved compliment to an able historian whose work was cut short by death. From the brief introduction supplied by Dan Elbert Clark we learn that Dr. Parish was of Iowa birth, that he attended the State University of Iowa both as an undergraduate and as a graduate, that his historical activities ranged westward from Iowa, where he was long connected with the State Historical Society, through Colorado College, where he taught for several years, to the University of California at Los Angeles, where he was an esteemed member of the history department at the time of his death. To Parish the westward movement was not a subject of academic interest merely; it was a part of his life, and his life was a part of it.

Of the essays here collected all but two are already in print, and several are very well known. "The Persistence of the Westward Movement," which gives title to the book, is a

thoughtful commentary on the succession of frontiers that followed each first frontier. Any given "west" was far from final when it had come to be marked on the map as settled, and the growing-up process was no less significant than the process of being born. Most of the other essays also ring the changes on the western theme. Parish's approach is frankly Turnerian; for one of his background and experience to doubt that the West was of great significance in American history would have been as difficult as for one to doubt one's own existence. But Parish was more than a mere reflector of Turner's views; he was a luminary in his own right.

Several of the essays, most particularly the one on the "Intrigues of Dr. James O'Fallon," are excellent examples of the author's capacity for painstaking research. He saw and understood the inability of many early American frontiersmen to draw a clear line between loyalty and treason; he convicted the chief plotters from evidence found in unimpeachable manuscript and archival sources. The essay on "John Stuart and the Cartography of the Indian Boundary Line," never previously printed, contains as it stands much new and valuable information, but the author, had he lived, would doubtless have done more work on the subject before publishing his findings.

One could use these essays, as many will, to argue the case for or against the considerable significance of the frontier in American history. But the reviewer's opinions on this subject are already well known, and new arguments are becoming lamentably scarce. If Turner's ideas make sense, if the conquest of the continent by a race of pioneers had great meaning for them and for us, these essays are worth while—worth even reprinting—for they add to and elaborate on the Turnerian approach. But if Turner missed the boat entirely, if the only gospel worth while is the gospel according to Karl Marx, these essays are "poisonous," and the materials used in turning them into an admirable example of the book-maker's art are wholly wasted.

JOHN D. HICKS

University of California, Berkeley

Science, Philosophy, and Religion. Third Symposium. Edited by LYMAN BRYSON and LOUIS FINKELSTEIN. New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc., 1943. Pp. xix + 438. \$3.00.

The Conference responsible for this symposium has set itself the ambitious task of breaking down the barriers to understanding between the various scholarly disciplines, and also of interpreting men of affairs and scholars to one another. This mutual intelligibility it considers a prime need of contemporary civilization.

The volume before us is chiefly concerned with the problem of relative values. Thirty papers by as many authors center about this topic, besides comments by numerous critics. The contributors include theologians, philosophers, scientists, historians, educators, artists, and administrators. Space limitations do not permit a real review of the symposium or even a list of the contributions. Suffice it to say that a majority of the papers impress the reviewer as valuable, and the volume as a whole of more than ordinary interest. Walls between the various disciplines represented still stand firm, however, for all the efforts at mutual understanding. It is surprising to note, for example, that only a minority of the discussants are aware that values have a cultural basis. Evidently there is plenty of need of the liaison work to which the Conference as an organization is devoting itself.

A few papers would be noteworthy in any context. There is nothing finer in sociological literature than Lyman Bryson's "What Is a Good Society?" which lays down a cultural conception of national autonomy and of international order that far transcends the parochial views now so common. Eliot D. Chapple offers a highly significant definition of democracy as a form of interaction between administration and the "administered." David E. Lilienthal shows how the many different kinds of T.V.A. specialists could be integrated, despite extreme professional ethnocentrism, by "a strong enough, exciting enough, unifying idea." The papers of Gregory Bateson, J. M. Clark, R. M. MacIver, John U. Nef, and others also deserve comment, but space is lacking.

SEBA ELDRIDGE

University of Kansas

Naturalism and the Pioneers of American Sociology. By WILLIAM T. O'CONNOR (Catholic University of America: Studies in Sociology, Volume VII). Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1942. Pp. viii + 264.

This is a doctoral dissertation, written by a priest of the Diocese of Davenport, at Catholic University; it bears the official *nihil obstat* and

imprimatur. Under those circumstances no one should be surprised that it reports a study made from a special point of view, and one characteristic of Roman Catholic scholarship. In fact, Father O'Connor, has made a careful analysis of the writings of Ward, Giddings, Small, and Sumner, to determine the extent to which, and the way in which, their sociological conceptions were affected by "naturalism." A preliminary chapter (Chapter II) is devoted to the exposition of naturalism as it appears in the writings of a succession of great European thinkers from the Greek hylozoists through Comte and Spencer. Modern naturalism is, he finds, of three varieties: materialism, evolutionism, and positivism (p. 8, *et passim*). All of these, he further finds, involving as they do a denial or omission of all supernaturalism, are unacceptable to the Church, at least when they pretend to yield a complete or sufficient account of man, society, religion, or ethics. A final chapter attempts to re-enforce the argument as to the inadequacy of the theories of these four pioneer American sociologists. In the judgment of the reviewer, a better job might have been done, though perhaps it would not have been easy. "Naturalism" is open to criticism, if it be put forward as a philosophy and not simply as a method of study, but the criticism is not made very convincing in this monograph.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

University of Virginia

Le Droit Raciste a l'Assaut de la Civilisation
(*The Assault on Civilization by Racist Law*).

By ERNEST HAMBURGER, MAX GOTTSCHALK, PAUL JACOB, and JACQUES MARITAIN. Preface by B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch. New York, N.Y.: Editions de la Maison Française, Inc. Pp. 137.

This volume consists of four lectures presented at the annual meeting of the *Institut de Droit comparé*. The first, by Ernest Hamburger on the subject of "The Extermination of the German Jews by the Hitler Regime," reviews the methods by which the Jews of Germany have been progressively reduced in status, deported, and largely exterminated since the Nazis came to power in January, 1933. The second lecture by Max Gottschalk is a comparative study of racist legislation as it has appeared in various countries submitted to Nazi control or influence. Among these, at the time of writing, Italy had in some respects the least severe anti-Jewish legislation. The third lecture by Paul Jacob describes the application of racist legislation in France after its defeat, and

includes material on the strenuous resistance of the French people. The final lecture by Jacques Maritain on "Racist Law and the True Significance of Racism" is perhaps the most interesting and significant, both for its inherent merit and because it represents the view of an eminent Catholic philosopher. Maritain is concerned first with establishing the hostility of the Pope to racism, and then with analyzing racism as a collective psychosis made up of inferiority complexes, dreams of revenge, and feelings of persecution. Nazi anti-semitism, in particular, is regarded as essentially a *Christophobie* in which the Nazi hatred of Christianity is displaced upon the Jews as the progenitors of Christ.

EVERETT V. STONEQUIST

Skidmore College

Education and the Cultural Process. Papers Presented at Symposium Commemorating the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the Founding of Fisk University, April 29-May 4, 1941. Edited by CHARLES S. JOHNSON. Reprinted from *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 6, May, 1943. Pp. iii + 136.

This symposium of 14 papers by as many anthropologists and sociologists is concerned with the educational aspects of a number of inter-racial and inter-cultural situations ranging through the Americas and Africa. A principal aim running through the discussions is to relate the problem of formal or school education to the larger process of cultural transmission and renewal: to understand why, as Embree states, "for many students school is school and life is life and never the twain do meet." Viewpoints and proposals vary with the situations under consideration. Thus, Malinowski's analysis of cultural conflict in Africa leads him to stress the desirability of relating education more closely to the African background without necessarily isolating the African from the advantages of modern culture. Margaret Mead, in scrutinizing our own educational emphases, believes the discontinuity between school and home points to the possibility of using education as a "device for creating a new kind of world by developing a new kind of human being." Thompson's paper on plantation areas points up the limitations on education imposed by the form of political control and the practical uses which can be made of school training. Wirth shows how Jewish education has functioned to prevent acculturation and to promote

the survival of the Jewish people. Park, after making an analysis of the nature of our cultural crisis, emphasizes the need for education to build up new solidarities of feeling and understanding. Despite the somewhat generalized and loosely integrated nature of the symposium as a whole, practically all of the papers contain suggestive materials for the educator who wants to obtain cultural perspective.

EVERETT V. STONEQUIST

Skidmore College

New World A-Coming. By ROI OTTLEY. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1943. Pp. vi + 364. \$3.00.

The chapters of this book focus upon Harlem, the area of greatest Negro concentration in New York City. The book, however, is something more than an account of life in a single racial ghetto. Harlem is used, as the author says, "as a sort of test tube in which the germs of Negro thought and action are isolated, examined, and held up to full glare."

On the other hand, *New World A-Coming* is something less than its subtitle, "Inside Black America," suggests. For black America includes not only the Negro "demos" of the cities, but also the Negro folk of the Southern countryside—and a consideration of Negro folk society is not included in this volume. This accounts for the author's omission of significant developments occurring among Negroes in the South.

Mr. Ottley is a newspaperman, and in his book he is, like a good reporter, out after the news, and not the little news but the big news. He is not interested in what merely happens. He is no Negro Lincoln Steffens but, like Steffens, he is interested in something important going on, something that has a past and a future. What Mr. Ottley is really reporting on is the Negro's rôle in contemporary history. It is in New York and in our other big cities that Negroes are coming to live in the world and to respond to world-shaking events.

As Negroes with folk and peasant backgrounds have moved into the cities to enter new trades and new professions they have acquired new conceptions of themselves and new so-called racial traits. In the cities Negroes are no longer content with the old customary expectations from whites but are concerned with their rights. The lost souls among them join religious sects while others participate in social movements designed to get more jobs, restore the African homeland, or improve the status of

Negroes in American society generally. They make common cause with other suppressed colored peoples in other parts of the world and crusade for world democracy. They are forced to engage in a ruthless economic competition with each other and with the members of other races. The result of the competition is to put most of them in the slums and some of them in cafe society. All of this is described by Mr. Ottley with the skill of a seasoned newspaperman.

Always, it seems, the disadvantaged peoples of a society tend to move toward the cities where they find some measure of emancipation from old restrictions only to discover new ones. The terms of freedom have then to be consciously formulated, and in seeking to win it for themselves they have to try to win it for all. The history of the American Negro in this regard is not unique. The Negroes in our Northern cities are recapitulating the history of the Metics in Athens, the Christians in Rome, the Jews in European cities, and many other disadvantaged groups. In the turbulent life of our cities Negroes are becoming civilized as others before them have become civilized. In the cities they also are contributing to civilization.

EDGAR T. THOMPSON

Duke University

The WPA and Federal Relief Policy. By DONALD S. HOWARD. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1943. Pp. 879. \$4.00.

This volume, while completed too early to include the full statistical data on the Work Projects Administration, covers in essence the entire experience with the WPA. The analysis is concerned with the lessons learned through the operation of federal public works and other relief programs and with their application in terms of comparable programs which may be developed as post-war measures. Two major aspects of federal relief policy are analyzed, namely, the rôle of the federal government in meeting the need for general relief and federal provision of work for the unemployed. More limited in scope than the recent comprehensive report, *Security, Work and Relief Policies*, prepared under the direction of Eveline M. Burns for the National Resources Planning Board, this volume gives greater wealth of detail concerning its particular field of inquiry.

The book is carefully and logically organized into five parts: The Setting, the WPA and Its Program, Eligibility, Numbers Employed, and

The Broader Issues. Part I deals with the general problem of relief in terms of numbers and costs with an evaluation of the adequacy of general relief programs in terms both of the availability of assistance and the amount of aid given.

In the analysis of the WPA and its program, relatively little attention is devoted to actual physical accomplishments. Rather, the emphasis is placed upon the varied wage policies followed and conditions of employment. In this connection the problems created by the dual nature of the WPA program, which involved both work and relief, are summarized.

The section on eligibility covers the varied rules regarding persons eligible for employment and the relationship of the regulations both to need and to employability. This is followed by a survey of the numbers employed. The factors determining the volume of employment and the adequacy of the program in terms of numbers employed are discussed.

Part V, The Broader Issues, develops the author's program for future action to meet relief needs in the light of careful evaluation of past experience. He marshals the arguments for federal responsibility in terms of the expanding rôle of the government, the need for more equitable spreading of the costs of relief, and the advantages of federal control. Federal assumption of responsibility would include the now widely endorsed general relief program to under-gird all special programs. The public work program advocated should make employment "available to potential workers without respect to race, political consideration, residence, nationality, or economic need. . . . Restrictive policies, such as limiting employment to needy families or to family heads . . . should be avoided" (p. 844). Looking at the present and to the future, a dual work program to meet the needs both of the able-bodied unemployed and of handicapped workers is advanced.

For the social welfare theorist and for the practical social planner alike this comprehensive analysis will be highly useful. In addition to its contribution to the philosophy of federally supported public welfare, the careful documentation and well-selected material make the book a valuable reference for the factual history of the Work Projects Administration. While the author's own point of view is clearly evident, he consistently presents both sides of the numerous issues involved in federal relief policy.

ELLEN WINSTON

Meredith College

The Pillars of Security and Other War-Time Essays and Addresses. By SIR WILLIAM H. BEVERIDGE. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1943. Pp. 248. \$2.50.

This collection of papers by one of the most distinguished authorities on social security should be read by all students of the social insurances and related services. It will also be of interest to the general reader. The book is well written and proves that a social scientist can write in clear concise English without the usual overdose of technical language. Indeed, the reader will be impressed with the literary quality of these essays in spite of the complaint of the well known literary critic, Mr. Clifton Fadiman. He diagnosed the "report," "Social Insurance and Allied Services," as having been written in some obscure tongue which he called "civil service English."

Several of the points brought out in the "report" are re-emphasized in this volume. Sir William advises us "to get on with a people's war for a people's peace." Social insurance is an attack on one of the five Giant Evils, Want. The other Giants are Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, and Idleness. War-time is the ideal time to plan for the elimination of these Goliaths. "In war," declares Sir William, "the pace is set by the enemy, not by the conversion-time of whatever may be the slowest minds. . . ."

This little book also re-emphasizes the reformist spirit of its author. We are advised that social insurance enables us to use God's gifts for the benefit for all segments of society, not for the special aggrandizement of a few. Sir William is not merely an economist—he is also a philosopher and a moralist in the finest meaning of that much abused word. "A war of faith is what the world is waiting for. Don't let it wait another minute."

Likewise we are reminded that social insurance is not primarily a sound business device, a sort of giant government insurance company created as a scientific and economic means of sharing certain risks common to the working classes. To Sir William, social insurance is much more than that—it is a means of redistributing a nation's wealth.

Sir William's specific proposals, which are brought out in this volume in a more limited way than they were in his "report," are addressed to the British people. It is evident, however, that all countries have the same risks of sickness, accident, old age, lack of employment, and should develop adequate programs against them. What Sir William says, therefore,

in regard to specific plans is of interest to American citizens. Our particular systems of social security have to be hewed out of native materials, but they are designed to protect us against the same hazards as the British workers face.

The text is illustrated with a number of well chosen cartoons republished from English newspapers and magazines, six of them by Low. A brief but adequate index is of assistance to the reader who is interested in a specific point.

In conclusion, this little book is an interesting companion piece to Sir William's history-making "report," "Social Insurance and Allied Services," one of the most significant documents in the field of social policy that has been published in our generation. To read it is to renew your faith in democracy and to understand what can be accomplished for the benefit of all by the planned use of human resources.

ARTHUR P. MILES

Denver, Colorado

Kaiser Wakes the Doctors. By PAUL DE KRUIF. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943. Pp. 158. \$2.00.

This is a typical de Kruif story of the prepaid medical care plans at the Kaiser shipyards in Richmond, California, and Vancouver, Washington. An account of an earlier pioneer undertaking at Grand Coulee, also for Kaiser employees, serves as a curtain raiser. The medical hero of the story is Dr. Sidney Garfield.

The story is replete with dramatic incident centering around the none too scrupulous opposition of the medical politicians. In the end, however, the projects received the necessary professional approval through the efforts of progressive medical leaders in California and Washington. The undertakings showed that complete, unlimited medical care of the highest grade, including hospitalization, could be provided at a weekly cost of fifty cents per worker plus the industrial insurance fees for workmen's compensation care amounting to two-thirds as much. Painstaking estimates on the basis of several months' experience indicated that care of the same quality, on the usual fee basis, would cost three times as much.

This is surely a significant demonstration. Yet de Kruif makes it mean something more. In endorsing all Kaiser's ideas, he would have the reader believe that voluntary medical insurance, in the form of prepaid medical care sponsored by industry or by rural groups, may solve the problem of bringing good medical

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care within reach of the masses. Long experience with voluntary forms of insurance—old age, accident, unemployment, and sickness—here and elsewhere belies such an assumption. In line with this position de Kruif joins the industrialists and medicos in asserting that a public system of medical care would be "bureaucratic," controlled from Washington, and other horrendous things; but adds later that the Federal Government should put up much of the money for necessary clinic and hospitalization facilities. Apparently he is unaware that up to now governmental agencies have contributed incomparably more to medical and health care than industry; and that much of this care conforms to standards as high as anything industrial medicine or private practise has to show.

SEBA ELDRIDGE

University of Kansas

The Farm Bloc. By WESLEY McCUNE. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1943. Pp. 278. \$2.00.

This timely volume gives a journalistic account of the most sinister combination of pressure groups now operating in opposition to the public and national welfare. It is a simple and factual account of the agricultural and industrial organizations and commodity groups, their connections and interrelations, and something of the means by which they control legislation in the name of the farmers for their own interests. It gives some data on the character and connections of the persons—senators, congressmen, lobbyists, and others—who make up and direct the activities of the lobby.

The introductory chapters deal with the diverse interests represented in the farm bloc. In some measure operating farmers from all areas and of contradictory and overlapping interests are represented, but the big farm owners and operators and the companies that process farm products dominate the lobby and benefit from its operations. But business, operating through the agricultural division of the United States Chamber of Commerce, the Automobile Manufacturing Association, the National Manufacturing Association, and other non-agricultural units are active in the alliance. The major governmental measures involving credit, inducement payments, cash subsidies, and control of production are described and the points at which the special interest and pressure groups entered the scene are indicated. Some description is given of the condition of the agricultural population and of the efforts to bring

order and relief by parity prices. The Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Food Stamp Plan, Farm Security, and other measures are described. The Milk Lobby and its war on the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine are briefly outlined. Somewhat more detailed information is given on the development and functioning of the National Council of Farm Co-operatives, the National Grange, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and the National Farmers Union. The chapter on "The Commodity Boys" deals chiefly with the sugar lobby. Finally, brief attention is given to the relation of the United States Department of Agriculture to the producer and consumer interests.

The Farm Bloc is the type of book for which there should be no place. It contains information that should be universal in the population of a political democracy, information that would be universal if the press was moderately efficient and inclined to give readers data of vital public interest. But in the present condition Mr. McCune's book should have a far wider circulation than a useful book ever receives.

The chief value of the book to the sociologist lies in its illustrations of the natural history of legislative and institutional structures.

E. B. REUTER

University of Iowa

Rural Sociology and Rural Social Organization. By DWIGHT SANDERSON. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1942. Pp. xvii + 806. \$4.00.

This text represents the harvest of twenty-five years of teaching and research in rural sociology. The author retired from active teaching at Cornell University in October, 1943. Unlike most text-book writers, Sanderson waited until almost the very year of his retirement to publish in text-book form the product of his years of experience. How well the book will serve the needs of students and teachers in the field, only time will tell, but the prognosis is decidedly favorable.

As the title suggests, Sanderson makes a distinction between rural sociology on the one hand and rural social organization on the other. The object of the first is the "accurate description of . . . the forms of association in rural society" (12); that of the second, "advancing the welfare of rural people" (9). The first is science; the second, technology—the application of science.

The author's approach to the study of social

phenomena is "naturalistic" (3 ff.). One observes human behavior as he would the behavior of lesser animals. But he recognizes that the present state of knowledge does not permit adequate description of many types of rural social phenomena, particularly those of a psycho-social character. For this reason, only the "anatomy and gross physiology (or how structures function)" (16) can be given, and the social psychology of rural life is not treated separately because of inadequate data. Nevertheless, Sanderson has included most of the rural social-psychological data that are available, and one can only commend him for refraining from including the loose generalizations so commonly made regarding the "psychology" of farm people.

The organization of the book falls under four main divisions: Introduction; Environmental Conditions; Rural Institutions, Groups and Classes; and Rural Social Organization in Relation to the Great Society. Arrangement of text materials is always a difficult problem, and it is one which apparently troubled this author, as it has all others, although he has been more successful than most writers in finding a logical pattern. Even so, one notes the same topics discussed in different sections. For example, marital status is considered under Part II (67) and again in Part III (221); likewise, village population (55 ff. and 254 ff.). Another difficulty confronting all rural sociologists, is that of deciding what economic data to use and how to use it. Sanderson devotes nearly 100 pages to a discussion of what ordinarily is considered subject matter of agricultural economics including such topics as land tenure, credit, soil conservation, taxes and cooperative marketing and buying. The question raised here is whether these are all subject matter for a course in rural sociology, and if they should be treated as separate topics, or considered under more purely sociological rubrics. For example, one wonders why the author did not treat land tenure under the heading of "stratification" and co-operative marketing under "co-operation," both of which latter headings occur in Part IV. It would seem to the reviewer that the sociologist may and should deal with data from other fields, but only in their relation to social organization. The problem raised is not peculiar to rural sociologists.

Sanderson has, in this scholarly volume, made a contribution to rural sociology which will enjoy increasing appreciation with time, as more sociologists ponder the thought-provoking chap-

ter 2, and his clarification of concepts throughout the volume.

LOWRY NELSON

University of Minnesota

Culture of a Contemporary Rural Community. By OLEN LEONARD and C. P. LOOMIS. Washington, D.C.; Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U.S.D.A., Rural Life Studies: No. 1, 1941. Pp. 72.

This is a report on one of six communities which were studied by field workers of the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics during the year 1939. The community covered in this report is El Cerrito, a small Spanish-American village in San Miguel County, New Mexico. One of the authors lived five months, and the other three months, in El Cerrito. Both of them speak Spanish.

The study of El Cerrito is a valuable contribution to the growing literature on the Spanish-American communities of the Southwest. It deals with the history and background of the settlement, the relation of the people to the land, community organization, the expanding world of the inhabitants, and integration and disintegration in community and individual life. Each section is presented in an interesting manner and gives evidence of thorough study and keen analysis of the data. Photographs and sociometric charts add to the text of the report.

The authors consider El Cerrito as "a singular example of a group of people that has maintained its individuality in the face of ever-increasing forces that have been brought to bear upon it." The family and the church are the two institutions that have exerted the greatest influence in the integration and stability of El Cerrito. In addition, "the individual is conscious of his role as a member of the community as a whole." During the last ten years, however, the solidarity of the village has shown signs of cracking.

Studies of Spanish-American communities along the lines pursued by the authors give insight into the nature of social organization of the Spanish-Americans in the Southwest. Such studies should provide much sound information for the development of an adequate program designed to meet the needs of the members of this minority group.

SIGURD JOHANSEN

New Mexico College of A. & M. A.

Culture of a Contemporary Rural Community: Harmony, Georgia. By WALLER WYNNE.

Rural Life Studies: 6. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1943.

This is the last of a series of six studies begun in 1939. The work is presented in six sections, the first of which is a fictional account of one man's life intended as a synthesis of the findings of the study. Other sections cover the historical background of county and community, population changes and land use trends, community-life patterns, etc.

The series is presented not as a geographic sampling of rural communities, but "... as samples of, or points on, a continuum from high community stability to great instability." Harmony, Georgia is described as falling between the two extremes, and we are warned that all six studies must be read for a full understanding of the findings.

This injunction puts the reviewer at a disadvantage, for he has read only this one, and if the others are as bad as this, it is the only one he ever will read. This report is what a professor might expect as a term paper from a sophomore in a beginning course in Rural Sociology. It would rate a grade of C, possibly C plus. It is naive, immature, repetitious, badly organized, badly written, and badly printed. Nothing is said about method except that halfway through we learn that some farmers were interviewed. After 35 pages we learn, in parenthesis, that the study was made in 1940. It took six weeks. Of the 58 pages 36 are about the county, 22 about the settlement in the title. The 36 pages are a badly organized re-hash of agricultural census statistics and trends; the 22, which purport to be a sociological analysis, are mazes of naive, speculative observations not the least embarrassed by frequent contradictions and the constant use of "probably."

In view of all the fine work done in research on the South, it is difficult to understand how the U.S.D.A. could lend itself to such folly.

WALTER COUTY

University of Texas

Farm Families in the Grange: A Study on Cortland and Otsego Counties, New York. By W. A. ANDERSON. Ithaca, New York: Dept. of Rural Sociology Mimeograph Bulletin No. 7. Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, March, 1943. Pp. 38.

This is a study of farm families in two selected counties of New York State. It concerns itself primarily with participation and

its relationship to Grange membership. Comparisons are made between Grange members and those who are not Grange members on the basis of such criteria as membership in other organizations, age, stability, education, family composition, household conveniences, communication facilities, land ownership, land classification, size of farms, and family income. Grange members seem to belong to more organizations, participate more frequently in groups, be more stable, have more formal schooling, have more household conveniences and communication facilities, include a greater percentage of full farm owners, and have higher family income.

The main criticism is directed toward Anderson's method of sampling. In spite of the sample including 50 per cent of the occupied farms in Cortland County, it could still lack representativeness. His sample, for the same reason, could be still more unreliable for Otsego, where the study included only 12 percent. Anderson states that his sample is reliable because it contains adequate proportions of farms on basis of land classification. Now, this is acceptable provided the land classifications contain adequate proportions of farm families stratified with respect to age, religion, and other such factors. It might be that Anderson has done this, but he fails to state it explicitly. To say that a sample is representative on one general factor, *therefore* it is representative of a number of specific factors, can be a gross misrepresentation of the technique of sampling social data. If his sample is reliable, then Anderson's study can be made use of by rural planners attempting to stimulate group participation. Finally, Anderson seems to assume that high mobility means instability; this may or may not be true.

DOUGLAS G. MARSHALL

University of Wisconsin

Family Situations: An Introduction to the Study of Child Behavior. By JAMES H. S. BOSSARD and ELEANOR S. BOLL. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943. Pp. viii + 265.

The student of sociological method should find much stimulus to thought and discussion in the many questions contained in this small volume. Bossard advances his thesis in the five chapters of Part I, of the prime importance of the "situational approach" in the analysis of human behavior, and in particular of the family group. Social situations, he says, "just as social

institutions and various other organized data in Sociology," can be regarded and studied from the three angles of structure, process and cultural content, with cultural content perhaps the basic aspect. While he has much to say of the situational approach in general, Bossard stresses family situations as of primary concern because here is where analysis should begin. "Once the situational approach to human behavior is made, the primary importance of the family becomes evident at once; once social situations come to be studied with complete objectivity, such analysis should begin with family situations." This is so because of the paramount importance of family situations in "the determination of personality patterns and human behavior," and also because family situations "offer the best opportunities for the development of the technique which their objective analysis necessitates" (p. 40). Once we have objective analyses of family situations there is the need for classification.

Mrs. Boll, writing in Part II, dwells concretely upon the problems of classification in science. She presents a scheme of classification of family situations of a most interesting kind, which she goes on to develop and give graphic content to from a survey of the literature in the field covering the past fifteen years.

In the concluding chapter Bossard makes a special case for sociology (assuming it to include social psychology) as "the one appropriate and available science" to assume responsibility in the study of the situational approach. He believes this approach to have promise of becoming the distinctive sociological field. The situational approach, on its part, needs the specialized contribution which sociological analysis can give.

The volume is second in a series to be published by the William T. Carter Foundation for Child Helping of the University of Pennsyl-

vania. A comprehensive bibliography is appended.

KATHARINE DU PRE LUMPKIN

Institute of Labor Studies
Northampton, Mass.

Contraception and Fertility in the Southern Appalachians. By GILBERT WHEELER BEEBE. Published for the National Committee on Maternal Health, Inc. Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Company, 1942. Pp. xii + 274. \$2.50.

Contraception and Fertility in the Southern Appalachians is concerned with the extent to which birth control practices can be encouraged among rural women of high fertility. A sample of 1,300 families in Logan County, West Virginia, and their reactions to contraceptive services available from June, 1936, to August, 1939, form the basis for the analysis. The problems found in Logan County are assumed to be useful as a basis for generalizations concerning the entire Southern Appalachian region. The high fertility of the group prior to the availability of contraceptive services was found to be due directly to lack of, or inefficient, birth control practices. The younger, better educated, and economically more secure couples were most interested in limitation of family size. There was surprisingly little objection to contraceptive services on moral or religious grounds. Perhaps the major contribution of the study with respect to clinical service in general is the emphasis upon the fact that a single prescribed method will not adequately meet the needs of all patients. There is great need for more diversified contraceptive service.

The appendix summarizing the methodology of studies in clinical contraception and the well-selected bibliography add to the value of the book.

ELLEN WINSTON

Meredith College

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